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Abstract 
 
 
 
It is often assumed that the concept of the event provides an alternative way of 
thinking about processes of political transformation compared to Hegelian and 
Marxist notions of linear, progressive historical development. Politics of the Event 
after Hegel argues that the distinction is in fact much more subtle; showing how a 
concept of the event has been tacitly included in this philosophical tradition from its 
very inception. Tying together a lineage of Hegel, Marx and Lenin, and the 
contemporary French theory of Althusser, Badiou and Meillassoux, the investigation 
shows that they share the same desire to conceptualise novelty-bearing events 
which limit foresight about processes of historical development. At the same time, 
all six chapters show these thinkers struggling to maximise the novelty-bearing 
capacity of events whilst simultaneously warding against the appearance of 
authoritative knowledge. Exploring the tension between authority and novelty in 
their ideas of the event, the thesis concludes that these are essential categories for 
any future conceptualisations of social, political and economic change within a 
ruptural paradigm. 
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Preface and Acknowledgements 
 
 
The origins of this thesis lie in the studies I undertook during my Masters’ degree. 
While pursuing a specialism in Middle East politics at the School of Oriental and 
African Studies in London, I became fascinated by the Iranian revolution: the most 
populist revolution in human history. At the same time, I had begun to read Alain 
Badiou’s Being and Event in order to get a better grip on the philosophy of this titan-
like figure whose book promised, intriguingly, a conception of novelty-bearing 
events grounded rigorously in mathematics. The two interests converged. The more 
I learnt about the Iranian revolution, the more it seemed to support the notion of 
political change relying upon contingent explosions of political activity outside of 
normal modernist accounts of historical progress. On the other hand, the Iranian 
revolution appeared to impose itself as a limit-case for conceiving of political change 
as the result of emancipatory flashes. The event of 1979 may have been the most 
widely participated-in revolution in human history, but it also took less time for it to 
degenerate into a vehicle for reaction than had any previous revolution. Arguably by 
1982 things were already unwinding: Ayatollah Khomeini had crushed alternative 
currents within the revolution, the factory shurahs had been dissolved, and a 
semblance of normality has been re-established, generally at the loss of a great deal 
of freedom for women.  
 Was this an event or not then? In a commonsense categorisation, undeniably 
yes. Everything that is to be expected from a revolution was there: masses on the 
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streets, splits in the institutions of state, the fall of the government, and so on. 
Judged along a Badiouian vector of novelty production, too, although Khomenei’s 
movement could be subsumed under the rubric of ‘fundamentalism’, such a move 
would fail to account for the historically unprecedented fusion of government with 
Islam in the establishment of a grand jurist, or for the dramatic realignment of post-
revolutionary foreign policy. Yet in an equally faithful adoption of Badiou’s 
framework, no could be a plausible response. Unlike the 1917 Russian revolution, 
Iran’s revolution did not trigger a wave of subsequent revolutionary movements in 
an appreciable fashion to the way in which so many 20th century revolutionaries 
owed their loyalties to the Bolshevik model. If it was an event, it seemed more 
singular and ephemeral than even Badiou’s theory could account for. In the case of 
Iran, I saw Badiou’s theory come frustratingly close to being one which could make 
sense of the event, yet ultimately come unstuck in the messy details.  
Despite this setback, what was nonetheless apparent was that Badiou’s idea 
reflected something of a sea change in how we conceive of historical and political 
change. In place of the teleological and progressive notions of historical 
development associated with Marxism was a new focus on interruptions, ruptures, 
revolutionary flashes and revolts, all of which seemed to offer little more than a 
contingent possibility that the social and political order can be refashioned.  No 
telos, no culmination of existing tendencies, no guarantees of progress. In my 
Masters’ thesis, then, rather than seeking to use Badiou’s theory to somehow 
explain the Iranian revolution, I instead focused on this distinction. I located 
analogous conceptions to the divide between the classical Hegelian and Marxist 
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notions of historical change and the more Badiouian notion of evental change in the 
differences separating the philosophies of Morteza Mottahari and Ali Shariati, two 
influential ideologues of the Iranian revolution. In the work of the former, the Shia 
jurist Mottahari, I saw something closer to the cumulative notion of history 
associated with Hegelianism and Marxism, whereas in the ideas of the latter thinker, 
Shariati, I perceived something closer to that of Badiou’s idea of the event (not 
coincidentally it should be pointed out, since like Badiou Shariati was influenced by 
Sartre).  
By the time I started to develop the PhD my interest in the Iranian revolution 
waned and the focus on Iran was eventually dropped from the project altogether. 
What I took away from my early studies, however, and what led to the architectonic 
of this PhD, was the need to get precisely at what if anything separates the two 
notions of historical change that I had previously taken from granted could be set up 
dichotomously. As things transpired, getting at the nub of the difference would be 
an arduous task involving a rigorous study of the primary sources. The rest of this 
manuscript presents the results of the ‘theoretical detour’ which followed. 
Although this preamble makes it sound as if there was a smooth, continuous 
development of ideas culminating in the present work, in reality things came 
together in a somewhat more piecemeal fashion than can be satisfyingly retold ex-
post facto. I could, for example, mention the 5,000 words I wrote on Aquinas’ idea 
of the event that somehow seemed to fit into the project at one time, or the 
discussion of Heidegger that was subsequently dropped, and which in the PhD’s final 
form would seem to have no obvious place. Equally so, there is no sense in which at 
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any point in the project’s development any kind of event could account for its final 
structure. Rather, and as with most things in life, a confluence of disparate people 
and circumstances led to its realisation. At this point it seems appropriate to 
mention some of those names. 
First and foremost, I need to express my gratitude to my PhD supervisor, 
Professor Nathan Widder. Without Nathan’s faith in me from the start it would have 
been impossible to secure the Reid Studentship at Royal Holloway which supported 
me through the crucial first three years of my research. It is unlikely that a project 
such as mine would have ever secured the support of a government funding body in 
the current climate: a time in which the rubric of social impact is stressed ever more 
greatly to the detriment of experimental approaches in philosophy and political 
theory. Nathan’s open-minded approach to scholarship and the College’s financial 
support was therefore indispensible for making this study happen. His trust in me 
meant that I had the freedom to follow my instinct (even when it led me astray) and 
to pursue some seemingly obtuse angles in approaching my research question. As 
with most productive intellectual relationships we did not always see eye to eye, 
especially at the start. But during the course of my PhD we came to understand one 
another’s positions and to appreciate better the merits of the parallel theoretical 
canons we work on.   
After this I must thank my parents, Lynne and Steven Coombs, for their 
tireless support of my studies. Without their belief and support it would have been 
difficult to complete the PhD. I must thank in equal measure my wife, Sandra 
Preciado, who was researching her PhD at the same time. She deserves my gratitude 
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for her patience and consideration during these years. Although we frustrated one 
another with adding to ever-growing piles of paperwork occupying our small living 
space in London, the lion’s share of responsibility for filling up bookshelves with 
burdensome texts falls on me. Throughout my research numerous other people 
assisted and helped. Luke Fraser deserves a special mention for the inexplicably 
generous way he guided me through Paul Cohen’s theory of forcing, and for 
checking the drafts of this section of the thesis. I must thank my viva panel 
members, Dr. Alberto Toscano and Dr. Iain MacKenzie, for their close reading of my 
PhD manuscript. After hearing many horror stories about PhD examinations, it was a 
pleasant surprise to find my own one passing by quickly and enjoyably as a 
consequence of their challenging, intelligent, and sharp questions – all signs that 
they had read the text in great detail. Their recommendations for revisions were 
difficult to disagree with, and although relatively minor they have added to the 
fluency of the final text. Other names deserving of a special mention are my friends 
Robert Farnan, Pepijn van Houwelingen, Amin Samman, Nick Srnicek, and Alex 
Williams. There are unfortunately many other names that could be added to this list 
if it were not for the demands of brevity and the need to draws lines somewhere or 
another, no matter how arbitrary. 
 
 
Nathan Coombs 
 
Bath, U.K., July 2013
11 
 
Introduction 
 
 
knowledge, power, and political transformation 
 
 
 
This thesis is about theories of political change. It is about the metaphysical ideas 
used to understand riots, revolts and revolutions. It is about events. More precisely, 
it is about how theorists in the Marxist tradition after Hegel have brought science to 
bear in conceptualising them. It is about the tension pervading all of Marxist thought 
between an evolutionary notion of historical change and an expectation, indeed 
implacable need for, a theory of sudden transformative revolutions. It is not a neat 
story. It is neither one of gradual theoretical improvement, nor one of a fall from 
pristine origins. Although the selection and ordering of thinkers in this thesis is 
guided by genealogical considerations, this is not a classical work of genealogy. The 
chapters which follow instead engage in immanent critique of six thinkers across 
two lineages; the emphasis being on teasing out the difficulties harboured by (1) 
orthodox Hegelian-Marxism and (2) Althusserian-inspired theories of the event. On 
route, Marxism will be rescued from its clichéd representation as an historicist 
doctrine, but then charged with suffering from some of its ills. Then Louis Althusser’s 
idea of the event will be credited for breaking from the shackles of Hegelian 
Marxism, but considered to lack an adequate theory of historical judgement. This 
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thesis thus aims to unpack the stakes of ideas of the event in both the classical 
Hegelian-Marxist tradition and in the Althusserian-inspired contemporary lineage. 
Why were these ideas forged? How have they changed? What problems have they 
faced? Two categories in particular – novelty and authority – we will claim make 
sense of these difficulties. And these categories, we will also conclude, remain 
essential for any future understanding of historical change through events. 
 These themes will be expanded upon. But it is necessary to begin by 
addressing a common misconception: namely, that the category of the event is alien 
to Hegelian-Marxist ideas about political transformation. Indeed, not just alien. 
Moreover, a concept defined in its essence as an alternative to these theories of 
change. Understanding why this oversimplifies matters will serve as a gateway into 
the truly intractable dilemmas posed by our theorists’ ideas of the event. For 
although wrongheaded, the dichotomy between Hegelian-Marxist historicism and 
eventalism is at least an attempted response to a most difficult question: what is an 
event? 
 
Philosophies of the event are today numerous. They include theologies of the 
event,1 phenomenologies of the event,2 analytic metaphysics of the event,3 and 
                                                 
1
 John Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2006.) 
 
2
 Claude Romano, Event and World, trans. Shane Mackinlay (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2009.) 
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continental theories of the event. Despite their differences, they are united by a 
guiding idea: that we need to orient ourselves towards the contingent singularities 
responsible for change. Within the continental tradition, one of the more famous 
eventalisms is Martin Heidegger’s, whose notion of Ereignis, the event of 
appropriating language, is irreducible to any cause-effect schema. Well known too is 
Gilles Deleuze’s vitalist immanence where, "life is everywhere ... carrying with it the 
events and singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects."4 Once 
we go beyond these theorists’ shared identification of the event with becoming, 
however, attempts to flesh out the concept reveal just how nebulous it can be. A 
preponderance of eventalisms has not clarified what is meant by an event. 
Depending on the theorist in question, events can be rare or ubiquitous, inscribed 
into metaphysical reality or the result of a historically contingent decision. If one had 
to formulate a lowest common denominator, it would probably assume the form of 
a tautology such as ‘an event is what happens when something happens.’  
An exception is political theory. Here philosophies of the event find a shared 
footing in opposition to Hegelian and Marxist teleology, obtaining a clear identity 
through their determinate negation of their mutual foe. The following contrast 
should therefore be familiar: on the one side, the philosophies of the event open to 
                                                                                                                                           
3
 For a survey of analytic metaphysics of the event see Peter Simmons, “Events” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Metaphysics, eds. Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003.) 
 
4
 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life, trans. Ann Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 
29. 
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the singular and the transitory; and on the other, mechanical Marxist teleology.5 The 
former sensitive to the contingent; the latter directed towards necessity. The former 
pictured as a series of points; the latter as a line curving upwards and onwards. 
Jacques Derrida manages to capture most of these distinctions in a single, 
condensed sentence: 
 
Is there not a messianic extremity, an ... ultimate event (immediate 
rupture, unheard-of interruption, untimeliness of the infinite surprise, 
heterogeneity without accomplishment) [which] can exceed, at each 
moment, the final term of a phusis, such as work, the production, and 
the telos of any history.6 
 
For Derrida, who might as well be speaking on behalf of most political eventalists, 
philosophies of the event disinvest history from guarantees of progress; they help 
undo the bewitching spell of modernist narratives to redirect our imagination 
towards liberating ruptures without final cause. Against the Marxist grand narrative, 
sensitivity to events allows us to suspend our spontaneous identification of history 
progressively improving, tending asymptotically towards its conclusion. It is in this 
tenor that prominent American political theorist, William Connolly, stakes his flag to 
                                                 
5
 A recent example: Andrew Gibson, Intermittency: The Concept of Historical Reason in Recent French 
Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011).  
 
6
 Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx: the state of the debt, the work of mourning, and the New 
international, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), 45. 
 
15 
 
the eventalist mast: “Events startle, provoke and energize; they can also disturb, 
defeat, alienate and sow resentments. They, therefore, form part of the very 
essence of politics.”7 Andrew Gibson, more explicitly, seeks to render the dichotomy 
between Hegelian-Marxist philosophies of history and the evental paradigm as the 
grounds for an alternative politics sensitive to randomness and surprise: 
 
The ‘solar view of history’, which sought to think or view history whole, from 
above, is deﬁnitively in ruins. The mind can no longer apprehend a historical 
design. The modern question ...  is rather, ‘How may we let ourselves be 
affected by the haphazard character of history and the seeds of new 
beginnings’?8  
 
The call is repeated elsewhere in political theory discourse. In his thesis on the role 
of events in International Relations, Tom Lundborg remarks that it is high-time the 
discipline turn its attention to their theoretical examination.9 Iain MacKenzie, 
likewise, directs a similar demand towards political theorists, when he writes that 
what is required is “an account of political events qua events.”10  In each case, either 
implicitly or explicitly, the turn towards thinking change through events is motivated 
by attempting to extricate the political imagination from teleological schemas. As 
                                                 
7
 William Connolly, “The Politics of the Event”, The Contemporary Condition, 3 April 2011. Available 
at: http://contemporarycondition.blogspot.co.uk/2011/04/politics-of-event.html [Accessed 20 July 
2013]. 
 
8
 Andrew Gibson, “Thinking Intermittency”, Textual Practice, Vol. 23, No. 6 (2009), 1051. 
 
9
 Tom Lundborg, Encountering the ‘Event’ in International Politics: Gilles Deleuze, ‘9/11’, and the 
Politics of the Virtual, PhD thesis, University of Aberystwyth (2008). 
 
10
 Iain MacKenzie, “What is a Political Event?”, Theory and Event, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2008). 
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Lundborg stresses, a focus on events “escapes the idea of a predetermined goal and 
stays open to different forms of creations and transformations.”11 Only by making a 
move away from progressive, historical thinking to one in tune with the potential of 
interruptive singularities, can we grasp the temporalities of political transformation 
which mark our present age. Only by letting go of the old Hegelian and Marxist tales 
of historical consummation can we start thinking about what properly eventalist 
political interventions might look like. 
So far, so familiar. But this thesis intends to complicate things. For within this 
framework it would be easy to presume that Hegelian-Marxism, especially, has a 
peculiar inability to appreciate events. In this representation, Marxism’s focus on 
the total historical process seems to come at the expense of appreciating singular 
becomings. Yet in reality Marxism has never been blind to events. In fact, if there is a 
discourse of political change singularly attentive to the importance of crisis, revolt 
and revolution, this is it. What makes the classical Hegelian and Marxist approach 
distinct – or so outmoded political eventalists might say – is rather the way in which 
it embeds its appreciation of events as an unfolding taking place upon the historical 
stage. The difference is tangible. For even if one rejects the portrayal of Marxism as 
a deterministic faith in history driving forward towards communism,12 it is still true 
that it has always looked towards those historical tendencies where the germ of the 
                                                 
11
 Tom Lunborg, “The Becoming of the ‘Event’”, Theory and Event, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2009). 
 
12
 An overview and series of critical reflection upon these representations of Marxism as a messianic 
secular theology, particularly within Cold War literature, can be found in Alberto Toscano, Fanaticism: 
On the Uses of an Idea (London and New York: Verso, 2010), Chapter 6 ‘The Cold War and the 
Messiah’. 
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future can be discerned. Part of Marxism’s appeal follows from its capacity to 
discern the limitations of the present in order that this critical consciousness can 
help actualise a new future. Events will always happen – but for Marxism truly 
revolutionary events have to be made to happen. And this is possible not because 
history is rolling out on a track towards utopia, but because possibilities exist in one 
mode of production to intuit the possibility of succession. Therein lies Marxism’s 
optimism: events can be made to realise their potential as long as one grasps their 
traversal by an arrow of historical possibility.  
There remain further differences, however, between the tendential 
approach of Hegelian Marxism and the eventalisms which hope to supersede this 
concept of change. These differences go some way to explaining why a prevailing 
pessimism about transition to post-capitalism has led to such theories falling out of 
favour. It is in this context, and by speaking to an audience sympathetic to the 
Marxist critique of present, that alternative philosophies of the event like Alain 
Badiou’s and Quentin Meillasoux’s have risen in prominence, becoming some of the 
most beguiling (and also perplexing) ideas in continental philosophy. As Badiou 
portrays it in his magnum opus, Being and Event, events erupt unpredictably out of 
an inconsistent ontological void: their potential only effectuated through an 
experimental process carried out in the wake of their unpredictable becoming.13 
After the fall of really existing socialism, since which time alternative projects like 
the alter-globalization movement have foundered amidst the recrudescence of 
                                                 
13
 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London and New York: Continuum, 2005) 
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global capitalist hegemony,14 the notion that contingent events can unleash hitherto 
unsuspected novelties is undeniably seductive. We may have given up hope in the 
arrow of history, but, Badiou’s philosophy of the event assures us, deep within all 
systems lurk inconsistencies waiting to erupt, offering the perpetual promise of 
change.  
For these reasons, ideas of the event like Badiou’s also tend to invite 
suspicion. Whereas traditional Marxist theories of change are grounded in concrete 
political and economic processes, Badiou’s ontological notion of dramatic ruptures 
seems to bear more in common with theology than the secular, egalitarian project 
his theory is supposed to serve. Events appear like miracles dealt by divine grace to 
disrupt the humdrum repetition of earthly inequity.15 Given that the imperative of 
Marxism has always been to change the world, and not just to wait for its 
spontaneous combustion, it seems hard to explain how the stress placed on the 
radical novelty released by unpredictable events can be seen in any kind of lineage 
with Marxist ideas. Problems of continuity can lead to the impression that we are 
dealing with incommensurable theories of political transformation. Therefore, in 
                                                 
14
 Recently many on the left have sensed greater hope in the ‘Arab Spring’ and Occupy Wall St. 
Movement; yet the ambiguous nature of these political events means that a lot of these hopes seem 
to be invested in their evental possibilities to upset the coordinates of the status quo and give rise to 
political procedures that might eventually engage in more determinate negation of capitalism. (See 
for example Slavoj Žižek, The Year of Dreaming Dangerously (London and New York: Verso, 2012) and 
Alain Badiou, The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings (London and New York: Verso, 
2012.))  
 
15
 Daniel Bensaïd, “Alain Badiou and the Miracle of the Event” in Think Again: Alain Badiou and the 
Future of Philosophy, ed. Peter Hallward (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 94-105. 
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attempting to get to the bottom of just what separates Hegelian-Marxist ideas about 
events and more contemporary notions, great care has to be taken. The idea that 
Hegelian-Marxism is blind to events will not do; but neither will any assertion of an 
unbroken continuity between the traditions.  
Indeed, the problem only becomes more pronounced once we consider the 
variety of theoretical traditions emerging in the 20th century that have shared roots 
to Hegelianism and Marxism, but which have branched off in different directions. 
There is the deconstructive tradition, following Sartre, which is imbued with a 
critical spirit that many have seen as allied to Marxism’s emancipatory goals, and 
which in Derrida’s hands ends up placing the event as a central transformative 
category. Then there is Deleuze for whom the event was crucial for thinking change 
and which has given birth to an extensive secondary literature. Like Derrida, Deleuze 
planned to write a late career text on Marx, and we can only speculate about to 
what extent his idea of the event would have infused his reflections on the subject. 
Then there is the somewhat more orthodox pathway that takes us from Antonio 
Gramsci through to Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of ‘radical democracy’. Although the 
event is not an explicitly articulated category for them, it could be possible, with 
enough effort, to piece together how political transformation brought about 
through the establishment of hegemony is articulated, in the final instance, around a 
notion of the event. 
The genealogical possibilities are numerous. In seeking to understand both 
the continuities and differences between Hegelian-Marxist and contemporary 
theories of the event, the task is bedevilled by the heterogeneity of the heterodoxy. 
20 
 
This is why, in addition to its focus on the orthodox tradition, this thesis 
concentrates on just a single lineage within contemporary French theory: that set in 
motion by Louis Althusser and carried through by Alain Badiou and Quentin 
Meillassoux. The reasons for this choice are threefold. First, the idea of the event in 
this tradition is the most rigorously theorised of all the heterodox branches of 
critical thought. No other theory of the event formalises the event as such an 
integral part of an epistemological and ontological system. Second, the idea of the 
event in this lineage has perhaps the most in common with revolutions as normally 
understood. Whereas, say, for Deleuze events are a prior metaphysical reality 
preceding identity, and hence are ubiquitous in all processes of change, for 
Althusser, Badiou and Meillassoux, events are rare occurrences. They are specifically 
historical or world-changing events that correspond to the kind of dramatic shifts we 
already tend to identify with revolutions. Third, this lineage has an internal 
hermeneutic loop similar to the one between Hegel, Marx and Lenin in the orthodox 
tradition. Althusser, Badiou and Meillassoux represent an informal teacher-student 
lineage, and the influences are not hard to discern. All, similarly, reference back and 
forward to orthodox thought, in order to affirm, improve or negate key parts of it. 
This makes for a productive hermeneutic exchange between the two traditions. 
Hence, this thesis seeks to challenge prevailing wisdom about the determinate 
negation grounding contemporary notions of the event against those of the 
Hegelian-Marxist tradition by adopting a focus on the Althusserian-inspired lineage. 
This approach, we claim, allows us to best throw into relief the continuities and 
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differences between orthodox and contemporary notions of political 
transformation. 
 But let it be stressed again, the contention here is that there is an idea of the 
event stretching back to Hegelian-Marxist tradition. The challenge, accordingly, is to 
try to explain what animated its change in form through the Althusserian lineage to 
the point today where it could be misrecognised as a novel concept in absolute 
distinction to its Hegelian origin. That the idea of the event should now rise to the 
status of an exalted category – in its most excessive form, absolutised as a cosmic 
hyper-chaos by Badiou’s student Quentin Meillassoux16 – has an explicable, albeit 
convoluted, intellectual history which it is possible to make sense of through 
genealogical reconstruction.  If, then, for the time being we grant that no absolute 
line of demarcation separates Marxist theories of change and the eventalisms often 
taken as their antitheses, the question this thesis considers is not solely ‘can 
Hegelian-Marxism be reconciled with contemporary, Althusserian-inspired 
philosophies of the event?’ but moreover: How have ideas of these ideas of the 
event changed?17 This how also beckoning towards the question of why? For to 
                                                 
16
 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2008) 
 
17
 What is Marxist philosophy? The question is not as easy to answer as might be expected. After all, 
the term implies a far from an innocent endeavour. Associated on the one hand with Stalinist 
dialectical materialism (the master discourse of Party authority in the Soviet Union), or on the other 
with quietist Western Marxism defaulting to revulsion with modernity (Adorno’s refusal to support 
the student protests in ’68 being emblematic of its political failure), even the last great defender of 
Marxist philosophy, Louis Althusser, declared the project a dangerous misnomer by the end of his 
career. (“Portrait of the Materialist Philosopher” in Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-
1987, trans. G.M.Goshgarian, eds. F. Matheron & O. Corpet (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 
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simply describe the changes is one thing, but to explain these changes as 
adaptations made in response to impasses within Marxist theory is to offer an 
appreciation of the stakes of ideas of the event as they relate to theories of 
revolutionary change more generally.  
With respect to the genealogies this thesis focuses upon – in Part I, the 
orthodox line running from Hegel, through Marx and Lenin, and in Part II the 
heterodox lineage running from Althusser, through Badiou and Meillassoux – our 
primary contribution is to locate a break between those crafted out of Hegelian 
ontology and Louis Althusser’s anti-Hegelian interventions of the mid-1960’s. As we 
shall see, the problem provoking this break is that of the inability of Hegelian-
inspired dialectical materialism to properly conceptualise a novelty-bearing event. 
One of the most lasting contributions of Althusser and his successors is the way they 
diagnosed with great acuity this problem with historicist ontology and therefore 
                                                                                                                                           
291.) His long time collaborator, Étienne Balibar, one of the most famous ‘Marxist philosophers’ alive 
today, likewise claimed by the mid 90’s that “there is no Marxist philosophy and there never will be.” 
(The Philosophy of Marx, trans. Chris Turner (London and New York: Verso, 1995), 1.) Of all the 
thinkers we devote chapters to in this thesis only two – Lenin and Althusser – could be said to have 
explicitly engaged in Marxist philosophy; and even then, the former only occasionally (in form of 
critiques and fragments of philosophical commentary) and the latter only temporarily (Althusser 
would describe his project as a “philosophical detour” by the mid 1970’s). (“Is it Simple to be a 
Marxist in Philosophy?” [1975] in Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists, ed. 
Gregory Elliott (London and New York: Verso, 2011), 213.) The only other possible candidate for the 
title of Marxist philosopher within this thesis, Alain Badiou, although retaining a residual connection 
to Marxism via his emphasis on political militancy, provides an ontology so completely subtracted 
from determinations rooted in political economy that most, including Badiou, shy away from calling it 
Marxist philosophy. Nevertheless, it is in the loosest sense of philosophies created by theorists 
responding to impasses within Marxism that we will use the term.  
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rejected situating events within a linear concept of historical change, as in classical 
Hegelian Marxism.  
But this invokes a further crucial question: namely, why is novelty such a 
consistent desideratum for Marxist thinkers? After all, in Marxism’s classical form 
bringing to fruition existing tendencies within capitalism – indeed their release from 
the social limits imposed by capitalist relations of production – appears to indicate 
acceleration as a more primitive ontological condition for change. Yes, Marxism 
always beckoned towards a new world, so was always in some sense aspiring 
towards the new; but why ideas of the event focused on conceiving change in the 
form of leaps, breaks, ruptures and scissions whereby the novelty released is 
supposed to break from its process of emergence in the existing social order? To 
answer this one needs to have at one’s disposal means by which to uncover and 
trace Hegelian-Marxist ideas of the event along this particular axis: a way to critically 
reconstruct where ideas of the event come from, why they were forged, and what 
problems they encountered. This thesis offers three triadically organised hypotheses 
to assist this project. The first provides the categories (novelty and authority) acting 
as a fulcrum for the execution of the entire project, with the latter two hypotheses 
elaborating upon the problems they raise for the orthodox Hegelian-Marxist lineage 
(Part I of this thesis: Chapters 1-3) and the Althusserian-inspired tradition (Part II of 
this thesis: Chapters 4-6). The rest of the introduction will lay out these hypotheses 
and in so doing give a flavour both of the thesis as a whole and the arguments 
forwarded by the specific chapters. 
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Novelty against authority 
 
The first hypothesis attempts to understand the compunction behind Marxist ideas 
of the event. It acts as a background condition for the structure of this thesis, aiming 
to provide a rationale for why revolution was translated within Hegelian-Marxist 
philosophy into a concept of a novelty-bearing rupture dividing pre and post 
revolutionary worlds into discontinuous orders of knowledge. What our hypothesis 
suggests is that in both the Hegelian and Althusserian-inspired lineages novelty can 
be profitably understood as a way of delimiting the intellectual authority of 
communist theorists in order to prevent knowledge as power dominating processes 
of political change. In the idea of the event, we claim, one of its animating impulses 
is the demand for a concept of rupture whereby the knowledge used to help make 
revolution is circumscribed by the capacity of the revolutionary event to inflict an 
epistemic caesura. The concepts used to understand the tendencies within class 
dynamics, the mechanisms of capitalist exploitation, and the strategic imperatives 
for successfully realising revolution; all these are dramatically diminished in their 
purchase on understanding the world by the novelty released by the revolutionary 
event. Or to put it in a different way, the guiding hypothesis of this thesis is that 
from the beginning the idea of the event has served as a functional response to the 
problem of intellectual authority. Power over political movements gained through 
theoretical mastery is what the idea of the event is supposed render inoperative. 
The future, the idea of the event wagers, is open. It is not bound by any existing 
expert or authoritative knowledge over economic processes or historical tendencies. 
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The people, not scientists, theoretical authorities, political leaders, or any others 
claiming to wield specialist knowledge, have control over the post-revolutionary 
landscape. This is why the event is pregnant with emancipatory potential. As well as 
possessing the capacity to upset existing social relations it also limits knowledge as 
power. 
Why the need to curtail knowledge?  The crux of the problem is as follows: if 
there is one thing which distinguishes Marxism compared to other radical political 
ideologies it is the stress it places on the need for revolutionary theory to bring 
about sweeping social change.18 As a result of the pre-eminence of theory for 
practice, no matter how deep Marxist knowledge is embedded within the working 
classes an intellectual hierarchy emerging from the conceptual labour to ascertain 
correct ideas can accompany, if not be entirely coupled with, the rise of a political 
vanguard (quite frequently those who can master theory most comprehensively will 
also rise to positions of political influence).19 In other words, a political economy of 
                                                 
18
 Against those theories that would seek to resolve the problem through ‘flat’ concepts of praxis, 
although we readily acknowledge the circularity between ideational generation and political practice, 
in our view the two cannot be adumbrated together without losing a grip on the efficacy of either 
process. Whether or not particular theorists have been willing to acknowledge the autonomy of 
theory to the extent that Althusser staked his reputation upon, in our opinion any properly Marxist 
theory should be seen as irreducible to mere experimentation in response to strategic impasses. 
Pragmatism from below, this is to say, has never been adequate to realise Marxism’s revolutionary 
ambitions. We concur with Lenin in What is to Done? (V.I. Lenin, “What is to be Done?” in Essential 
Works of Lenin, Ed. Henry M. Christman (New York: Dover Books, 1987)) and Althusser in For Marx 
(Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London and New York: Verso, 2005) that practice 
without theory degenerates into opportunism. 
 
19
 This issue has already been identified: from 19th century adversaries like Mikhail Bakunin to 20th 
century sympathisers like Alfred Sohn-Rethel. In the case of Bakunin’s quarrel with Marx, a source of 
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knowledge has to be taken into account as well as more conventional problems 
associated with vanguardism. Although this mastery of theory might be credibly 
taken as a process whereby truth emerges through a rational battle of ideas, once it 
intersects with prognoses on the means and ends of political struggle the question it 
points towards is how Marxism can avoid reduplicating the idea of Platonic 
philosopher kings, who, in Plato’s Republic, need merely to wait for the contingent 
event (for Marxism, class struggle boiling over into revolt) in order to found a new 
society based upon theoretical knowledge?20  
Our hypothesis is that this problem was intuited from the very founding 
documents of Marxism and just increasingly formalised as time went on through 
Hegelian philosophy and later heterodox ontologies of the event. Already in the 
founding document of Marxist political theory – Marx and Engels’s The Communist 
                                                                                                                                           
animosity between the two derived from their conflicting evaluations on the role for theory. Bakunin 
accused Marx of “ruining the workers by making theorists out of them”, making them depart from 
their natural, spontaneous urge for freedom that would otherwise lead to immediately dispose of all 
state forms during revolution. For Bakunin, part of the problem with Marx’s theoretical disposition 
was its potential conversion into institutionalised power in the transition period after revolution. (See 
Ann Robertson, “The Philosophical Roots of the Marx-Bakunin Conflict”, What’s Next Journal 
(December 2003) Available online: 
http://www.whatnextjournal.co.uk/Pages/Back/Wnext27/Marxbak.html [Accessed 16 Aug 2012].) 
Alfred Sohn-Rethel raises similar issues by noting problems with scientific and theoretical knowledge 
passing through revolutionary transformations. The division of society along the lines of intellectual 
and manual labourers “has an importance for bourgeois class rule as vital as that of the private 
ownership of the means of production. It is only too evident in many of the socialist countries today 
that one can abolish property rights and still not be rid of class.” (Intellectual and Manual Labour: A 
Critique of Epistemology (London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 1978), 37). 
 
20
 Plato, “The Republic” in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997), 1120-1121 [§499b-499d]. 
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Manifesto – revolution provides the keystone for this delimitation.21 In their 
differentiation between the aspirations of utopian socialists and role for communist 
intellectuals as a one of a group of reformists hoping to seal an image of the future 
according to the intellectual plans of the present versus radicals who use theoretical 
tools solely to drive towards social revolution, the idea of communist revolution 
expresses an articulation of knowledge and power. Knowledge – and the intellectual 
authority it entails – is articulated with power in the role ascribed to communist 
theorists, with revolution acting as the auto-limitation and auto-legitimation of its 
temporally transient nexus.22 The upshot is that if the application of theoretical 
knowledge can be limited in this way, then Marxism has at its disposal a concept 
explaining why intellectual hierarchy cannot pass through revolution to become a 
form of institutional intellectual hierarchy after the event. Revolution is thereby 
credited with the capacity to generate the conditions for mass emancipation freed 
from the threat of intellectual authority dominating processes of change. Hence, 
                                                 
21
 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 254, 
234. See Chapter 2.1 of this thesis for more discussion of this point. 
 
22
 An acute awareness of this structures many discussions within Marxism even when they are 
articulated in slightly different ways, or where the themes are only touched upon tangentially. 
Alberto Toscano, for example, when seeking to carve out a role for communist theory fulfilling the 
role of “non-dogmatic anticipation” writes that philosophy “might ‘anticipate’ a communist politics”, 
but not “in the sense of producing its own futurological standard against which to measure instances, 
but by delineating the problems and lines of solution that communism calls for.” For Toscano one of 
the most intractable dilemmas Marxist philosophy can make some contribution towards solving is the 
question of communist power and how it is constituted by knowledge, because “Without some such 
articulation of power and knowledge, the notion of communist revolution is unintelligible.” (“The 
Politics of Abstraction” in The Idea of Communism, eds. Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek (London and 
New York: Verso, 2010), 201, 203-204.) 
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two of the key terms in this thesis. Novelty is the capacity events possess and 
authority is what novelty suppresses. Exactly how these conditions are articulated is 
addressed by our second and third hypotheses. 
 
Dialectics and the problem of novelty 
 
Our second hypothesis, around which Part I of this thesis is oriented, claims that 
attempts in classical Marxism to conceptualise a novelty-bearing event out of 
Hegelian dialectics necessarily reach an impasse. First set out by Engels’s 
appropriations from Hegel’s The Science of Logic23 in the founding text of dialectical 
materialism,24 Anti-Dühring,25 the idea of leaps between quantity and quality 
became orthodox Marxism’s default idea if the event; thenceforth firmly enshrined 
into Marxist theoretical consciousness. Since this time the idea has acquired an 
entrenched position within Marxist discourse, applied not only with respect to social 
revolutions but also with respect to dramatic changes in the mode of production 
                                                 
23
 G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (NJ: Humanities Press International, 1969),  
Vol. 1, Book 1, §3, 335. 
 
24
 The term dialectical materialism was actually coined by Plekhanov, but Engels’s concept of ‘modern 
materialism’ from Anti-Dühring was so completely taken over by Plekhanov that it is not incorrect to 
attribute dialectical materialism to Engels. For an account of the high esteem held for Engels’s Anti-
Dühring by key practioners of Second International Marxism like Plekhanov, Kautsky and Lenin. (See 
Z.A.Jordan, The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism: A Philosophical and Sociological Analysis (New 
York: St. Martins Press, 1967), 66-67.) 
 
25
 Fredrich Engels, Anti-Dühring (Moscow: Foreign Languages Press, 1976). 
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and questions of socialist transformation. The basic idea behind this orthodox 
concept is that at a certain quantitative tipping point the linear accumulations taking 
place within any social phenomena radically transform into a new qualitative state. 
Hegel’s example is the transformation of water into ice. Running down a linear 
(quantitative) temperature scale it is only when the liquid water hits precisely 0 
degrees centigrade that it suddenly (qualitatively) transforms into a solid state. Even 
though for Hegel this idea was solely meant to exhibit the limits of quantitative 
determination within physical mechanics, dialectical materialism converted it into a 
concept that could be used as a model for the discontinuities taking place within 
social transformation. Unlike the gradualist take on history proposed by historical 
materialism, where, in Marx’s analysis, capitalism emerges over centuries as a 
gradual process of consolidation between the value form and the separation of 
workers from the means of production, the idea behind quantity-quality 
transformations supplied by dialectical materialism is that they are meant to 
demonstrate how events like revolutions radically interrupt evolutionary processes. 
Furthermore, the transformation of those attributes of the social world that can be 
analysed quantitatively into a new qualitative state signals an epistemic break in 
knowledge. At the very least, the criteria used to evaluate phenomenon ex-ante 
have to be significantly readjusted ex-post.  
In such a fashion, dialectical materialism’s orthodox idea of event aims to 
reconcile Marxism’s notion of the historical emergence of one social form out of 
another with the imperative stated in our first hypothesis, namely, that revolutions 
impose epistemic limits upon knowledge. In this respect, it is no accident that Engels 
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wrote his defence of dialectics in response to Dühring’s naturphilosophie. Engels’s 
response was motivated, at least in part, because he saw Dühring’s project as 
aligned with the resurgence of the kind of utopian socialism against which Marx and 
himself directed polemic in The Communist Manifesto. Engels’s focus on quantity-
quality transformation in this text thus supplements Marxist historical materialism 
with a Hegelian-inspired concept of rupture, linking the schemas of gradual change 
between modes of production with a notion of the radical changes taking place in a 
revolution. The result is that quantity-quality transformations disqualify utopian 
socialism and delimit Marxist knowledge of the future by the same stroke.  
The combination was always an awkward fit, however. The attempt to 
fashion an idea event from Hegel’s Logic relies upon the condition that it is can be 
separated from the historicism found throughout the rest of Hegel’s system – 
otherwise it would collapse to similar continuities already found in Marxist historical 
materialism. Unfortunately, dialectical materialism’s attempted separation of the 
concept of quantity-quality transformations from the historicist system of Hegel falls 
apart on close examination. The reasons for this will be expanded upon in greater 
depth throughout Part I of this thesis. But in brief, they condense to the fact that 
once dialectical materialism imports the idea of quantity-quality transformation 
from physical mechanics (see Chapter 1) to think social phenomenon, it signals the 
need for a singular nomination of what the quantity is from which a change in 
quality emerges. The implication is that change must take place at a single point of 
transformation at which the linear development of quantity (say, productive forces) 
gives way to a respective qualitative transformation (say, relations of production). 
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Instead of seeing the event as a unity of overlapping processes (as Althusser will see 
it) or as a multiple (as Badiou will conceive it), the reduction of revolutionary change 
to a single point of transformation, we will argue, reduces the potential to think 
through the processes which create genuine novelty/discontinuity. This leaves the 
idea of quantity-quality transformations ensnared in a notion of change being 
effectuated by a transformation taking place through a dialectical switch – an idea 
intimately connected with a linear concept of history unable to properly think 
novelty.  As further developed in Chapters 2 and 3, the essential problems of 
Hegelian dialectics to think novel change also act as a limitation to Marx and Lenin’s 
ideas about revolution and political transformation. 
 
Heterodox ontology and the problem of authority 
 
The third hypothesis, guiding Part II of the thesis, claims that while Louis Althusser’s 
response to this problem manages to develop a more adequate notion of novelty-
bearing events than those fashioned from Hegelian ontology it does not resolve all 
questions related to authority. Althusser’s innovations in the realm of Marxist 
theory are, of course, numerous; overturning almost all of the Hegelian-inspired 
notions taken as sacred within the discourse of dialectical materialism (even if 
confusingly Althusser maintains the term to describe his own theories). The 
centrepiece of Althusser’s quarrel with Hegel’s dialectical notions of change is, 
however, precisely the aforesaid inability of its schemas adequately to account for 
novelty. Hegelian dialectics, Althusser charges, are enmeshed not just in an 
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irreducibly evolutionary schema, but moreover cannot think novelty since its 
systematic historicism conceives all change as already being contained in the 
origin.26 Against the Hegelian-inspired tradition of dialectical materialism, by 
combining the French epistemologies of science with structuralist concepts, 
Althusser develops the idea of ruptures in scientific conceptualisation into his 
trademark idea of the ‘epistemological break’, one embedded in a synchronic (as 
opposed to Hegelian diachronic) conception of history. Admittedly, Althusser’s 
conception of the ‘epistemological break’ bears more upon events within 
intellectual history than those of social revolution, but nevertheless his synchronic 
concept of history held together in a ‘complex whole’ carries across to this thoughts 
about the unity of overlapping causalities within revolution. In the Althusserian 
view, the causalities bringing about radical change cannot be reduced to a single 
‘general contradiction’ as in all Hegelian-inspired ontologies of the event. On the 
contrary, in order to think revolutionary change, it is imperative to conceptualise the 
process as the result of multiple, overlapping practices. The result is that Althusser’s 
concepts better allow an idea of the event carrying genuine novelty. Events are 
novel precisely because they cannot be reduced to any original ground or linear, 
historical processes of actualisation. There are no mechanisms within history 
pushing epochs from one stage to another based on contradictions between two 
variables, as in Hegelian historicism and the dialectical materialist idea of quantity-
quality transformation.  
                                                 
26
 See Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London and New 
York: Verso, 2009). 
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Why did Althusser’s novelty-oriented notion of the event not manage to put 
the problem of authority to rest then? Indeed, why did the question of authority dog 
the Althusserian project from the start, and more so in the wake of May ’68? 
Political discourse often conducts a hermeneutics of suspicion by attributing to 
Althusser’s reverence of science an ulterior motive: that of shoring up party (French 
Communist Party) authority.27 Yet our third hypothesis claims that the notion of 
event crafted by Althusser has problems with authority immanent to its concept – 
problems that carry across to Badiou’s and Meillassoux’s ideas of the event. This is to 
say, once events are subtracted from any ground in a historical process where 
mechanisms of change can be positively identified, the nomination of an event 
becomes remarkably hard to disentangle from the discourse which seals its status 
qua event. Or in other words, by undercutting any rational, extra-theoretical 
grounding for supporting what counts as an event, thus rendering it an entirely 
voluntarist decision, the fact that the Althusserian-inspired notion of the events 
stress novelty does not, ipso facto, manage to undercut the authority of theorists. 
This problem, we will show, also passes over to Alain Badiou (Chapter 5). Charting a 
trajectory away from Althusserianism during the 1970’s, culminating in his magnum 
opus Being and Event by the end of the 1980’s, Badiou’s idea of the event can be 
taken as a particularly sophisticated attempt to delimit the authority of philosophers 
in response to the problems of Althusserian theory. But whilst Badiou’s system 
represents one of the most sophisticated and consistent efforts to delimit the 
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 Jacques Rancière, Althusser’s Lesson, trans. Emiliano Battista (London and New York, Continuum: 
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authority of philosophers in the history of Western philosophy, certain cracks within 
the system give away the fact that it carries across some of the same problems 
haunting Althusser’s project. Namely, although Badiou seeks to excise philosophers 
from having any part to play in the nomination of events, we see how these 
demarcations are complicated by his use of Paul Cohen’s semantic procedure of 
forcing. Equally, Meillassoux’s philosophy of contingent events (Chapter 6) 
demonstrates how novelty-bearing events do not necessarily disqualify a role for 
philosophers. If we understand Meillassoux’s work in light of his doctoral 
dissertation as seeking to supplant Marxist historicism with a conception of change 
erupting through epochal events, then the fact that he ends up attributing a role for 
philosophers elevated to the position of supplying a speculative discourse of ethical 
messianism, indicates that contemporary notions of the event cannot easily resolve 
the problem of authority. Thus, the overarching message of Part II of the thesis is 
that whilst the Althusserian-inspired lineage successfully manages to overcomes the 
problem with thinking novelty in Hegelian dialectics, its elevation of the capacity of 
the event to produce novelty ex-nihilo does not necessarily undermine the authority 
of theoreticians. In a subtle sense, non-foundational, voluntarist discourses of the 
event, in fact take the event out of the province of rational contestation. More 
historicist notions of the event, although not ontologically well-equipped to think 
novelty, can at least be subjected to a certain empirical and discursive scrutiny.  
 
The above hypotheses intend to demonstrate that while ideas of the event serve a 
noble theoretical purpose, they have been fraught with difficulties from the start. 
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Our ambitions are suitably modest. As should already be clear, this thesis does not 
propose to solve the problems it identifies. Rather, by focusing on these genealogies 
of the event we wish to show how both streams harbour further unresolved 
problems. In the first instance, one of fashioning the idea of a novelty-bearing event 
out of the resources of Hegelian dialectics; and in the second instance, in the 
Althusserian lineage, one pertaining to the authority of philosophers in the 
nomination of events.  
These intimations of the problems facing our thinkers will no doubt still seem 
rather shadowy. But by this thesis’ conclusion we wish to have persuaded the reader 
that the ways in which novelty and intellectual authority are mediated by ideas of 
the event has important implications for political practice. The thesis concludes by 
drawing on the findings of all these chapters and reflecting upon what a concept of 
the event suitable for 21st century theory might look like. It seeks to draw on the 
merits of both traditions to suggest ways in which new theories of social causation 
can be used to reformulate a notion of the event sensitive to the contingent but also 
able to productively interface tendencies that might allow for a form of anticipatory 
practice in the pre-evental world.  
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PART I 
 
Dialectics and the Problem of Novelty 
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1. The Hegelian Horizon 
 
 
infinity falls to earth 
 
 
 
The Hegelian horizon continues to dominate Marxist philosophy more than a century 
after Engels introduced the doctrine of dialectical materialism. Along the way, 
Hegelian-Marxism has made friends and enemies, ebbed in and out of favour; yet it 
has never withered even under the glare of damning criticism. Despite the acute 
pressure Hegelian dialectics have received from critical theorists since the mid-
twentieth century – Louis Althusser’s objections to its bourgeois humanism, Lucio 
Colletti’s charge that its speculative modus operandi resurrects the divine logos of 
metaphysics, Gilles Deleuze’s rejection of its philosophy of identity, the whole gamut 
of post-structuralist and post-modern critiques of its narrativised recuperation of 
history – Hegel, it seems, always makes a comeback.  
One revivalist strategy since the 1980’s has been to pick up those ambiguous 
remarks made by Marx in the Forwards to Capital and to attempt to demonstrate 
systematically how Marx’s treatise owes its insights to Hegel’s The Science of Logic. 
The ‘new dialectics’ school aims to show how Marx’s concept of value follows a 
Hegelian model of concept generation, as does Marx’s development of his other 
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categories across all three volumes.28 An even more conspicuous revival has taken 
place within philosophy, where Hegel has undergone a reversal from universally 
agreed upon ‘bad guy’ against which ever self-respecting theorist needs to position 
their work, back to the forefront of contemporary theorising. In this vein, the insights 
Hegelian philosophy is suggested to offer for theories of recognition (e.g. Axel 
Honneth29) or cognitive neuro-philosophy (e.g. Catherine Malabou30) are typically 
appropriations taking a particular angle on Hegel’s system, confirming Croce’s 
imperative to discern ‘what is living and what is dead in Hegel’s philosophy?’31  
Today Slavoj Žižek wishes to push things one step further, reviving Hegelian-
inspired dialectical materialism in its full ontological glory.32 Nowhere in Žižek’s work 
does he endorse the dissection of parts of Hegel’s system firewalled from the 
commitments of a fully-fledged dialectics of nature – and he has labelled analytic 
philosophers like Robert Brandom, who aspires to extract a ‘thin’, semantically-
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 Tony Smith, Chris Arthur, et al. We discuss these interpretations in the next chapter on Marx and 
provide full references there. 
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 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel 
Anderson (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996) 
 
30
 Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, trans. Lisabeth 
Dühring (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2005) 
 
31
 Benedetto Croce, What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel?, trans. Douglas 
Ainslie (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986) 
 
32
 See his most recent tome, Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical 
Materialism (London and New York: 2012) 
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oriented Hegel,33 as the enemy of true Hegelians like himself.34 In his view, a Hegel fit 
for Marxist praxis must necessarily be an ontological Hegel: a Hegel for whom 
dialectics propels processes or order and change, a Hegel fitting the mould of 
dialectical materialism.  
Žižek and others like him aim to make a new generation of Marxists 
comfortable with Hegel again. The edited collection, Lenin Reloaded: Towards a 
Politics of Truth,35 for instance, invites Marxists to return to orthodox dialectical 
materialism as a specifically Marxist ontology of revolutionary change. Contributors 
to the second part of the volume on ‘Lenin in Philosophy’ focus on Lenin’s reading of 
the Logic in the years preceding the Russian Revolution, drawing attention to how 
Lenin’s discovery of ‘leaps’ in the transformation between quality and quality in 
Hegel’s book helped contribute to his singular insistence on Marxism as a 
revolutionary practice. If there is a clear point we could infer from these authors’ 
loyalty to this illustrious revolutionary heritage, it is that in dialectical materialism 
possesses a suitable ontology of revolutionary change. Quantity-quality 
transformations permit us to conceptualise events in a way that more gradualist, 
evolutionary or positivist accounts would necessarily miss. On the basis of these 
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 Robert B. Brandom,"Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel. Comparing Empirical and 
Logical Concepts", Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus, Vol. 3 (2005), 131-161. 
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 Comments made during a talk given at the University of Bonn Philosophy Summer School ‘The 
Ontological Turn’, July 2012. 
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 Sebastian Budgen, Stathis Kouvelakis and Slavoj Žižek (eds.), Lenin Reloaded: Towards a Politics of 
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arguments one might thus conclude that dialectical materialism already equips 
Marxism with an adequate idea of the event. Through the idea of quantity-quality 
‘leaps’ the gradual processes of transition between modes of production can be 
reconciled with the idea of sudden, disruptive events which release novelty into the 
world.  
We will discuss the specifics of Lenin’s take on dialectical materialism in 
chapter three, but for the time being the essential point is that in the midst of 
contemporary Hegel revivalism, the danger for Marxism is that it can default to 
orthodox dialectical materialism and by so doing lead us to miss just what heterodox 
theorists objected to so strongly all along: i.e. the inability to conceive novelty within 
the Hegelian horizon. In response, and given the fact that this return to Hegel in both 
its ‘new dialectics’ incarnation (about which we have more to say in chapter two) and 
through the Leninist turn back towards dialectical materialism (chapter three) is 
concentrated upon Hegel’s Logic, the core problem we wish to demonstrate in 
dialectical materialism’s idea of quantity-quality leaps is that they do not allow one 
to break from historicist notions of linear political change. This compels immanent 
criticism of why this is so – criticism that will then traverse the entire orthodox 
lineage in Part I of the thesis.  
To this end, this chapter offers criticism inspired by Badiou that Hegel’s 
dialecticization of the mathematical infinite is erroneous. This approach responds to 
those interpretations that claim Hegel’s notion of good quantitative infinity 
prefigures the contributions of the mathematician Georg Cantor. We then show the 
repercussions of this failure for dialectical materialism, since in the ordering of the 
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categories of the Logic it is precisely Hegel’s dialecticization of the mathematical 
infinite that grounds the idea of leaps between quantity and quality in the section on 
Measure. In so doing, we demonstrate why Hegel’s infinite cannot be seen to 
anticipate Cantor’s and explain this as a result of his attempt to shoehorn the 
development of metaphysical categories out of one another in an ordering reflecting 
an historical gnoseology. In this way, Hegel’s position on the mathematical infinite is 
shown to reflect the historicism prevailing throughout the rest of his system: it 
cannot think the disjunction in the number system because it has to account for 
developments within mathematics so that they reflect the original categories of 
Western metaphysics, no progress on this front having been made since Parmenides’ 
encounter with Socrates in Ancient Greece. As a consequence, we will show that 
Hegel’s notion of the event no more fully breaks from historicism than does any 
other parts of his system. 
 The argument first recounts the philosophical stakes of The Science of Logic. 
Following this we recall the development of Hegel’s reflections on mathematics and 
the problem of its application to the physical world. This allows us to progress to an 
in depth reading of the section of the Logic concerned with mathematics. We then 
critically assess the legitimacy of Hegel’s dialectical mathematical infinite and its 
grounding of leaps between quantity and quality. The conclusion discusses the 
political significance of these findings. 
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1.1 What is the logic in The Science of Logic? 
 
For a book of such importance, influencing the thought of world-historical figures 
from Marx to Mao,36 the lesser prominence of Hegel’s Logic is intriguing. Partly this 
can be attributed to role of Alexandre Kojève in popularising Hegel in France with a 
near exclusive focus on the Phenomenology of Spirit;37 partly it could be the 
legendary length and difficulty of the book, not helped by questionable translations 
into foreign languages.38 Whatever the reason, a certain mystique hangs around the 
Logic: it holds the promise of a ‘good’ Hegel, standing as an alternative to the more 
suspicious works: Phenomenology of Spirit, Philosophy of Right and Philosophy of 
History. If these texts are considered by many as just historicist apologetics for 
monarchy, Christianity and Western superiority over other regions of the earth, the 
legacy of Marx’s ambiguous nod to the Hegelian method has reserved a certain 
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 Echoing Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks in 1957 Mao writes “If you comrades here already know 
materialism and dialectics, I would like to advise you to supplement your knowledge by some study 
of their opposites, that is, idealism and metaphysics. You should read Kant and Hegel and Confucius 
and Chiang Kaishek, which are all negative stuff. If you know nothing about idealism and metaphysics, 
if you have never waged any struggle against them, your materialism and dialectics will not be solid” 
(quoted in Alain Badiou, The Rational Kernel of the Hegelian Dialectic, trans. Tzuchien Tho 
(Melbourne: Re.Press, 2011), 9.) 
 
37
 See Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (Basic Books, 1969), which, while beginning with 
reference to fundamental points sourced from the Encyclopaedia Logic, soon moves on to his true 
site of interest, which is the Phenomenology of Spirit.   
 
38
 A new translation of The Science of Logic by George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) addresses many of the perceived failings of the standard A.V.Miller translation. 
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respect for the Logic. That has not meant that the Logic is appreciably well read, 
however. It will therefore help to lay out the aims of the book and the meaning of 
logic construed therein. This section will focus on why the contents of the Logic are 
as important as its essential point (the dialectic’s culmination in the Absolute Idea), 
and why the mathematical infinite and its relationship to the concept of Measure 
assumes a particularly prominent position amongst these contents. 
The Science of Logic is a more expansive work than the name might suggest. 
For whilst seemingly constrained to the rather dry topic of ‘logic’ – in its Hegelian 
variation, the movement of thought towards the Absolute Idea – in fact the Logic’s 
speculative scope goes beyond just studying the movement of abstract concepts.39 
The construction of the book gives an indication of this. The Logic is divided into two 
volumes: the ‘Objective Logic’ (Volume I) and the ‘Subjective Logic’ (Volume II), with 
the aim that the conceptual unfolding in the first volume will correlate so absolutely 
with the second that the two will join up in a circular movement. As such, since the 
terminus of the Logic is the speculative identity of thought and being (the subjective 
and the objective), it is somewhat misleading to see the book as only about 
speculative thought. The temptation to see the Logic as concerned only with 
abstraction, against the more concrete studies of nature, mind and Spirit found 
                                                 
39
 Richard Dien Winfield differentiates Hegel’s approach from both formal logic (of say logical 
positivism) and transcendental logic (of a more orthodox Kantian kind) in the way that Hegel, almost 
alone in the history of philosophy, sought to make logic a “self-determined determinancy” – or the 
derivation of determinacy entirely from itself. In Winfield’s words, “In undertaking this endeavour, 
pioneered by Hegel in his Science of Logic, systematic logic makes manifest that presuppositionless, 
self-grounding, and unconditioned universality all consist in self-determination” (From Concept to 
Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel’s Subjective Logic (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 11). 
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elsewhere, should be avoided. Because while Hegel is certainly dealing with abstract 
thought determinations in the absence of a relation to any sensuous, mediated 
understanding (i.e., any initial ‘empirical object’), its end point is the same Absolute 
Idea as that found in, say, the Phenomenology of Spirit. Indeed, Hegel means it quite 
literally when in the Logic he describes the Absolute as a ‘concrete totality’40: 
concrete insofar as the realm of finite concepts gives way to the truth of the infinite 
in both the concept and absolute metaphysical reality.41 Subjective thought captures 
objective logic precisely because neither represents the foundation, which, if it were 
the case, would imply they could be split apart so that either logic or the real could 
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 The finite intellect (understanding) pertains to Kant’s reduction of ontology to epistemology in 
scientific knowledge. Opposed to this is infinite, speculative reason of the dialectical kind preferred 
by Hegel. Lucio Colletti captures the stakes of the two conceptions in a particularly astute passage. “If 
man were like God, rather than the ‘finite, thinking being’ that he is, the distinction between the 
sense-world and the understanding, receptivity and spontaneity, would no longer exist. There would 
be an ‘intellectual intuition’ (which is exactly what there is for Hegel); thinking and perceiving would 
coincide; the representation of an object and its creation would be one and the same act.” (Marxism 
and Hegel, 214). Incidentally, this is also a critique of what Meillassoux will call ‘strong correlationism’ 
(see Chapter 6). 
 
41
 Kojève rightly stresses this point in the opening of the first chapter of his book when he writes “On 
the other hand, one might suppose that Dialectic is the preserve of logical thought; or in other words, 
that this passage is concerned with a philosophical method, a way of investigation or exposition. 
Now, in fact, this is not at all the case. For Hegel’s Logic is not a logic in the common sense of the 
word, nor a gnoseology, but an ontology or Science of Being, taken as Being. And “the Logic” (das 
Logische) of the passage we have cited does not mean logical thought considered in itself, 
but Being (Sein) revealed (correctly) in and by thought or speech (Logos). Therefore, the three 
“aspects” in question are above all aspects of Being itself: they are ontological, and not logical or 
gnoseological, categories; and they are certainly not simple artifices of method of investigation or 
exposition” (Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, [I think this is pp. 169-170, but check your version 
of the book]). 
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be posited as antecedent to the other. At the start of the Subjective Logic, Hegel 
reflects on the question of how the objective categories, which at first appear 
something like Platonic Forms, relate to the subjective logic. 
 
It might perhaps seem that, in order to state the Notion of an object, 
the logical element were presupposed and that therefore this could not 
in turn have something else for its presupposition, nor be deduced; just 
as in geometry logical propositions as applied to magnitude and 
employed in that science, are premised in the form of axioms….Now 
although it is true that the Notion is to be regarded, not merely as a 
subjective presupposition but as the absolute foundation, yet it can be 
so only in so far as it has made itself the foundation. 42 
 
Hegel makes a special effort to refute the impression that his Logic implies recourse 
to a priori logical concepts, because this would leave logic and reality in irresolvable 
opposition. The foundation of logic is rather immanent on both the objective and 
subjective level, meaning that the Logic’s terminus – the fusion of thought and being 
– allows it to escape the prison house of describing only abstract thought 
determinations. The Notion presupposes substance and then describes substance’s 
generation of its Notion in turn. “Consequently, the Notion has substance for its 
immediate presupposition; what is implicit in substance is manifested in the Notion. 
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 Hegel, Science of Logic, 577. 
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Thus the dialectical movement of substance through causality and reciprocity is the 
immediate genesis of the Notion, the exposition of the process of its becoming.”43  
But does this not imply that the Logic therefore captures all of existence 
within its speculative purview once logical development fuses with Absolute 
metaphysical reality?  To pre-empt confusion that the fusion of logic with reality 
might seem to entail that one can derive all of the (finite) sciences (or at least their 
limits) from Hegelian logic, George di Giovanni insightfully describes the Logic as a 
discourse regarding a hierarchy of intelligibility: a kind of conceptual measure against 
which finite discourses can be compared.44 Which is to say, Hegel’s Logic, once 
having devoured the sciences, cannot necessarily develop their contents; but it can 
serve to render meaning, coherence, order and hierarchy amongst them. For this 
reason, and despite their affinities, Hegel’s Absolute is distinguished from Hericlitean 
flux, which could be reduced to the maxim that everything which comes to be passes 
away, because his system preserves/sublates finite conceptual determinations in the 
totality.45  In order for the Absolute to express the identity of thought and being it of 
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 Ibid. 
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 “The Logic is a discourse about discourse – the only discourse which, because of its subject matter, 
can attain perfect completion and which, therefore, defines the norms of intelligibility against which 
all other types of discourse, all of them more or less open ended in their own spheres, are to be 
measured” (Di Giovanni, “Preface” in Hegel, The Science of Logic [Cambridge edition], xxxv). 
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 Hegel lauds Heraclitus’ development of the speculative Idea. In comparison to Heraclitus’ 
predecessors Hegel writes “Here we see land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not 
adopted in my Logic.” Indeed, it is hard to detect much criticism in Hegel’s discussion. The limitations 
of Heraclitus’ philosophy are only evident with his description of it as a “simple principle” or a “simple 
Notion” where “nothing is existent and only the one remains; but that is the Notion of the unity 
which only exists in opposition and not of that reflected within itself.” In other words, Heraclitus’ 
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necessity needs to be a differentiated whole preserving the conceptual ‘contents’ as 
‘moments’ of a unitary unfolding. Since Hegel’s dialectical method will throughout 
the Logic repeat again and again the same move of showing why all finite 
determinations collapse into untenable contradictions that can only be resolved in 
the infinite totality, the really hard work lies in the ordering of this content. The 
Logic’s contents matter precisely because they are not negated but instead sublated. 
Only by preserving the contents of the finite understanding can Hegel’s Logic make 
any claim to fuse thought and being in the infinite Absolute. 
Not often remarked upon with sufficient wonder is the sheer heterogeneity of 
the ‘contents’ Hegel synthesizes in the development of ‘concrete totality’: taking 
ideas from classical metaphysics, physics and mathematics, as well as “some almost 
untranslateable German expressions.”46 Hegel’s aim is to show the immanent 
development of all these ‘contents’ into one another. The act of ordering the logical 
development between such diverse content into a totality is meant to undermine 
any finite conception of their discrete application to separate regions of being. Thus, 
the real is shown to be as much a totality as the concept through the act of joining 
together the conceptual contents.47  
                                                                                                                                           
notion stands in a relation of externality to the finite contents of existence and thus fails to sublate 
these into a differentiated whole. (G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History Vol. I, trans. 
E.S Haldane (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 279, 292-293). 
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 Giacomo Rinaldi, A History and Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel 
(Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 16. 
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 Giacomo Rinaldi describes the result of this formal ordering, “The seeming dispersion and 
heterogeneity of the logical forms of common, scientific, and metaphysical thinking comes thus to be 
48 
 
With this in mind it is possible to appreciate why, despite already 
undermining the traditional distinction between logic and metaphysics in the 
Nürnberg Logic 1808-1811 (a distinction still in place in the earlier Jena Logic of 1804-
05), which would seem to constitute Hegel’s essential point of the Greater Logic, he 
still continued to tinker with the ordering of the categories right up until the 2nd 
edition in 1832.48 Hegel did not see his system reducing to the Absolute Idea, with 
                                                                                                                                           
removed – or rather ‘sublated’ in an organic system of categories, hierarchically ordered in a gradual 
and progressive succession, according to their greater or lesser intrinsic coherence and 
comprehensiveness.” (Ibid., 16-17.) 
 
48
 Ibid., 98-105. A proper conceptual understanding of mathematics is not just important for proving 
the worth of philosophical idealism, what is often missed is its role for Hegel in also grounding the 
category of Measure. As we will see later on in the chapter this is because of the dialectical transition 
he establishes between ‘good quantitative infinity’ and the category of Measure in the Greater Logic 
(where the leaps between things quantity and quality are found). But by way of following the 
evolution of Hegelian logic, we can gain an enriched sense of how closely these specific transitions 
are related with his overarching speculative goals. The intermediary form of the 1804-05 Jena Logic 
shows the particular importance Hegel attached to the sections on Quantity and Measure. In this 
early text, logic and metaphysics are still maintained as separate regions of being pertaining to the 
science of abstract thought and absolute reality respectively. (G.W.F. Hegel, The Jena system 1804-5: 
logic and metaphysics, eds. and trans. John W. Burbidge and George di Giovanni (McGill-Queen’s 
Press, 1986), see also Di Giovanni, “Preface” in Hegel, The Science of Logic [Cambridge edition], xix). 
While the first section of the work corresponds with the Doctrine of Being in the later Logic, 
conspicuously absent is the section on Measure where Quantity and Quality are synthesized. (Rinaldi, 
A History and Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel, 91.) In fact, in the Jena text Hegel repudiates the 
possibility of Measure as he will later present it in the Logic, holding impossible the ‘leaps’ of the later 
Logic that Marxist dialectical materialism would later adopt from his work as its core idea. During his 
time in Jena, Hegel did not consider magnitude (quantity) in any way enmeshed in the determination 
of the thing in-itself. He writes, “The Thing does not disappear in the absolutely small any more than 
it goes beyond itself in the absolutely large; the disappearance does not become intelligible by 
increase or decrease because it is of the essence of magnitude that it be not a determinacy of the 
Thing itself.” (Hegel, The Jena system, 19.) Further on he also says, “The quantitative is something 
quite external, not an analysis of the one, or an internal ratio.” (Ibid., 27) For Hegel in his Jena period 
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the contents playing the role of a merely convenient propaedeutic, disappearing in 
the transfer to the work’s speculative apex. This is why any potential critique levelled 
solely at the Absolute in Hegel’s Logic would be of limited effectiveness. If Hegel 
manages to order successfully such diverse material, and also show convincing 
                                                                                                                                           
the mathematical infinite has nothing to say about objectivity, because the quantitative is kept 
conceptually external to objectivity. And while rudimentary objections to ‘bad infinity’ close the 
section on ‘Simple Connection’ in the Jena Logic, these are not expounded via any serious discussion 
of the mathematical infinite, or the procedures of calculus. There is therefore a parallel – and 
possibly a necessary connection – between the distinction maintained between logic and 
metaphysics in Hegel’s Jena period and the absence of a section on Measure integrated with the 
mathematical infinite. The later Nürnberg Logic on the other hand – so called after the five texts 
written during Hegel’s time as Rector and Professor in the town’s Gymnasium – demonstrates the 
end of the distinction between logic and metaphysics; and by his last 1810/11 text written in the city, 
the end of this distinction also coincides with the introduction of the category of Measure into the 
system for the first time. Consequently, it is reasonable to infer that in Hegel’s intellectual 
development towards his essential point the introduction of the sections on Measure and the 
mathematical infinite were crucially entwined. Furthermore, as extra textual evidence for showing 
why Hegel saw the mathematical infinite as one of the lynchpins amongst the contents of the Logic 
for securing Absolute identity, the most extensive editions to the 1832 edition were appendices of 
extra mathematical reflections, showing that Hegel continued to work on the mathematical 
dimension of the Logic’s contents to a greater extent than with any of the other materials he 
synthesized within the system.  The evolution of the Logic towards its essential point went hand in 
hand with Hegel’s elaboration of the relationship between the qualitative and quantitative and their 
resolution in Measure. Now, whilst such a claim might seem to run against interpretations of Hegel’s 
Logic contending that the mathematical infinite and Measure hold a merely negative purpose in the 
final system, (Rinaldi, A History and Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel, 177) at the same time their 
prefiguration of the speculative essential point of the work is evidenced by difficulties Hegel 
encountered in the evolution of his logic. In the Jena Logic, even before the infinite is passed through 
mathematics and Measure as in later works, Harris notes that the discussion of ‘bad’ and ‘good’ 
infinity in the opening objective phase of ‘Simple Connection’ causes Hegel some structural problems. 
“Hegel needs to resort to a long note (or a series of notes) at this point because in the first place he 
wants to put his discussion of the ‘bad’ infinite into the context of the ‘good infinite’ (the ‘absolute 
essence,’ which properly belongs to metaphysics).” (H. S. Harris explanatory note in Hegel, Jena logic, 
14.) 
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transitions between them (presuming that the content is not mutilated in the 
process), then his essential point is proven almost by de facto,49 whether or not one 
wishes to denounce the Absolute as untenable metaphysical nonsense (as did Engels, 
Lenin, etc). So, crucially, to repeat the point once more, Hegel’s Logic cannot be 
reduced to simply his dialectical methodology of showing the limitations of all finite 
determinations; the contents through which this demonstration is pursued matter 
equally as much.  
This is where mathematics comes in. The conceptual problem of the 
infinitesimal (infinitely small unit) in calculus presents a supreme opportunity for 
Hegel, as it reflects the finite/infinite dialectic at work throughout the Logic, but at 
the level of a real problem confronting science’s understanding of its concepts. For 
where else does modern science struggle with what seems to be an appreciably 
similar problem to the one structuring the whole of Hegel’s enterprise? If logic is not 
to be metaphysics in the old sense, it has to interface with science. The risk is 
enormous, but the potential payoff equally so. For if Hegel can resolve the 
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 It is worth acknowledging the limitations of the ‘almost’ here. For as Peter Wolfdendale argues, the 
‘identity thesis’ of the unity of thought and being is not given an explicit justification in the Logic, 
which rather relies upon a presupposition supposedly proven in the account of consciousness from 
the Phenomenology of Spirit. (“The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel’s Idealism,” 
paper given at the ‘21
st
 century idealism’ conference at Dundee University (2011). Available online: 
http://warwick.academia.edu/PeterWolfendale/Papers/1208748/The_Greatest_Mistake_A_Case_for
_the_Failure_of_Hegels_Idealism [Accessed 2 March 2012]). Karl Marx attributes the final transition 
from logic to nature as a transition from abstraction to intuition owing to the philosopher’s 
“boredom” with the emptiness of self referential logic encountered at the Absolute apex of the 
system. (“Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts” in Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(London: Penguin, 1975), 398.) 
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conceptual problem underlying one of the most important advances in modern 
mathematics (also of great significance for physics), then he can quite literally prove 
the superiority of philosophical idealism: its necessity and worth not just for 
undermining the certainties of finite, scientific understanding, but its necessity for 
the scientific intellect’s understanding of its own procedures.50  Science will, in short, 
need philosophical idealism for a proper appreciation of its own practice.  
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 Or to put it another way, just to bring out how high the stakes are for Hegel in making his concept 
of ‘good quantitative infinity’ work, if he could not show how the mathematical infinite resolves itself 
into ‘true’ infinity he would lack a logical proof exceeding the eloquence of his own philosophical 
architectonic for demonstrating the superiority of infinite speculative reason [Vernunft] compared to 
the concepts of the finite intellect/understanding [Begriff]. With this in mind we can better 
understand why a quarter of the entire book is devoted to mathematical/quantitative reflections and 
reams of pages pour over the latest methods of the calculus (202 pages in the English translation, 
nearly a quarter of the whole Logic). Nonetheless, it is worth acknowledging how those spearheading 
the revival of Hegel in contemporary theory contest the interpretation of Hegel’s privileging of reason 
over understanding. In a recent edited volume, Hegel and the Infinite: Religion, Politics, and Dialectic, 
eds. Slavoj Žižek, Clayton Crockett and Creston Davis (New York: Colombia University Press, 2011), 
Crockett and Davis associate the view of Hegel privileging Reason with a conservative interpretation 
where he is attributed a “liberal bourgeois subjectivity grounded in the idealized split between 
Reason and the external world” (“Introduction,” 2). The ‘open Hegelianism’ promoted by Slavoj Žižek 
and followers questions the Absolute identity thesis, and sees in the dislocating movement internal 
to the Hegelian One the force of the dialectical Two that undoes all fixed determinations (“Preface: 
Hegel’s Century,” x). For a variation on the theme of mobility in Hegel as opposed to static Absolute 
Knowledge also see Malabou, The Future of Hegel. Within the domain of more conventional Hegel 
studies a similar debate has taken place between John Burbidge and Stephen Houlgate, with the 
former offering an argument that the culmination of Hegel’s Logic in the Absolute does not demean 
the understanding but rather establishes it as the most crucial of all speculative moments. Drawing 
on a wealth of direct citations which bear witness to Hegel explicitly taking the opposite view, 
Houlgate provides a convincing rejoinder establishing the documentary evidence for the conventional 
take on Hegel’s philosophy. (“Where is the place of Understanding?” and “A Reply to John Burbidge” 
in Essays on Hegel’s Logic, ed. George di Giovanni (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 
171-182, 183-190.) In our view, Hegel quite openly privileges infinite, speculative Reason over finite, 
scientific understanding on a systematic level.  
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Before progressing to the Logic, however, the next section will examine the 
problems concerning Hegel when it came to mathematics’ relationship to 
philosophical conceptualisation and physical reality in his earlier works on the 
subject. The aim of this is to help explicate the way the intellectual struggle waged by 
Hegel in this domain does not reduce to a single problematic, but is rather a 
multifaceted encounter. Prising the distinct problematics apart will put us in a better 
position to evaluate the final position taken in the Greater Logic and the results of 
Hegel’s assimilation of calculus into his philosophical system. 
1.2 At the limits of geometry 
 
The starting point for most discussions of Hegel’s use (and abuse) of mathematics is 
his 1801 dissertation on the orbits of the planets.51 Because of the justified 
rubbishing the thesis has received from his own contemporaries through to Karl 
Popper in the 20th century,52 it is easy to get the impression that Hegel began his 
philosophical career with incredibly naive ideas about mathematical rationality and a 
romantic belief in the universe’s conformity with it. Yet Hegel’s earlier 1800 
Geometrical Studies – passed down to us only in fragments – paints a picture of a 
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 For an English translation see G.W.F. Hegel, “Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the 
Planets,” trans., with Foreword and notes by P. Adler, in The Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 
Vol. 12, No. 1 (1987), 269–309. 
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 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies: Volume 2 Hegel and Marx (London: Routledge, 
1966), 27. 
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more nuanced meeting between his philosophy and mathematics. By beginning with 
this work we are able to disentangle two separate aspects of Hegel’s philosophical 
approach to mathematics, both unfortunately fused together in his doctoral 
dissertation. The first being the search for conceptual necessity in mathematical 
practice; and the second being the question of precisely how mathematics relates to 
the physical world. 
 At the time of undertaking his study of Euclid’s Elements at the turn of the 
18th/19th century, Hegel was immersed in an intellectual environment where 
Neoplatonism was ascendant. For this reason, Alan Paterson sees close parallels 
between Hegel’s approach to geometry and that of Proclus.53 The difference is that 
while Proclus seeks to interpret geometry as a hierarchy of perfection in terms of its 
figures’ proximity to the equality of an originating One, Hegel, on the other hand, 
seeks similar criteria, but in terms of conceptual unity. By working with the dyad of 
limited/unlimited (another rendition of the finite/infinite dialectic one finds 
throughout his work), Hegel wishes to locate the simplest concepts underwriting 
Euclid’s development of his theorems. In his Geometrical Studies Hegel is, as his later 
take on calculus will also be, reasonably respectful of mathematical practice; he does 
not enter the fray in order to tear apart mathematics according to the demands of 
higher speculative reason. Rather, he more subtly seeks to provide dialectical 
philosophical conceptualisations where he perceives Euclid to lack a sufficiently 
rigorous conceptual underpinning of his own; limiting himself to providing more 
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 Alan L. T. Paterson, “Hegel's Early Geometry”, Hegel Studien 39/40 (2004/2005), 61-124. Author’s 
manuscript available online: https://sites.google.com/site/apat1erson/Heggeom7.pdf?attredirects=0 
[Accessed 20 March 2012],  
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rigorous conceptual justifications for geometrical propositions and occasionally 
shortening proofs. One such ‘correction’ is a critique of the superposition technique 
occasionally used by Euclid. This technique involves a manipulation of the 
geometrical figure in the mind – in Proposition 4, for example, a triangle – to make a 
geometrical proof by imaginatively placing one triangle on top of another. Hegel 
considers it cheating to rely on such a sensuous understanding of geometrical objects 
for the reason that the concepts at work in geometry are more succinct than their 
visual realisation. For instance, the concept of a triangle need only pertain to two 
angles and the concepts of line and plane; the complete visualised triangle (having 
three lines, three angles, and three points) is superfluous compared to its simpler 
conceptual identity. It follows that any method relying on these superfluous 
visualisations to make a proof misses the deeper, simpler and more necessary 
conceptual proof. For Hegel, deriving the latter relies upon a systematic construction 
of the concepts of geometry out of the notions of the limited and unlimited. This 
begins with the simplest figures and only completes itself once the major figures of 
geometry have been developed out of them. The point begins the dialectical 
generation and is infinite (unlimited), but it is a ‘bad infinity’ because it is as yet 
without relation to the finite (limited), which evolves from the conceptual unfolding 
of line, plane, and the geometrical figures they construct.  
What can be taken away from Hegel’s geometrical studies is his attempt to 
provide a philosophical conceptual framework to simplify and bring to mathematical 
understanding a proper comprehension of its practice. The open question this raises, 
however, is to what extent philosophy really can play the role of resolving 
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mathematical conceptual problems, or if in fact it only manages to create the 
appearance of its necessity in a parasitic relationship to positive science? As we will 
see, this is the question around which the whole debate about Hegel’s use of 
mathematics in his system revolves. But before running ahead of the argument, let 
us turn to Hegel’s dissertation and his first attempt at ‘applied mathematics’, where 
he proposed a union of the qualitative and quantitative. More than just proposing 
that the world is governed by mathematical, physical laws, a position with which 
physicists would readily agree, Hegel attempts to link the inner, conceptual 
rationality of mathematical number series to predict the distance of the planets from 
the sun. The thesis is based on a conviction that the deep, conceptual understanding 
philosophy brings to mathematics can attain predictive power.  
In his thesis Hegel seeks to find a rational basis for the Titius-Bode ‘law’ of the 
distances of the planets in the solar system from the sun. Hegel’s procedure entails 
taking a number power series from Plato’s Timaeus and correlating it to the known 
orbit distances of the planets, obliging him, if he was to make the sixth number in the 
series match the orbit of Saturn, to fudge the Platonic number series (1,2,3,4,9,8,27) 
by replacing the 8 with 16 (1,2,3,4,9,16,27) – a substitution performed without any 
theoretical justification. However, Piazzi’s discovery of Ceres (nowadays considered a 
‘dwarf planet’, orbiting between Mars and Jupiter) in the year of the defence of 
Hegel’s dissertation undermined his already suspiciously arbitrary application of the 
number series. Hegel’s intuition of the absence of any necessary planet between the 
orbits of Mars and Jupiter was proved wrong by empirical science, resulting in 
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contemporaries heaping scorn upon his work.54 After having his fingers burnt with 
dabbling in ‘applied mathematics’ Hegel began a career-long process of equivocation 
regarding the relationship between mathematics and physical reality: initially he 
renounced the claims of his dissertation, but he then later retracted the 
renunciation.55  
That he never entirely gave up on the idea that the mathematical relations 
ordering the universe should conform to a higher conceptual rationality is evidenced 
in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. In a discussion on the Pythagorean 
School Hegel revisits the question of the ordering of cosmic relationships, 
commenting scornfully that “The Pythagoreans further constructed the heavenly 
bodies of the visible universe by means of numbers, and here we see at once the 
barrenness and abstraction present in the determination of numbers.” Only a few 
pages on, though, polemic gives way to a more wistful reflection on the “grandeur of 
this idea of determining everything in the system of the heavenly spheres through 
number-relations which have a necessary connection.” The modern era, Hegel 
recognises, has made great advances in the use of mathematical thought to 
understand celestial laws and phenomenon, yet “everything has the semblance of 
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accident and not of necessity.”56 The Pythagoreans went astray not just by 
attempting to represent the speculative Idea through motionless number, but also by 
failing to delineate the “transition of qualitative into quantitative opposition,”57 
which cannot rely on the naive assumption that the universe conforms to the 
conceptual underpinnings of number series – as Hegel himself assumed in his 
dissertation when seeking to find a rational basis for the Titius-Bode law. As we will 
see, the Logic seeks to resolve this problem by synthesizing the quantitative and 
qualitative in the category of Measure. This will be a more limited exercise in ‘applied 
mathematics’ than that attempted in the dissertation, seeking to show how the 
conceptual basis of calculus demonstrates – within the limits of ultimately qualitative 
determination – that quantitative measure in physics is not externally imposed on its 
objects of study.  
At the bare minimum then the preceding discussion allows us to affirm that 
Hegel attached great significance to mathematics throughout his career. It is now 
time to return to the Logic. In so doing, we need to judge if Hegel successfully rides 
to the rescue of understanding mathematics’ foundations or illegitimately restricts its 
practice by subordinating it to speculative reason. The introduction to this chapter 
has already indicated what our conclusion will be, but the exact manner in which 
Hegel fudges the matter will provide crucial insights to the problem of using his 
‘leaps’ between quantity and quality as an idea of a novelty-bearing event. 
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1.3 On the (ab)uses of mathematics in the Logic 
 
Commentary on Hegel’s interpretation of mathematical infinity is highly polarised. 
On the majority’s side you have the likes of Bertrand Russell, whose dismissal of all 
that Hegel has to say on the subject can be considered common sense wisdom on 
the matter.58 On the other side, a minority stream of readers swing to the opposite 
extreme and defend Hegel’s speculative insights by arguing that they, in some loose 
sense, prefigure Cantor’s transfinite. The idea behind the minority’s defence is that 
even if Hegel’s speculative explorations of the problems of infinitesimal calculus do 
not break new mathematical ground, they nonetheless stretch in the right 
direction.59 Hegel might not have created the mathematics for the Cantorian 
revolution, but on the conceptual level he was, such readers argue, close enough to 
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affirm that he made a lasting contribution to the field.60 There is also a third view on 
Hegel’s mathematical work. Positioning his magnum opus, Being and Event, as an 
alternative to Hegel’s Logic, Alain Badiou reprimands Hegel’s blindness to the need 
for subjective decision on the existence of the actual infinite.61 He rejects Hegel’s 
dialectical infinite as a piece of ‘speculative theatre’ whose name does not accurately 
reflect the true mathematical infinite which it attempts to subsume. While we will 
agree with Badiou’s charge that Hegel’s mathematical infinite can in no sense be 
considered to prefigure Cantor’s, we need also to go beyond his critique by showing 
why this undermines the section on Measure presenting the ‘leaps’ between 
quantity and quality. For Hegel’s derivation of these leaps relies upon his dialectical 
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infinity being a legitimate conceptual take on mathematical infinity. If it is not, the 
question of why not will become crucial for understanding the problems with its 
appropriation by dialectical materialism. It is thus necessary to delineate exactly 
what Hegel is attempting to achieve over the course of the chapters in sections 2 and 
3 of the first Book of the Logic, before returing to a critical evaluation of its 
consequences for orthodox Marxism’s idea of the event.  
Hegel’s take on mathematics in the Logic is often taken as merely destructive 
insofar as he seeks to derive the immanent necessity of mathematical categories in 
order to undermine the ascendant mathematical formalism amongst his 
contemporaries. But his project is not solely a critical one. As with his earlier work on 
geometry, it is not so much concerned with delimiting the practice of mathematics as 
it is in insisting upon reconciliation with ontological categories, which only dialectical 
philosophy can accomplish.62 It follows that Hegel’s at first seemingly exaggerated 
preoccupation with mathematics can only be properly understood by placing it in its 
historical context.63  It is well known that the 19th century represented a foundational 
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interregnum in mathematics after the enormous strides taken by Isaac Newton 
(1643–1727) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) more than a century earlier in 
formulating differential calculation, and the more contemporary opening up of 
mathematics to the late-19th/20th century terrain of Georg Cantor’s (1845–1918) 
transfinite, Kurt Gödel’s (1906–1978) incompleteness theorem, and Benoit 
Mandelbrot’s (1924–2010) fractal sets, amongst others. Hegel was not insensitive to 
the sense of transition in the field. Against the widespread caricature of Hegel as a 
philosophical megalomaniac – and conversely, a mathematical ignoramus – in fact 
Hegel was conversant in the mathematical practice of his time, and even taught a 
course on differentiation. In an 1865 letter Engels went so far to claim that “Hegel 
knew so much about mathematics that none of his pupils were in a position to 
publish the numerous mathematical manuscripts among his papers.”64 Hegel was 
also familiar with contemporary practitioners’ efforts to set differentiation on more 
rigorous ground, such as in the work of Joseph Louis Lagrange (1736–1813) and 
Augustin-Louis Cauchy (1789–1857). Not unreasonably, Hegel’s concern with 
mathematics stemmed from a realisation that calculus had opened up an irreparable 
wound in the solidity of mathematics’ foundations; and this was coupled with, at the 
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same time, the great progress in the field having humbled confidence in the 
speculative capacity of philosophy, a field working within a similar domain of reason, 
yet unable to deliver the same sort of rapid advances. So Hegel’s aims are twofold: to 
attempt to show how only dialectical philosophy can reason away the fundamental 
conceptual problem underlying calculus, hence proving the superiority of 
philosophical idealism compared to scientific understanding, and at the same time to 
also provide mathematics with the conceptual understanding of its practice. 
Addressing both of Hegel’s intentions, the aim of the rest of this section is to see how 
Hegel’s take on calculus’ categories fits within his Doctrine of Being and why this (1) 
necessitates a criticism of thought’s subservience to mathematics, (2) demonstrates 
how qualitative moments emerge necessarily in the concept of quantitative number, 
(3) shows why on its own ground number cannot escape never-ending progress to 
infinity – “spurious infinity”, (4) necessitates the category of Measure, and (5) 
culminates in the scathing criticism of gradualness in quantity-quality ‘leaps’ that 
dialectical materialists adopted as their idea of evental transformation.  
The following quote exhibits the full force of the critique Hegel levels against 
rendering philosophy subservient to mathematics:  
 
These ancients perceived quite correctly the inadequacy of number 
forms for thought determinations and equally correctly they further 
demanded in place of the substitute for thoughts the characteristic 
expression; how much more advanced they were in their thinking than 
those who nowadays consider it praiseworthy, indeed profound, to 
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revert to the puerile incapacity which again puts in the place of 
thought determinations numbers themselves and number forms like 
powers … which are themselves often only a perverted mathematical 
formalism...65 
 
This is because “In symbols the truth is dimmed and veiled by the sensuous element; 
only in the form of thought is it fully revealed to consciousness: the meaning is only 
the thought itself.”66 By which he does not mean that in any vulgar sense that 
philosophy’s superior hermeneutic function is necessary for understanding what is 
going on in mathematical manipulations. Rather, Hegel’s contention is that 
mathematics remains encumbered by its own finite understanding subsumed, and 
hence rendered invisible, beneath the surface of seductive symbolism. Dialectical 
reason, however, can penetrate through these misguided understandings to expose 
the deeper ground of reason – most importantly in the obscure status of the 
vanishing operator of the infinitesimal used in calculus for obtaining the differential 
of a curve. In Leibniz’s notation, for example, the differentiation of x2 = y becomes 
 
dy
dx
=
x + dx2 − x2
dx
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which after carrying out the required multiplications and cancelling out of redundant 
terms can be reduced to: 
 
dxx
dx
dy
+= 2  
 
But then given that dx represents an infinitesimal, yet 
dy
dx
 retains its value as the 
required measure of the ratio, dx is cancelled out leaving only 
 
x
dx
dy 2=  
 
This approximation technique violates algebraic logic for the purpose of determining 
the gradient of the curve, even whilst it permits exactly correct results. For Hegel, 
dialectical reason can explain what necessitates this cheat by situating it within an 
ontology of the quantitative. Hegel’s concern is to deduce the relationship of quality 
and quantity to each other, particularly regarding the relation of the finite to the 
infinite enmeshed with these categories. It follows that our exposition needs to 
explain both of his categories, since Hegel establishes two dialectical unfoldings: 
finite quality to infinite quality; and finite quantity to infinite quantity. 
Hegel defines Quality as Being, wholly simple and immediate. It is “reality” in 
its most basic form, and hence in the Hegelian metaphysics it is marked by 
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negativity.67 In order for reality to take on a determinate, qualitative being it is 
necessary that it also be something.68 Hegel determines a something as possessing a 
limit internal to itself (not just respective to another), and this “is the mediation 
through which something and other each as well is, as is not.”69 The finitude of 
qualitative things is consequent upon the fact that “finite things are not merely 
limited—as such they still have determinate being outside their limit—but that, on 
the contrary, non-being constitutes their nature and being.”70 What Hegel describes 
as the sadness of this realisation follows from the fact that finite things “are, but the 
truth of this being is their end. The finite not only alters, like something in general, 
but it ceases to be.”71  
 Critically, in the qualitative field Hegel stresses that the finite and the infinite 
should not be thought apart from each other; the latter should not be treated as the 
“beyond” of the finite – a conception which he derides as “spurious infinity.” To treat 
the infinite as being in opposition to the finite would imply a limitation within the 
infinite, thereby rendering it another finite something. Instead, “the infinite only 
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emerges in the finite and the finite in the infinite.”72 Thinking them separately is 
therefore only the abstraction of two moments; but insofar as they can be thought 
apart from each other Hegel insists that we conceptualise their relationship as one of 
“the alternation of the two determinations, of the unity and of the separation of 
both moments.”73 This does not, however, imply putting the finite and infinite on the 
same footing. For Hegel only in the infinite is there “a purely self-related, wholly 
affirmative being. In infinity we have the satisfaction that all determinateness, 
alteration, all limitation and with it thought itself, are posited as vanished.”74 Or to 
repeat, negativity is rendered in positivity only at the level of qualitative infinity, 
therewith recuperating the dialectic of negativity to both truth and the good. This 
proves to be problematic for Hegel in his analysis of quantitative infinity. The notion 
of “spurious infinity” that he derides in the qualitative field, he finds to be a 
consequence of the being of Quantum as it progresses to infinity without ever 
reaching it – leaving the two ‘levels’ torn permanently asunder. 
 The notion of “pure quantity” parallels that of “reality” in the qualitative field: 
it is continuity – and here Hegel follows Kant’s representation of it with space and 
time – that requires its determination as quantum; or, as the discreet something of 
pure quantity. However, against Kant, Hegel argues that the continuity and 
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discreetness are but two moments; and consequently, “continuous magnitude” and 
“discreet magnitude” are inseparable conceptually other than as “species” of the 
same concept.75 In other words, the discreteness of quantum cannot be held in 
opposition to pure, continuous quantity: each conceptually necessitates the other, 
discreteness emerging out of continuity as a dialectical moment. Quantum then 
attains its determinate being as a discreteness in which its limit is no real limit in the 
continuous repetition of a series of ones: a limit that is indifferent. Thus, if the one 
satisfies its determination as self-relating, enclosing, and as an other-excluding limit 
it is number. But at the same time, at this point a qualitative difference first emerges 
in the differentiation of unit and amount within the idea of number. Because the 
determination of units in a continuous sequence of ones is indifferent, the plurality 
of the amount is irreducible to any of these indifferent units, implying a qualitative 
difference between two somethings – unit and amount – each containing the other 
in its own determination. In Lacroix’s words, “number attests to a first form of 
resurgence of qualitative difference in the heart of quantitative homogeneity.”76 
 The resurgence of qualitative distinction within number becomes more 
pronounced once extensive and intensive quantum are specified. In the form of 
number – possessing an amount – quantum is “in its own self” an extensive 
magnitude. By contrast, intensive quantum, degree, represents the difference 
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between two numbers: introducing a qualitative difference. But Hegel is keen to 
impute that degree is not a category introduced externally from the difference 
between varieties of empirical measurement. For instance, even though temperature 
is normally thought in terms of the intensive quantum of degrees (Celsius), it is 
equally an extensive quantum in that the sliding scale of a thermometer moves 
extensively in response to changing conditions. Extensive and intensive quantums 
are therefore further examples of “moments”; both are contained within the 
concept of number – the qualitative difference immanent to number emerges in the 
extensive/intensive binary. In Hegel’s exact words: “Number itself necessarily has 
this double form immediately within it.”77  
Extensive quantum is thus never negated into intensive quantum in such a 
way as to allow a direct passage to qualitative infinity; and for Hegel therein lies the 
problem, because “the increase of quantum brings it no nearer to the infinite ... the 
difference between quantum and its infinity is essentially not a quantitative 
difference.” As a result, “This infinity which is perpetually determined as the beyond 
of the finite is to be described as the spurious quantitative infinite.”78 The roadblock 
of the antinomy between finite quantum and quantitative infinity Hegel describes as 
“an impotence of the negative.” And it is also at this dialectical impasse that Hegel’s 
analysis converges with his critique of contemporary mathematical practice in the 
calculus, where the correctness of the results are presumed to affirm an incorrect 
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understanding of the method. He writes, “This alone is a bad state of affairs; such a 
procedure is unscientific. But it also involves the drawback that mathematics, being 
unaware of the nature of its instrument because it has not mastered the metaphysics 
and critique of the infinite, is unable to determine the scope of its application and to 
secure itself against the misuse of it.”79 
 Over the following pages Hegel proceeds to engage with and repudiate 
Lagrange’s method of attempting to ground calculus intra-mathematically. For some, 
Hegel’s conclusion – and evident bias against any solely mathematical resolution of 
the problem – represents his crime against mathematics. Hegel argues that the 
reason why this issue cannot be resolved intra-mathematically is because the 
calculus has been formalised as an application based upon experiential, empirical 
physics. Thus, by attempting to resolve the problem solely quantitatively 
mathematics is in effect trying to purge the qualitative moments from the formal 
analysis. “The desire to uphold the honour of mathematics, that all its propositions 
ought to be rigorously proved, has often caused it to forget its limits; thus it seemed 
against its honour to acknowledge simply experience as the source and sole proof of 
empirical propositions.”80 Hegel insists upon the entrance of qualitative moments of 
experience into mathematics’ objects and warns against the flight into the pure 
abstractions necessitated to ground mathematics after severing all links to the 
empirical referents from which it draws its content. Yet the analysis is not left on this 
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negative note. One of his most ingenious moves is to rescue the seemingly hopeless 
quantitative ‘spurious infinite’ from its dead end of ceaseless repetition, and to do so 
by locating the necessary concepts within mathematics’ own practice. This requires 
two moves: firstly, that of reasoning a ratio’s relation (therefore a qualitative 
moment) and its equivalence to an infinite quantitative series (e.g. 


 = 0.28571...);81 
and secondly, by demonstrating how, by moving to the power of a ratio, the 
quantitative is prevented from any lapse into ‘spurious infinity’ by its rendition within 
the structure of qualitative infinity.  
 Returning to the penetration of qualitative determination within number and 
intensive quantum, Hegel extends this to the notion of fraction. A fraction, e.g. 


 , is 
related to its ‘exponent’ (Hegel means the right hand side of the equation), e.g. 0.25, 
as unit is to amount in the idea of number. With a fraction no matter how large the 
numbers become, e.g. 


, the amount is not altered; it remains 0.25. Because the 
fraction represents a relation it constitutes a quantum determined qualitatively; the 
infinite series produced on the other side of the equation in the form of an amount 
represents the sublated difference in the form of an extensive magnitude – i.e. a 
number series progressive to infinity, but never reaching it. But even the series, in 
the form of an inverse ratio, when varied (e.g. 0.25  0.35) generates the structure 
of ratio out of this difference. Therefore, the two sides of the equation are 
dependent upon each other and cannot be taken individually: “consequently, 
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according to the specific nature of their Notion, they themselves are not complete 
quanta.”82 The upshot of this conceptualisation is Hegel’s interiorisation of 
quantitative infinity within the qualitative relation of fraction to ‘exponent’. Hegel 
achieves this by the dialectical sublation of quantum, initially conceived as an 
indifferent series of ones, to then conceive it in terms of qualitative ratio. This 
antinomy between ratio (qualitative unit) and exponent (quantitative amount) he 
describes as a “contradiction between its determination as the in-itself, i.e. as unity 
of the whole, which is the exponent, and its determination as moment of the ratio; 
this contradiction is infinity again in a fresh, peculiar form.”83 The significance of 
Hegel’s determination of good quantitative infinity is that “it is possible to conceive a 
completed infinite totality without resorting to an operation of enumerating its 
elements”84 – an operation that some like Lacroix claim, puts Hegel on the same train 
of thought as Cantor and Bolzano. 
The ratio of powers (e.g. x2 = y) goes one step further in completing the 
conceptual arc. Insofar as the ‘exponent’ of a ratio of powers produces only another 
ratio, there is a complete sublation of the quantitative back to the qualitative. 
Therefore, “in the determinate being into which it has developed in the ratio of 
                                                 
82
 Hegel, Science of Logic, Vol. 1, Book 1, §2, 316. 
 
83
 Ibid.,, 319. Lacroix paraphrases the movement well: “For Hegel, to speak in this case of an infinite 
series is an abuse of language: the series is but the approximate calculus of the determinateness of 
magnitude contained in the fraction and thus merely employs the bad infinite of progression; on the 
other hand, the finite expression, because it is a ratio, expresses the true infinite as its immanent 
determination” (“The Mathematical Infinite in Hegel”, 308). 
 
84
 Lacroix, “The Mathematical Infinite in Hegel,” 314. 
 
72 
 
powers, quantum has reached its Notion and has completely realised it.”85 That is, 
expressed in the form of an entirely relational mathematical identity, quantum 
conceived as an indifferent series of ones tending to infinity (yet never reaching it) is 
sublated into the true quantitative infinity, determining itself intrinsically. In a 
dialectical twist, it is not just that quantity has come to be determined as quality; 
rather, “it is the truth of quality itself, the latter having exhibited its own transition 
into quantity….This observation on the necessity of the double transition is of great 
importance throughout the whole compass of scientific method ... this is the truth of 
quantum, to be Measure.”86 
 
There is no denying how impressive Hegel’s dialectical exposition is. By managing to 
incorporate even relatively basic mathematical conceptual issues within dialectical 
philosophy, he achieves more than might be expected of an approach oriented 
around proving the higher truths of speculative thought compared to the work of the 
finite intellect in mathematical science.87 But by the same token, some readers of 
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Hegel, overawed by the cleverness of the exposition, have made the mistake of 
thinking that when Hegel discusses ratios of whole numbers on the left hand side of 
the equation equalling an infinite string on the right hand side, he has brought 
irrational numbers into his system. It is perhaps an easy mistake to make for those 
not well versed in mathematics. Yet this it is a not inconsequential misunderstanding; 
because, precisely oppositely, the definition of an irrational number is that it is not 
the ratio of a pair of integers. Hegel’s mathematical infinite is infinite only so far as it 
applies to the rational subset of the reals. While the more sophisticated defenders of 
Hegel may admit that Hegel provides no account of irrational numbers and argue 
that Hegel’s conceptualisation of infinity points in Cantor’s direction nonetheless, it 
seems to rely upon a huge stretch of the imagination. For if there was one issue that 
defines Cantor’s efforts it was the relationship between the two powers of infinity: 
the first composed of rationals, the second composed of the reals (including the 
irrationals). How Hegel can be considered a conceptual precursor to Cantor when he 
ignores irrational numbers in his dialectization of quantitative infinity is far from 
clear, and seems more a sign of wishful thinking on the part of Hegel’s advocates 
than a genuine connection. Furthermore, this perspective also ignores Hegel’s stress 
on avoiding excessive abstraction away from the empirical applications of calculus, 
which goes some way to explain why Cantor’s most ardent antagonist, Leopold 
Kronecker (1823-1891), was a fastidious reader of Hegel, and the fact that Cantor 
negatively characterised Hegel’s philosophy as part of a “popular and thriving 
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academic-positivistic scepticism.”88 Although Cantor may have used terms like 
“dialectic generation” in his expositions, these bear only superficial resemblance to 
the sense of Hegelian dialectics.89  
 In sum, even giving Hegel’s attempted dialecticization of the mathematical 
infinite a charitable hearing, it is not possible to see how it prefigures Cantor, unless 
one is reduce Cantor’s pivotal insight to the level of a platitude – say, establishing the 
immanence of infinity within ordinal systems – rather than focusing on his 
specifically mathematical conceptual contribution. Hegel dialectically establishes a 
concept of good quantitative infinity where unending ‘bad infinity’ is mediated with a 
concept of infinity where they are self-related as qualitative differences. In his 
concept of the transfinite, Cantor, on the other hand, establishes that there are 
different sizes of infinity: infinity is plural, there being at least two powers of infinity 
within the continuum. That Hegel did not manage to anticipate the revolutionary 
breakthrough of Cantor puts to rest the overblown claims of Hegel’s advocates, yet it 
does not on its terms show why the idea of leaps between quantity and quality it 
grounds cannot be considered as novelty-bearing events. This is the task of the final 
section, where we will see how quantity-quality leaps rely on Hegel’s dialectical 
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infinite, and why this throws doubt upon the idea that they can be used to think 
beyond historicist, evolutionary ontologies of change. 
1.4 From infinity to measure 
 
At the start of the section on Measure Hegel’s warns that the “development of 
measure which has been attempted in the following chapters is extremely 
difficult.”90 Some commentators go further. In Erol Harris’ estimation this section is 
“extraordinarily difficult ... so obscure as to be hardly intelligible.”91 Rather than 
explicate the dialectical determinations of Measure in a fashion similar to the 
previous expositions of Quality and Quantity,92 it therefore seems preferable to place 
more emphasis on unpacking the implications of Hegel’s claim that in measure 
quality and quantity are united. To recapitulate, by the end of the chapters on 
Quality and Quantity we have learnt that (1) mathematics cannot be conceived 
purely quantitatively in absentia of qualitative determinations – thus the seeming 
paradoxes thrown up by the calculus stem from an over-abstraction of mathematics 
from the empirical world, leading to faulty conception of the actual infinite; and (2) 
once quantum is conceived as qualitatively determined, the same applies vice-versa: 
quality is quantitatively determined. At his disposal Hegel now has the conceptual 
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ground for thinking how quantitative, empirical measurements of things are possible, 
allowing him to avoid the alleged misperception that numerical quanta exist 
alongside, or worse, are imposed externally by a measurer upon an object’s 
qualitative characteristics – refuting, by the same token, the “error of one-sidedly 
holding fast to the abstract determinateness of quantum.”93 Reflecting these 
concerns, Hegel wishes to demark mere external measurement of nature “by 
agreement” from the quantitative magnitude of things, which is co-constitutive of 
their quality. If this at first seems to privilege physics – and indeed it does insofar as 
Hegel claims that only in mechanics dealing with abstract matter are the 
determinations essentially quantitative – he also observes how far biology still needs 
to progress to understand the connections between such quantities as the ratios of 
the human limbs to “the organic functions on which they wholly depend.”94   
 This means that in the development of Measure, culminating in the inverse 
ratio of powers (where ‘true’ quantitative infinity was realised before the transition 
to Measure), is a conception where measurement is understood as intrinsic to 
nature’s objects without the need for a subject to enforce external measurement on 
objects. What at first appears to be the realm of ‘external’, subject-dependent 
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concepts transpires at this point to be internal to nature. Yet Hegel cannot have the 
essential character of a thing change with every minor quantitative change, which 
would result in permanent flux. In this regard he takes quite seriously the ancient 
paradoxes, “does the pulling out of a single hair from the head or from a horse’s tail 
produce baldness, or does a heap cease to be a heap if a grain is removed?”95 In 
what he calls immediate measure – as ever, immediate implying the initial 
affirmation of a not yet non-dialectically examined understanding – then, yes, it 
does. But in the process of transition to ‘specifying measure’, the inadequacy of this 
understanding is exposed. The relative resilience of things to change is cast as a 
qualitative resilience to quantitative change. Hegel’s famous example is water: the 
qualitative nature as liquid as only changing to ice at precisely 0 degrees Celsius, at 
that point undergoing dramatic transformation.  
 Hegel writes, “The reason why such ready use is made of this category to 
render conceivable or to explain the disappearance of a quality or of something, is 
that it seems to make it possible almost to watch the disappearing with one’s own 
eyes, because quantum is posited as the external limit which is by its nature 
alterable, and so alteration (of quantum only) requires no explanation.”96 Or to 
paraphrase, the confusion of the finite understanding in taking quantum as an 
external determination (tending towards a ‘spurious infinite’ as ceaseless, indifferent 
repetition) results in a misconception of the nature of the change of things 
themselves; it cannot understand the sudden breaks necessitated by a conception of 
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the double relation between quality and quantity. At some point in the quantitative 
scale, in order for qualitative change there needs to be a ‘leap’ in quality: the same 
leap hidden by the calculus when, in attempting to find a curve’s differential, it 
defaces algebraic logic in the cancellation of the infinitesimal. Thus, to conclude, for 
Hegel it is the immanent structure of ‘good’ mathematical infinity in the inverse ratio 
of powers that one finds in nature and explains why Measure occurs autonomously 
of a subject in the ratios between objects. The ‘leaps’ between qualitatively distinct 
things match the disappearance of the infinitesimal in mathematics. The reason why 
mathematics struggles so hard to understand what is going on when its infinitesimal 
operator disappears in the process of calculus is because the mathematical 
procedure touches upon metaphysical reality, whereby the ultimately qualitative 
determination of things entails that at some point there necessarily needs to be a 
‘leap’ between qualities that is not captured by any quantitative determination.  
Now, while this is of course a satisfying solution insofar as it links 
mathematics, logic and reality all together within a single nodal point of the Logic’s 
conceptual unfolding, the question is whether Hegel has rendered a service to 
mathematics and physics in demonstrating a fundamental dialectical ‘law’ to sharpen 
these practices’ own understanding of their problems, or, oppositely, whether this 
resolution, for all its seeming sophistication, is merely Hegel’s self-serving attempt to 
prove the superiority of philosophical idealism? To answer this, it is necessary to get 
a grip on the consequences of his dialectical infinite. For, by way of caution, from the 
standpoint of conventional philosophy of science, the charge that Hegel goes astray 
by failing to account for irrational numbers may appear oddly superfluous. Hegel’s 
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neglect of irrationals clearly limits any legitimate claims that he has successfully 
managed to dialecticize quantitative infinity. But in the case of measurement of 
nature, is the charge is not rather strange? Is it not actually a fact that measurement 
of nature never produces irrational numbers? So perhaps, despite his failure to 
account for irrationals, might not Hegel’s mathematical infinity be satisfactory for 
transitioning to a concept of measure?  
Part of the problem with providing a simple answer to the questions is that 
most philosophy of science, under the influence of neo-Kantianism, makes no claim 
to know nature in-itself as Hegel attempts. For someone like Rudolf Carnap, for 
example, both the quantitative and the qualitative categories are simply two 
languages through which we, as human subjects, evaluate and gain knowledge of the 
world and they do not pertain to any difference intrinsic to nature.97 The same goes 
for irrationals. Logical positivistic approaches remain agnostic on the question 
because they are only concerned with the best way for us to gain conceptual 
knowledge of nature. The fact that many theoretical models in physics make full use 
of the reals, whereas empirical measurements are finite (hence also rational) is only 
a question of convenience from this perspective; it only poses the question of 
whether it is more parsimonious for calculation to adopt the full sets of reals?98 Since 
this approach makes no speculative claims about nature it has no need to proffer any 
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view on whether irrationals exist in nature itself. Mathematics is only a language we 
use to know the world and so where irrationals ease computation they have a place; 
where they don’t, they have no place. Given that all actually existing measurement 
only uses rationals there is no need for further discussion on whether irrationals 
actually exist in nature. Yet contrary to neo-Kantian agnosticism, we are burdened by 
an obligation to pose speculatively just this question. We cannot hope to make 
positive claims about nature one way or the other here, of course. But we can 
question whether Hegel’s account is satisfactory in contributing to scientific 
understanding by following the speculative implications of his own position and by 
inquiring into the source of his knowledge. 
 For if Hegel is right and no irrational numbers exist objectively in nature then 
it implies nature is discrete: there has to be a real halting point to all degrees of 
accuracy to prevent irrationals occurring within a natural continuum. This is because 
there would have to be an absolute halting point of accuracy for any empirical 
measurement preventing the emergence of any infinite and potentially irrational 
forms of measurement (if from a God’s-eye point of view such infinite measurements 
were possible). Yet this begs the question of how Hegel knows that reality is actually 
discrete? This, we will argue, is the true nub of the problem and why, despite the 
‘leaps’ from quantity to quality, his system cannot think novelty. In the section on 
Measure, Hegel’s implicit knowledge claim about the discreteness of nature follows 
from his derivation of dialectical infinity, itself derived from his deduction of quality 
and the atomism it implies found earlier in the Logic. But therein lies the problem. 
Hegel’s dialectical determination of discreteness found in the section on Quality 
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predetermines that his dialectical quantitative infinity cannot incorporate the 
continuum implied by irrationals, and neither – it also prescribes – can such 
irrationals be found within nature. Whether qualitative or quantitative, the 
discreteness of things is not given any justification that passes through modern 
scientific thought, but is rather a deductive a priori assumed by the ordering of 
Hegel’s categories allowing him to excise irrational numbers later on in the Logic’s 
exposition. Since this derivation occurs early on in the Doctrine of Being – and in the 
historically gnoseological exposition its determinations are derived from ancient 
metaphysical speculation – it is highly questionable whether it contributes to 
scientific understanding, unless we assume the invariance of scientific understanding 
being underwritten by timeless metaphysical deduction.99 For whilst scientists rarely 
partake in speculation about whether reality is fundamentally discrete or not, in 
practice scientists quite frequently make use of the full spectrum of the reals in 
calculus and theoretical physical models. What can speculative reason say in 
response to the fact that some physical models of the world assume a continuum, 
whereas others assume discreteness? What can it say about the interplay between 
finite and infinite paradigms in the interplay between mathematics and modern 
science in gaining knowledge? Let us offer a strong judgement. Hegel’s resolution of 
the quantitative and qualitative cannot contribute to scientific understanding 
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because it curtails its possibilities a priori according to a set of metaphysical 
questions already grappled with by ancient metaphysics – that is, the same forms of 
classical speculation engaged in by philosophers like Epicurus and Democritus, or in 
Parmenides’ dialectic of the One or the Many. Calculus, measure and the fusion of 
the quantitative and the qualitative for Hegel all reduce back to a dialectical 
deduction in favour of discreteness over continuity. Bertrand Russell’s charge that 
Hegel cannot get past the antinomy between continuity and discreteness is therefore 
true in a sense – the decision in favour of discreteness binds all of the reflections on 
mathematics and measure that follow it.100 Thus, for Hegel to say that there are 
‘leaps’ between the quantitative and the qualitative is ultimately to say no more than 
that reality is discrete. Why these ‘leaps’ occur in some instances and not in others 
has no explanation that can be derived from his speculative undertaking of aligning 
mathematics and measure with metaphysical deductive categories. The quantitative 
scale of resilience before these ‘leaps’ manifest themselves is left a total mystery. 
The Logic only succeeds in importing contemporary scientific contents into the 
deductive metaphysical system of categories. But worse than not being able to 
develop these contents, the understanding it aims to provide them, would, if 
adopted as genuine ‘law’, interfere with furthering genuine scientific knowledge. As 
even Hegel’s most zealous defender, Slavoj Žižek, concedes, “the basic fact remains 
that its fundamental tenor is totally inadequate in relation to the two key features of 
modern Galilean science: mathematical formalization and openness to the 
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contingency of (experimental) measurement.”101 We can go further. Hegel’s lack of 
openness to the contingency of experimental measurement is indicative, more 
fundamentally, of the way historicist reduction limits every aspect of his system from 
incorporating novelty. With the reduction of the contents of the Logic to classical, 
metaphysical categories, these predetermine Hegel’s excision of irrationals in 
mathematics and nature. So to assume Hegel prefigures Cantor would be no 
different to assuming that Parmenides prefigures Cantor. The point is that Hegel’s 
ordering of the categories through dialectical transitions in the Logic no more 
escapes the historicist approach found elsewhere in his system. All the answers in 
Hegel’s Logic are predetermined by the order of their exposition which matches an 
historical gnoseology beginning with the Greek’s metaphysical questions and moving 
onto categories associated with modern science – all the answers are, indeed, 
contained in the origin. No novel, incommensurable breaks ever really take place 
within Hegelian dialectics as reflected in his continuist epistemology. The Hegelian 
imperative to order all categories linearly in relation to one another ends up in the 
systematic elimination of the novelties which have historically upset continuities in 
the order of knowledge.  
 
We have travelled a considerable distance, so let us retread out footsteps, 
summarising the prior steps of argumentation, before moving to the chapter’s 
conclusions. 
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α.  While Hegel creates a convincing ordering of the categories, quality  quantity  
measure, the categories are set up in a way that excludes the disjunction in the 
number continuum caused by irrationals. This follows from Hegel’s unfolding of 
the categories from a dialectical determination in favour of discreteness early on 
in the Logic. 
β. It is therefore wrong to see Hegel’s dialectical mathematical infinity as a precursor 
to Cantor’s. Cantor was concerned with the two powers of infinity, the rationals 
and the irrationals, which co-exist in number theory. Hegel also cannot account 
for why irrationals are so important in the methods of calculus. This is 
particularly problematic because irrational functions historically led to Cantor’s 
breakthrough through the work of Cauchy. If mathematicians had accepted 
Hegel’s resolution, this development could never have occurred – and, indeed, a 
partisan of Hegel’s philosophy in the late 19th century mathematics community, 
Leopold Kroeneker, opposed Cantor’s transfinite. 
γ. Hegel’s section on Measure takes from his dialectical infinity the exclusion of 
irrationals and presumes, according to an a priori deductive decision in favour of 
discreteness, that irrationals do not exist in nature. But this does not account for 
modern scientific method, where irrationals are frequently used as part of the 
real set of numbers in theoretical models and calculations based on empirical 
data.  
δ.  The ‘leaps’ between quantity and quality can also be traced back to the deductive 
decision in favour of discreteness. But because the fusion between the two fails 
to explain why there are qualitative limits to quantitative change and why this 
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applies to some objects are not others, it does not contribute any positive 
knowledge. 
ε. Hegel’s engagement with modern scientific content is self-serving, and relies upon 
a reduction of scientific content to ancient metaphysical questions. Hence for all 
the appearance of conceptual movement in the Logic, in fact its reductive 
modality is essentially static, compressing all modern scientific knowledge back 
to the historical origins of the classical philosophy.  
 
1.5 A swan song for dialectical materialism 
 
There are political consequences related to the problems identified with Hegel’s 
‘leaps’ between quantity and quality. Since Marxists have frequently sought to use 
these ‘leaps’ for conceptualising historical change, its failure to break from a 
progressivist historicism has had repercussions in how they have sought to 
conceptualise political and economic transformation. Lucio Colletti, for instance, 
argues that the result of dialectical materialism’s adoption of Hegelian logic is 
demonstrated by Marxists’ confusion that modes of production are historically 
sequential in the sense found in the movement of the Logic’s dialectical 
aufhebung.102 “It is no accident,” Colletti writes,  
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that the root of these errors lies in their mistaking the logical process 
for the process of reality, or, in other words, in an abstract 
dialectization of the finite….Consequently, the categories (in this case, 
the commodity, money, and capital), rather than being grasped in the 
relations and meaning they have within modern bourgeois society, are 
instead conceived in accordance with the place and meaning they 
have in the succession of the various forms of society – in other words, 
according to that succession which is, more or less recapitulated in the 
logico-deductive movement of the ‘succession “in the Idea”’.103  
 
In the same way that infinite speculative reason attempts to sublate scientific 
understanding, so too Hegel’s mathematical dialectical infinite aims above 
mathematics’ own practice and fails to grasp the true mathematical infinite inclusive 
of the irrationals. In the same way that the dialectical deductive procedure, being 
linear and reductive, cannot permit breaks in knowledge to spoil its historical holism, 
so too it can scarcely be used by Marxists to conceive the breaks between modes of 
production (a point that will become clearer in Chapter 3 on Lenin). As Colletti puts it 
“the principle of reason or dialectical contradiction is insufficient not only in scientific 
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knowledge but also in historical knowledge”.104 Dialectical materialism thus made a 
grave misjudgement when it considered Hegelian dialectics to be compatible with 
the emphasis on movement and change in modern science. In fact, Hegel’s ontology, 
although appearing to have put forward conceptual movement, is essentially static. 
As Colletti forcefully argues, the errors of Marxists who have followed the Hegelian 
route, reaching an apogee with Stalin in the Soviet Union and the likes of Horkheimer 
and Adorno in the West, resulted from a project which was deeply problematic from 
the very start. When Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Lukács and Stalin (to name just some 
of the core protagonists) claimed dialectical materialism had inverted Hegel’s Logic, 
prising its materialist core away from idealism, in fact their supposed ‘inversions’ 
only served to perpetuate the ‘speculative nucleus’ of Hegel’s philosophy. At the very 
crux of this nucleus is historicism and the problem with conceptualising novelty. 
Events that can disrupt the linear, accumulative progression accruing in either 
scientific knowledge or historical processes are systematically excluded from the 
conceptual edifice of Hegelian dialectics.  
 In a sense, then, the idea of quantity-quality transformations do no more 
wrong than does any other aspect of Hegelian historicism when imported into 
Marxism. The Hegelian horizon is indifferent to the specific transitions one might 
wish to cherry pick to support different notions of political transformation. Over the 
next two chapters we will see the effects of this horizon as it bears upon concrete 
economic and political problems within Marxism. The seemingly abstract errors of 
Hegelian abstractions flagged up in this chapter will show up in surprising places 
                                                 
104
 Colletti, Marxism and Hegel, 135. 
 
88 
 
when we look at the ideas of Marx and Lenin – this alerting us of the continuing need 
to rethink our concepts of novelty-bearing events and what revolutionary change 
really means.  
  
89 
 
2. Marx’s Idea of Revolution 
 
 
real abstraction and empty cookbooks 
 
 
 
To accuse Marx of the errors of Hegelian historicism would be to repeat one the 
most raked over critiques in modern political philosophy. Such is its familiarity we 
need do no more than adumbrate the criticism.105 Adopting Hegel’s philosophy of 
history yet switching its mechanism of change to the materialist base underlying 
modes of production, Marx, his critics allege, plotted out a prophetic historicism 
where modes of production collapse into one after the other like a line of dominos 
set in motion from the origins of humanity to an inevitable conclusion in higher 
communism. If we take seriously such representations – for which Karl Popper’s 
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name is perhaps most closely associated, but is also given a positive spin by some 
friends of Marxism106 – it is however difficult to see why Marx would have thrown all 
his political efforts behind forming organizations to further cause of the working 
class or why he would have conducted lengthy scientific critiques of the capitalist 
mode of production for the express purpose of helping to make communist 
revolution. Befuddled on just this point, in The Open Society and its Enemies Popper 
ties himself in knots trying to reconcile historical materialism’s so-called prophetic 
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knowledge of the future with the Marxist insistence upon the need for social 
revolution. The fact that Marxists decline to offer details of how their future socialist 
society will run is attributed to a conspiratorial drive to deprive reformists of ways of 
ameliorating capitalism’s shortcomings – and this for the purpose of allowing 
antagonisms to build up which will eventually spill over into violent social revolution 
and permit the seizure of power by intellectual puppet masters working in the 
shadows.107  
 Stereotypes often draw upon a grain of truth, and sometimes the best way 
to combat them is to acknowledge this grain and to proceed to demolish the heap of 
misconceptions formed around it. Such is the case in this instance. Yes, Marx and 
Engels were supremely confident in the working classes’ desire to make revolution; 
hence the element of prophetic futurism infusing their pronouncements. And yes, 
there is something of an awkward fit between historical materialism’s longue durée 
understanding of transition between modes of production108 and Marxists’ 
insistence upon the need for revolution to initiate the transition from capitalism to 
communism. If it were not for these tensions then none of the reformist deviations 
within the Second International could ever have taken hold whilst still being able to 
claim credibly a degree of fidelity to Marx’s method. If it were also not for these 
tensions then dialectical materialism’s idea of quantity-quality leaps would not have 
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been held up by Lenin as essential for understanding Marxism as a revolutionary 
practice (see the next chapter). This is far as our sympathies with the critique stretch 
however. Because to say, as Popper does, that historical materialism bears affinities 
with Hegelian historicism and to leave the matter there is to miss what separates 
Marx from Hegel and why Marx directed such savage polemic in Hegel’s direction. It 
is likewise to miss how the differences between Marx and Hegel bear upon Marx’s 
idea of revolution and its unique epistemological underpinnings compared to the 
ontology underwriting Hegelian historicism. If a trace of Hegelian historicism 
continues to play a part in Marx’s theories, then it will have to be discerned in a 
more subtle way. 
This chapter seeks to explain these differences between Marx and Hegel in 
terms of Marx’s epistemology of social critique, labelled ‘real abstraction’ by 
interpreters in the 20th century. The central tenet of this approach is the claim that 
some of the abstractions occurring in conceptual analysis of society are not just 
abstractions but, rather, reflect abstractions in actual political and economic 
relationships.109 Since for Marx legitimate conceptual abstractions are reflective of 
real abstractions, and because the critical force of intellectual work derives from 
tracing the former back to the latter, it follows that we can only ever utilise 
abstractions a posteriori to their emergence from a separation in the real. Through 
this lens, we can see why, based upon these limitations upon knowing the future, 
Marx’s epistemological grounding of communist revolution matches his ideological 
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disagreements with utopian socialism presented in The Communist Manifesto.110 As 
stated in this thesis’ introduction, these are principally commitments regarding the 
role of knowledge in communist transformation.  
Once in a position to see how Marx’s ideological commitments and 
epistemological approaches synthesize, sense can be made of Marx’s idea of 
revolution as an event where the knowledge used to help drive the movement to 
the point of revolution is prevented from dominating subsequent processes of 
change. This then validates Marx’s refusal to write “recipes ... for the cook-shops of 
the future”111 without leaning upon any Hegelian historicist postulates about the 
necessary and inevitable unfolding of one mode of production after another.112 Pace 
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Popper, it also makes sense of the Marxist emphasis on revolution not on account of 
a conspiratorial desire for violence, but rather as a circumscription of the authority 
of communist intellectuals so that the knowledge used to help makes revolution 
cannot become a form of institutionalised domination by knowledge as power.113 
Nevertheless, despite the overall line of demarcation we hope to draw 
between Marx’s approach and Hegel’s, this chapter also argues that a trace of 
Hegelian historicism can still be discerned in Marx’s idea of revolution, one that 
makes it compatible with the idea of quantity-quality transformations Engelsian 
dialectical materialism later introduced as an abstract representation of 
                                                                                                                                           
methodological commitments. As Mandel writes, affirming the same point by citing Marx’s 
methodological reflections, “According to the method Marx applied to the study of the capitalist 
mode of production, a systematic analysis of the general characteristics of the transitional period 
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revolutionary change. This kernel of Hegelian historicism is evidenced in the way 
that until the end of his days Marx insisted upon revolutionary change occurring at a 
single point of transformation: that from which the abstraction of workers from the 
means of production would be closed down. The problem, we will see, is that the 
very structure of Capital – a structure that we will argue against the ‘new dialectics’ 
school cannot be seen as a Hegelian totality – militates against post-capitalist 
transformation being reducible to a single point of difference. Indeed, Capital’s 
analysis relies on at least two, quasi-autonomous abstractions comprising the 
capitalist mode of production and hence any changes need to be considered in 
terms of thinking how to overcome these abstractions simultaneously during a 
transition period. To make this argument we look specifically at Marx’s value form 
and the role of money in the capitalist economy Marx sets out in Vol. II. We argue 
that according to the logic of Marx’s own treatise, the role of money in the present 
capitalist economy (and any future socialist transition economy) does not reduce to 
the separation of workers from the means of production. But in order to circumvent 
the part for planning this indicates, Marx simply insists upon the revolutionary 
procedure bringing workers and the means of production together being enough to 
begin transition away from capitalism. In the final instance, we thus conclude, Marx 
remains unable to break from Hegelian historicism where a dialectical switch at a 
single point of difference is adequate to transfer between modes of production.  
This chapter begins with a review of Marx and Engels’s views on the role for 
communist intellectuals in The Communist Manifesto. It then progresses to see how 
this is compatible with the idea of real abstraction spanning all of Marx’s work. 
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Following this it is argued that the principle difference between Marx’s earlier and 
later use of the idea of real abstraction is that in his mature political economy he 
develops the idea of multiple real abstractions held together in a single mode of 
production. We argue that abandoning the notion of homogenous totality points 
away from the idea of Hegelian notions of change taking place at a single point, but 
nevertheless under the sway of his ideological commitments against planning and a 
residual influence of Hegelian historicism, Marx continues to maintain that a 
revolution reuniting workers and the means of production would be adequate to 
transition away from capitalism.  
2.1 Communism: a very short list of ingredients 
 
It is a common enough anti-Marxist accusation: peel away the altruistic facade and 
at its root Marxism is nothing more than an attempt to wield working class 
discontent to realize the ambitions of a marginalised contingent of the intellectual 
class.114 From this perspective, Marxism is just Platonism redux – and Popper for one 
was quick to draw the equivalence.115 Yet against this Cold War script, Marx’s texts 
indicate political commitments of exactly the opposite persuasion. From The 
German Ideology up to The Communist Manifesto and through to the Critique of the 
Gotha Programme, if Marx’s political writings stress one thing it is that communists 
should not adopt an external relationship to the workers’ movement and should 
                                                 
114
 For a discussion of this genealogy of critique see Toscano, Fanaticism: On the Uses of an Idea. 
 
115
 Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies Vol. II. 
 
97 
 
rather join them by supporting their interests and providing theoretical guidance 
about how best to realise their own emancipation. The question this raises, 
however, given Marx’s well known disdain for the theoreticism of bourgeois 
socialists, is how communist theoretical guidance is distinguished from that offered 
by the utopian system builders of the future? In this section we will see that the 
demarcation of communist intellectual authority turns on the temporality of 
theoretical guidance; specifically, that it only plays a role up to the revolutionary 
event, after which point the role for communist intellectuals is effectively rendered 
obsolete. At the same time, we will also see that the different measures suggested 
for post-revolutionary transformation reflect the changing nature of Marx’s criticism 
of capitalism. 
The Communist Manifesto’s central point is as follows: reformist planning is a 
bourgeois predilection opposed to the need for working class revolution. Supporting 
the revolutionary cause involves, for Marx and Engels, drawing a sharp distinction 
with the utopian socialists, who, by intention or default, always end up in the 
reformist camp. At the other extreme, communists, they argue, are those elements 
of the working class who proclaim the need for total social change, not just political 
revolution or tinkering with the system in order to render it more equitable. The 
raison d'être of communism qua the real movement of working class emancipation 
is expressed in no uncertain terms: “the emancipation of the working class must be 
the act of the working class itself.”116 Yet the Manifesto was of course written not by 
leading elements of the working class, but precisely by two bourgeois intellectuals. 
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How do Marx and Engels square these apparently conflicting positions: chastisement 
of the middle class intellectuals dreaming up castles in the air, and their 
presentation of communism as the properly working class movement, in 
composition and orientation? The answer is that they temporally resolve the issue 
by positing the involvement of intellectuals as part of the social transition leading up 
to the revolution: 
 
Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went 
over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over 
to the proletariat, and in particular a portion of the bourgeois 
ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of 
comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.117 
 
The role of intellectuals is to bring theoretical comprehension of the challenge facing 
the working class movement in the process of overcoming their factional interests 
and in pushing for maximal social change. Communists are required to prevent 
national cleavages within the proletariat and to “represent the interests of the 
movement as a whole.” Through their theoretical capacity they have the advantage 
of “clearly understanding the line march, the conditions, and the ultimate general 
results of the proletarian movement.”118  
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The need for communist theoretical insight is therefore distinguished from 
the utopian socialists around the temporal pivot of revolution. For whereas utopian 
socialists invent principles to be put into practice either immediately or in the far 
flung future, communists, instead, use their theoretical knowledge solely to drive 
the movement towards its revolutionary climax; at which point they cede guidance 
over the procedures of change. In the famous wording of The German Ideology, 
“Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to 
which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement 
which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result 
from the premises now in existence.”119 Yet not all revolutions are communist 
revolutions; in terms of a single principle to which a communist programme can be 
distilled it is, of course, the abolition of private property. The expropriation of 
private property will ultimately undermine all the social distinctions and the laws on 
which they depend, which turn on the abstractions arising from the ownership of 
property by the few. So-called economic laws, based on this alienation of private 
property (and the alienation of man from the objects of his production in general), 
will dissolve once this is accomplished. As Marx also writes in The German Ideology, 
“with the abolition of the basis of private property, with the communistic regulation 
of production (and, implicit in this, the destruction of the alien relation between 
men and what they themselves produce), the power of the relation of supply and 
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demand is dissolved into nothing, and men get exchange, production, the mode of 
their mutual relation, under their own control again.”120 
Exactly how, in terms of concrete measures, private property will be 
abolished is a more vexed question. Near the end of the Manifesto a programme is 
laid out which is judged applicable at least in the most advanced countries; it 
includes, amongst other things, “A heavy progressive or graduated income tax... 
Centralization of credit in the hands of the State...”121 and so on – all measures 
believed to create the conditions whereby class distinctions can disappear after all 
production has been concentrated in the hands of “vast association of the whole 
nation.”122 This programme is not definitive, but rather suggestive of the kinds of 
policies that communists could put into practice to serve the overall goal of the 
elimination of private property and class. Marx’s flexibility about such specific 
measures is amply evidenced over the course of his life in light of changing political 
circumstances. For example, the Manifesto’s authors included the disclaimer in the 
1872 Preface that “[I]n view of the practical experience gained, first in the February 
Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune... this programme has in 
some details become antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, 
viz., that ‘the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made State 
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machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.’”123 And near the end of his life, 
increasingly animated by the revolutionary stirrings in the Russian countryside, Marx 
backed off somewhat from the view of communism being solely a result of the social 
relations brought into being by modern capitalist industry. “Theoretically speaking, 
then, the Russian ‘rural commune’ may preserve its own land... It may become a 
direct starting-point of the economic system towards which modern society is 
tending... But it is necessary to descend from pure theory to Russian reality.”124 In 
the Critique of the Gotha Programme, too, after the statist policies of the Manifesto 
have already been dropped by its authors, Marx suggests measurement by an “equal 
standard, labour”125 with the aim to make the labour time invested in production 
transparently social as an immediate answer to the problem of exploitation in the 
transitional period of lower communism.  
Underwriting all of these proposals is the fact that they serve simply as 
suggestions for how, once proletarian revolution is actualised, things could be taken 
forward to the goal of eliminating private property, exploitation and class. There is 
no attempt at any point in Marx’s involvement with the political cause of the 
working class to prescribe economic transitional forms other than at the broadest, 
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most schematic level.126 Marx thus remained remarkably loyal to his principle 
against planning across his lifetime; he had, as he so famously put it, no intention of 
drawing up recipes for the ‘cook-shops of the future.’127 After the revolution, as long 
as the proletariat lay their hands on the means of production, all communist 
intellectuals have to offer is suggestions – and these of increasing irrelevance in the 
face of the real historical movement expected to occur. This is Marx’s idea in a 
nutshell: the circumscription of communist theoretical thought only up to the point 
of revolution – intellectuals being allowed to help make revolution but not to plan 
beyond it. Yet Marx’s idea of revolution also encompasses an epistemological 
approach which it is perhaps even more significant that his solely political 
commitments. For without being supplemented by a materialist theory of 
knowledge Marx would have no theoretical justification for his circumscription upon 
communist conceptual thought cutting off at the point of revolution, and the status 
of his own scientific labours of analysis and contribution to the working class 
movement would remain insufficiently differentiated from utopian socialism. In 
order to grasp Marx’s idea of revolution more fully, then,  we need to review his 
approach to critique called real abstraction – seeing how it temporalises the use of 
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valid conceptualisation as being a posteriori to the emerge of abstractions in real, 
already existing social relations. 
2.2 The viscosity of real abstraction 
 
Real abstraction is not a term used by Marx himself, but is rather an expression 
coined by Marxist scholars in order to indicate the process Marx posits of an 
abstraction (or separation) occurring in the social world – a split between the 
materiality of things and their social meanings, a rendering of relations non-
transparent even as they are held together in a concrete social whole. Sohn-Rethel 
brilliantly illustrates the basic idea with respect to the commodity form when he 
describes how even a dog can understand when the butcher hands over the meat to 
his master that that meat now belongs to them, but as soon as money passes hands 
between buyer and seller his master enters a shadowy world of value into which no 
animal can pass. In real abstraction material immediacy gives way to relations 
mediated according to invisible social logics. Yet despite the seeming intuitiveness of 
the idea, there is no academic consensus on the definition of real abstraction, and 
hence no real agreement as to whether the idea of real abstraction is found 
throughout Marx’s work, or which exact analyses conform to the concept.128 
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Following Lucio Colletti, however, it seems productive to consider the concept of 
real abstraction in accordance with a handful of fundamental characteristics – 
separation of elements of society, the break between material reality and social 
meaning, and the consequential phenomenological opacity of social relations – 
enabling us to perceive an invariant idea of abstraction underlying all of Marx’s 
political and economic analyses. Insofar as real abstraction is conceived as a 
separation which can only be discerned retroactively, it is useful concept to explicate 
in depth because it allows us to see why these epistemological commitments are 
integral to Marx’s idea of revolution as a circumscription upon the knowledge of 
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communist intellectuals. In this section, then, our aim is to establish the continuity 
of Marx’s idea of real abstraction, even if by doing so we glide across some of the 
differences between the forms of real abstraction which will be important for the 
argument of the next section. To this end, we present three examples, taken from 
treatises and notebooks written between the 1840’s to the 1870’s, and concerned 
with topics as disparate as the state, political economy and mathematics. We first 
look at Marx’s positive analysis of real abstraction, then how he uses the idea to 
explain the ideological deficits of his intellectual antagonists, and, finally, how it is 
compatible with the principle against planning and the temporal limit it places upon 
the intellectual authority of communist theorists. 
Commencing chronologically with a text often overlooked for its strident anti-
Hegelianism, Marx’s 1843 Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State exemplifies how 
Marx uses the idea of real abstraction to explain obfuscations standing in the way of 
criticising the status quo. In this text, Marx criticises Hegel’s attempt to represent the 
modern state as a universal organism by pointing to the fact that whereas in 
medieval times there was a real, corporate fusion of politics with the complete 
organism of the state, the distinction of the modern era is the real abstraction of the 
political state from civil society. Whereas in the medieval state, he writes, there was 
a “substantial unity between people and state,” in the modern state, on the contrary, 
“the constitution develops a particular reality alongside the real life of the 
people.”129 Modern constitutional monarchy takes this abstraction to its extreme. 
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For unlike medieval feudalism where the power of the sovereign “looks as if it were 
the power of private property” and thus “became the repository of the secret of 
universal power, the power of all the elements in the state” a constitutional monarch 
is a mere figment of the imagination: a separation of the “political person from the 
real one, the formal from the material, the universal from the particular, of man from 
social man ... expressed in its most contradictory form.”130 “The Middle Ages were an 
age of real dualism; the modern world is the age of abstract dualism”131 – this is the 
real abstraction of the state from the people.  
The commodity form analysis in Capital fulfils a similar concept of the 
production of abstract relations as a consequence of a separation occurring between 
real relations. Albeit a real abstraction without an historically definite origin – that is, 
the commodity form separating use value and exchange value is more like a universal 
form132 – it fits within the same idea of abstraction as a separation in the real from 
organic and transparent relations, to abstract and opaque relations. Marx’s analysis 
of the commodity aims to show how the material properties of commodities 
comprising their use-value are abstracted away in the process of exchange so that 
their exchange value – expressed in the universal equivalent, money – becomes an 
entirely socially determined value. This process occurs without any conscious 
decision on the part of those engaging in the process of exchange; instead, “by 
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equating their different products to each other in exchange as values, they equate 
their different kinds of labour as human labour. They do this without being aware of 
it.”133 The labour determination of exchange value arises as the result of solely 
structural social forces, with the necessity of a “regulative law of nature”134 as 
reliable as gravity. Commodity owners, when taking their wares to market, “have 
therefore already acted before thinking. The natural laws of the commodity have 
manifested themselves in the natural instincts of the owners of commodities.”135 
This real abstraction emerges as a transhistorical necessity from the exchange of 
goods under a social division of labour of a certain complexity.136 Epistemologically, 
the point that emerges from both of the above examples is that real abstractions can 
only be discerned after the fact, once their mystifying force has already taken hold. 
There is unilaterality of determination from abstractions occurring in the real to the 
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potential for legitimate abstract understanding of reality. As Marx writes: “The 
belated scientific discovery that the products of labour, in so far as they are values, 
are merely the material expressions of the human labour expended to produce them, 
marks an epoch in history of mankind’s development, but by no means banishes the 
semblance of objectivity possessed by the social characteristics of labour.”137 One 
can easily see how this coincides with Marx’s idea of revolution. If we can only know 
the world as it is through abstractions resulting from temporally prior real 
abstractions, the capacity for thought to imagine new, future-oriented abstract 
relations is severely curtailed. Hence Marx’s withering remarks about the bourgeois 
socialists drawing up new social laws with no basis in society as it really is. 
Furthermore, showing how purely intellectual abstractions in absentia of real 
determination result in explanatory failure acts as a critique of ideology. Early on in 
his life this charge is levelled against Hegelian logic, and as Marx develops his critique 
of political economy the accusation is also made against the economists’ use of 
abstract categories to cover up unpleasantness that would otherwise be revealed by 
their analysis. Throughout the 1843 Critique, for instance, Marx presents Hegel’s 
claims to discover the logical necessity of the modern state as simply a crude 
transposition of the Logic onto empirical reality,138 resulting in (at best) remarkably 
meagre speculative insights, and (at worst) outright sophism. His point is that when 
Hegel performs a subject-predicate inversion,139 replacing the historicity of real, 
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material agents as the active force by the development of the Idea, all that results is 
tautologies affirming the existing relationships between the empirical givens of the 
Prussian state.  The “whole critical failure” of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx 
stresses, comes down to “the fact that Hegel has analysed the fundamental idea of 
these presuppositions does not mean that he has demonstrated their validity.”140 
Almost exactly the same accusation is levelled at political economists in the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts: “Political economy proceeds from the fact 
of private property. It does not explain it. It grasps the material process of private 
property ... in general and abstract formulae which it then takes as laws.”141 Beyond 
the way ideologists are wont to provide abstract representations of reality and to 
proceed by taking existing relations as givens, Marx further targets their 
inconsistencies when seeking to rationalise the status quo. Where Hegel, for 
example, fails to provide a convincing account of the rationality of the Prussian state, 
his contortion reveals an intellectual contradiction where one can excavate a real 
abstraction. By attempting to refute the idea of democracy, when Hegel insists upon 
the abstraction of the notion of “being a member of a state,” Marx retorts that “if 
‘being a member of a state’ is an ‘abstraction’ this is not the fault of thought but of 
Hegel’s theories and the realities of the modern world, in which the separation of 
real life from political life is presupposed and political attributes are held to be 
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‘abstract’ determinations of the real member of the state.”142 On the role of the 
estates in Prussian government, Marx also sees in Hegel’s flawed attempt to confer 
upon them necessity for the universality of the state a sign of a deeper truth about 
the reality of modern society.  
 
The deeper truth is that Hegel experiences the separation of the state 
from civil society as a contradiction. The mistake he makes is to rest 
content with the semblance of a resolution which he declares to be 
the real thing. By contrast, he treats with contempt the ‘so-called 
theories’ which call for the ‘separation’ of the classes and Estates. 
These theories, however, are right in that they express a consequence 
of modern society, for here the Estates are nothing more than the 
factual expression of the real relationship between the state and civil 
society, namely one of separation.143 
 
Marx’s mature political economy from the late 1850s onwards evidences the use of 
the same critical operation against his theoretical antagonists. The division of the 
Grundrisse into two discreet chapters – money and capital – is in keeping with a 
dualism inscribed by classical political economists, where try as they might Ricardo et 
al. cannot fuse the categories. Marx maintains their separation in order to draw 
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attention to their merely abstract reconciliation at the ideological limits of bourgeois 
political economy. The aim being not to stop at immanent critique of the way 
political economy leaves its categories logically unresolved, but rather to ascertain 
how this dualism in thought is sculpted by a real abstraction in the social sphere. In 
regard to the relationship between money and commodities Marx says, “they 
[political economists] assert all at once that there is no distinction between money 
and commodities. They take refuge in this abstraction because in the real 
development of money there are contradictions which are unpleasant for the 
apologetics of bourgeois common sense, and hence must be covered up.”144 In the 
Grundrisse Marx also attempts to prise apart the political economists’ identity 
between production and consumption where they are represented as a single act in 
the term “productive consumption.” When considered apart from each other, Marx 
writes that “consumption ideally posits the object of production as an internal image, 
as a need, as drive and as purpose. It creates the objects of production in a still 
subjective form.”145 He then claims that there is “nothing simpler for a Hegelian to 
posit production and consumption as identical.”146 When one considers society as a 
single subject it is just an abstraction that allows production and consumption to be 
represented as a single act by speculative ideologues. Aristotle, too, comes on the 
receiving end of the accusation of historically-conditioned, ideological blinkeredness, 
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when Marx proposes that he was unable to derive the equality of labour lying behind 
the equivalence of goods “because Greek society was founded on the labour of 
slaves, hence had as its natural basis the inequality of men and of their labour-
powers.”147  Only when the equality of labour acquires a permanent place in popular 
opinion with the predominance of the commodity form do the categories become 
available to crack the social hieroglyph. Real abstraction thus always precedes valid 
conceptual abstraction; and the intuition of conceptual abstractions needs to be 
traced back to their real origins to ensure their validity. Marx even applies this 
formula self-critically. Elsewhere in the Grundrisse he derives logical dualisms only 
then to correct himself by observing the necessity of tracing them back to real 
abstractions.148 In the Chapter on Money, after an exploration of the relationship of 
money and commodities, and money as a commodity, Marx remarks in parentheses, 
“It will be necessary later, before this question is dropped, to correct the idealist 
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of investigation, where they are traced back to real abstractions. Carver writes that Marx “might 
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considered them unsatisfactory first interrogations of thought determinations on the subject matter 
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manner of this presentation, which makes it seem as if it were merely a matter of 
conceptual determinations and of the dialectic of these concepts.”149  
 As a final example, just to reinforce how the discernment of real abstraction 
continues right up to Marx’s latest, most technical and strictly scientific works, let us 
see how his mathematical writings apply the same critical operation. The 
manuscripts concern the differential method and the way in which during the course 
of the differential procedure the symbol  
dy
dx
 comes to stand in for a difference 
reducing to 0, or 
0
0
. His aim is to understand how from initial premises that seem to 
imply nothing, a transformative mathematical procedure is performed, leading to 
new results.150 In “On the Concept of the Derived Function,” Marx strives to derive 
the differential from elementary algebra. He writes that the reason for this approach 
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 Marx references this process by analogy when explaining the solution to why different branches of 
industry, with different relative levels of constant and variable capital, all obey the law of value. Many 
intermediate terms of analysis are necessary to explain the conundrum “just as, from the standpoint 
of elementary algebra, many intermediate terms are needed before we can understand that 0/0 may 
represent an actual magnitude.” (Marx, Capital Vol. I, 421) Just as breaking down political economy’s 
abstractions involved a determination of the ordering of production and consumption processes and 
the transformations revealed by these determinations, Marx applies the same method to 
differentiation to break its metaphysical charms. Carchedi also stresses this angle: “Thus, dx, rather 
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Manuscripts”, Science and Society, Vol. 72, No. 4 (October 2008), 423). 
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is for “understanding [how] the differential operation ... lies precisely in seeing how it 
differs from such a simple procedure and therefore leads to real results.”151 Using 
elementary algebra to unpack the process, Marx attempts to demonstrate how 
without any vanishing quantities or abstract notions of infinitesimals it is possible to 
see how the mathematical transformation takes place.152 And even if one were to 
replace the ratio of variable quantities 
∆y
∆x
 with the more illusive symbol of the 
differential ratio 
dy
dx
 Marx argues that now the “transcendental or symbolic mistake” 
has “lost its terror” since it now appears only the result of a process establishing 
“real content.”153  
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 The problem is succinctly laid out with an extremely simple example: In the function y = ax if you 
have an increase in the magnitude of y then y1 = ax1 and y1 – y = a(x1 - x). But if you perform the 
differential operation upon this by making x1 = x (i.e. by reducing the difference to nothing) then the 
complete equation y1 - y = a(x1 - x) also reduces to nothing: 0 = 0. Escaping this impasse involves 
determining the moments of the transformation of the function. If instead of dy
dx
 the equation is 
presented in the following form  
	

	

 = a = 
x
y
∆
∆
Marx determines that the change in x “was thus 
necessarily a finite difference,” hence the possibility to represent it as a change in quantity ∆. In this 
form a represents the limit of the ratio, which once they reach the limit are replaced by dy
dx
 as a more 
acceptable looking substitute for 0
0
. For Marx this is all working in the direction of showing how Leibniz 
and others’ consideration of dy
dx
 as infinitesimal is a chimera.  
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Whether applied to politics, economic theory, or even mathematics, then, 
Marx’s lifelong modus operandi is to expose the abstractions of the ideological realm 
and then to trace them back to the real abstractions from which they draw 
sustenance. Utilising abstraction without grounding by a real abstraction temporally 
preceding it results in inconsistent, scientifically invalid and class-biased ideological 
work. Marx’s opposition is always against “abstract forms of abstraction which fit 
every content and are therefore indifferent to all content.”154 Real abstraction relies 
on a temporal ordering whereby the real abstraction precedes valid abstract analysis 
of social processes or ideological abstractions. His approach therefore coincides with 
the temporal demarcation of the role for communist intellectual ideas being of use 
only up to the revolutionary climax. The abstractions communist intellectuals wield 
to help give theoretical guidance to the movement rely on real abstractions and are 
only of use for examining the system as it is. 
The crucial question, though, is whether this position remains congruent 
with his own analysis of the mechanisms of oppression that evolved in his mature 
political economy, especially considering their many divergences from his early work 
on the subject?  Because where early Marx posed all the vicissitudes of industrial 
capitalism emerging from the single real abstraction of the alienation of workers 
from their labour, late Marx, in conducting his analysis in Capital, isolated multiple 
real abstractions underlying capitalist domination. The problem this raises for his 
idea of social transformation is what happens if we conceive the oppression of the 
working class not as the result of a single abstraction, but rather as an amalgam of 
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multiple real abstractions forming a complex system of exploitation and oppression? 
Is Marx’s circumscription of communist theoretical thought only up to the point of 
revolution still tenable when capitalism is presented as a system composed of 
multiple abstractions interfacing with one another? We can only answer this 
question once we have taken a position on what it means when we say multiple 
abstractions underlie Marx’s analysis in Capital. 
2.3 Too many abstractions spoil the broth?  
 
This section will present arguments for the existence of at least two separate real 
abstractions in Marx’s analysis in Capital and the consequences this entails. By 
arguing that the commodity value form and the separation of workers from the 
means of production are different forms of real abstraction, we will contend that that 
the ‘nested model’ interpretation of Capital to which this position gives rise is the 
correct one, and that the capitalist system cannot be conceived as a homogenous 
totality.155 By this it is meant that not all processes are reflected/sublated in all the 
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 One advocate of the ‘new dialectics’ interpretation, Tony Smith, argues that, in common with 
Hegel’s Logic, Marx’s Capital shares a unifying thread inasmuch as Marx sought to explain the 
systematic progression of socioeconomic categories by reconstructing them in thought and by 
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into one another by each category giving rise to yet another category as a series of immanent 
tendencies. Against this, I argue that the circuits combined into the totality of capitalism – with their 
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others in the Hegelian sense, and thus one cannot think of the capitalist economy 
resting on a single abstraction (or single ‘contradiction’ as Hegelian readers would 
see things). This is an important point to establish for the aim of this chapter, since it 
has implications for post-capitalist transition. Accepting or rejecting the Hegelian 
view on the structure of Marx’s Capital determines whether collective ownership of 
the means of production (closing down the abstraction of the separation of workers 
from the means of production) is adequate also for undermining the commodity 
form (an abstraction between use and exchange value). The two possible answers to 
this question depend on whether one conceives the abstractions assimilated into 
capitalism as forming an absolute unity, or maintaining relative independence within 
the capitalist mode of production even while being synthesized in its reproduction 
and accumulation processes. If all the abstractions in Capital sublate into one 
another in the structure of a homogenous totality, then undermining a single 
abstraction – the separation of workers from means of production – will be adequate 
to annul the totality of capitalism’s abstract relations, including the commodity form. 
But if the real abstractions underpinning the analysis of capitalism maintain their 
own relative autonomy once they are synthesized, then undermining a single 
                                                                                                                                           
basis in real abstractions – are of different forms and that they give rise to circuits which maintain a 
relative degree of independence even once synthesized in the capitalist mode of production. In terms 
of planning beyond capitalism this is important because it implies that overcoming one abstraction in 
the system will not necessarily be enough to overcome all the abstractions if certain circuits can 
continue to function. Moreover, the persistence of certain abstractions and their emergent economic 
circuits can give rise to immanent tendencies that lead to the restoration of the overcome 
abstraction. My argument maintains that you could overcome the real abstraction of the separation 
of workers from the means of production, but if one leaves money intact in its current form, money 
possesses certain qualities that can undermine transition away from capitalism.  
 
118 
 
abstraction cannot undermine the dynamics of the system in toto156 – or, worse, it 
may create a situation in which one abstraction is overcome and others are left intact 
in a way that can encourage capitalism’s restoration. In the following section we 
argue based upon the second interpretation.157 To demonstrate the validity of this 
take on Capital’s fundamental structure, we need to see these different real 
abstractions as underlying the relatively autonomous circulation and value creation 
circuits, with their synthesis definitive of the capitalist mode of production.158 
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evidence in Marx’s Capital for the presence of this conception of historically  necessary transition, 
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dialecticians’, who seek to understand Capital in terms of the dialectical structure of Hegel’s Logic, to 
refute the impression that this implies a linear, historicist interpretation, I will also show that this 
view equally affirms Marx’s break from an historical gnoseology in his analysis of the categories and 
relations of capitalism. Arthur gives his take on the ‘orthodox’ account as follows: “The orthodox 
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Regarding these two abstractions, we will demonstrate (1) their formal difference, 
(2) how they are synthesized within capitalism, and (3) to what extent they maintain 
independence within the integrated system. 
 In the previous section we already encountered the commodity form as an 
example of Marx’s epistemological idea of real abstraction. We also noted, in 
passing, that it is somewhat different to many of the real abstractions that Marx 
proposes inasmuch as the derivation of value determination as a proportion of a 
society’s total socially necessary labour time (and money’s role as the universal 
equivalent) does not confer to an historically specific separation.159 Of course, Marx 
imputes that the commodity form only reaches maturity under capitalism once 
production becomes driven by the valorization process under the conditions of real 
subsumption where the division of labour has attained a specifically capitalist form. 
                                                                                                                                           
understanding of Marx’s method explains this by arguing that he presents his theory through a 
sequence of models, that a model of simple commodity production as a one class society allows him 
to give a complete account of the law of value, and that the subsequent introduction of a model of 
capitalism as a two class society allows him to demonstrate the origin of surplus-value through the 
speciﬁc inﬂection capital gives to this law of value; subsequently more complicated models, including 
landed property and the like, introduce still further distortions of the operation of the law of value” 
(Christopher J. Arthur, The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), 18). 
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 By saying this I do not mean to imply that the commodity form and money are eternal forms in the 
sense Marx criticises in other political economists. Rather, Marx’s division of labour and the 
commodity form arising from exchange processes are transhistorical. As Rosenthal also argues, “the 
treatment of the division of labour and related categories as transhistorical is perfectly 
legitimate….They are valid rather for every phase in the historical development of the specific object 
of enquiry” (The Myth of Dialectics, 52-53). Considering the value form as a ‘practical concept’ 
emergent from real abstraction, Rosenthal presents it as analogous to the Kant’s ‘pure concepts of 
the understanding’ – that is, as a transcendental condition from which axioms of exchange emerge 
(ibid., 59). 
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But what distinguishes the abstraction of commodities’ exchange value from the 
abstraction at the root of surplus-value exploitation is that the former is a necessary 
process arising in any exchange economy under a division of labour. Certainly, 
production for the purpose of accumulating and reinvesting exchange values reaches 
its apotheosis in the capitalist mode of production, but the value determination of 
commodities can precede capitalist production and so too can money operate as the 
universal equivalent in pre-capitalist modes of production. The commodity form 
abstraction is the basis of the monetary expression of economic activity even before 
the valorization circuit (M-C-M’) establishes itself under capitalism. As Marx affirms 
with respect to the circulation of commodities, “we know by experience that a 
relatively feeble development of commodity circulation suffices for the creation of all 
these forms.”160 The difference between the commodity form and the separation of 
workers from the means of production is the historical contingency of the latter 
abstraction, which “only happens on the basis of one particular mode of production, 
the capitalist one.”161 It is historically specific because 
 
nature does not produce on the one hand owners of money or 
commodities, and on the other hand men possessing nothing but their 
own labour-power. This relation has no basis in natural history, nor 
does it have a social basis common to all periods of human history.162 
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Indeed, the form of connection between workers and the means of production, 
unlike the commodity form, comprises the differentia specifica of the “various 
economic epochs of the social structure.”163 Although Marx describes the processes 
by which capitalism creates its own industrial reserve army of labour (‘free 
workers’)164 once it is already well established as an economic system, in order for 
capitalism initially to commence its transition to becoming a sustainable and, in time, 
dominant mode of production, it needs to take advantage of given conditions as a 
basis on which to consolidate its relations of production. Marx thus writes on the 
primitive accumulation necessary to supply the nascent capitalists of the 16th century 
with dispossessed labourers having nothing but their labour-power to sell. In British 
history at least, this circumstance comes about as a result of the Protestant 
reformation, the dissolution of the monasteries, the enclosures of the commons, and 
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 Marx attributes the “specifically capitalist mode of production” to the completion of a process 
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structural tendencies accomplishing the same ends (Marx, Capital Vol. I, 781-786). 
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the legally enforced disciplining of a workforce fit for factory wage-labour.165 All 
these historical contingencies, creating a vast pool of dispossessed workers needing 
to sell their labour-power as a commodity, underlie the development of the capitalist 
mode of production. Consequently, the difference between value determination of 
commodities in general and the value determination of the specific commodity of 
labour-power is also demarcated historically. The value for which workers are willing 
to sell their labour-power for does not have a quantitative determination deducible 
from its formal structure, but is rather historically sensitive with respect to the 
conditions confronting the class of workers that capitalists can assimilate into its 
production processes.166 The value of labour-power is determined by whether 
workers have access to any other means of subsistence and what socially 
conventional minimum expectations prevail for reproduction conditions (this could 
range from mere subsistence goods like food and shelter to needs including a share 
of ‘non-essential’ commodities). “In contrast, therefore, with the case of other 
commodities, the determination of the value of labour-power contains a historical 
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 Nonetheless, the limit of the value of labour-power is logically prescribed. Capitalism would cease 
to function if the value of labour-power was so high that it would have to be bought at the full value 
that it transfers to commodities within a legally enforced or contractually agreed working day. Thus, 
the subsistence value of labour-power should be considered variable and historically conditioned 
between the material limit below which labourers could not reproduce themselves and the upper 
limit past which capitalism could not extract surplus value. The determination of the value of labour-
power on this continuum is determined historically and politically, and includes class struggle as a 
factor. 
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and moral element.”167 Compared to Marx’s forbearers in classical political economy, 
only by building on the historically contingent real abstraction of the emergence of 
propertyless wage-labourers in the 16th century and opening up the category of 
labour by conceptually naming its temporally successive forms – labour-power sold 
as a commodity by the labourer to the capitalist, and the labour exploited afterwards 
in the workplace – can Marx solve the riddle of the capitalist value creation.168 For 
labour-power to be sold as a commodity requires labourers without others means of 
subsistence – and there is nothing natural or inevitable about this circumstance 
arising. 
                                                 
167
 Marx, Capital Vol. I, 275. 
 
168
 The genealogy of the ‘transformation problem’ further underlines the significance of temporal 
ordering for Marx’s labour theory of value (henceforth LTV). Adopting the approach of neoclassical 
economic analysis, Ladislaus Bortkiewicz’s early 20
th
 century critique of Marx’s LTV took a simultaneist 
approach aiming to correct the way Marx’s analysis valued inputs and outputs differently by instead 
valuing input and output prices at the same time – this approach leading, as a result, to a divergence 
between aggregate values and prices (see Andrew Kliman, Reclaiming Marx’s “Capital” (Lanham and 
Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007), Chapter 3, ‘A brief history of the controversy’, 46). Subsequently, 
the ‘transformation problem’ was born, undermining key Marxian propositions such as total profit 
deriving from the exploitation of labour, and also the long term tendency for a declining rate of profit 
– hence, in turn also disabling Marx’s theory of crisis. According to Kliman, the simultaneist stream of 
critiques and the readjustment of the Marxian analysis to accommodate them – most notably in the 
work of Sweezy, Steedman, and Straffa – can all be traced back to Bortkiewicz’s reconfiguration in 
which he quite conspicuously chose to depart from Marx’s temporal analysis. In Bortkiewicz’s words 
he rejected Marx’s economics where factors are “regarded as a kind of casual chain, in which each link 
is determined, in its composition and magnitude, only by preceding links” (Bortkiewicz, cited in ibid., 
47). In this way, Bortkiewicz’s analytic followed the neoclassical school by transposing a static 
equilibrium model upon the real world in which there is an actual temporal process; a process which it 
is necessary to dissect using the category of value in order to ascertain the source of profit in Marxian 
economics. 
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 These two real abstractions – the commodity form and the separation of 
workers from the means of production – nonetheless form circuits which are 
organically synthesized in capitalism. The money circuit M-C-M’ is interposed with 
the circuit of productive capital M C 
 M (L = labour-power, mp = means of 
production) giving rise to the valorization process whereby capital becomes a self-
propelling subject. As Marx repeats again and again, in order to understand the 
valorization process one cannot derive it from the simple money circuit, yet without 
the money circuit valorization would be impossible. The money circuit is the 
transhistorical, spontaneous precondition for the productive circuit of capitalism. As 
Foley describes, “The function of money as expressing labor time is common to all 
commodity-producing societies, but different arrangements perform this function in 
each society. The functions of money, and the theoretical problems they pose – such 
as explaining the divisions of value in capitalist production, or the determinants of 
the value of money – are independent of the particular monetary institutions of a 
society.”169  
But then does not this difference between the commodity form abstraction 
and the specific historical abstraction giving rise to capitalism (seen as two separate 
real abstractions) mean that we are back to an orthodox Engelsian view on the 
synchrony between history and the emergence of logical categories?170 Are we not, 
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 Engels gives a mobilist view on how categories emerge cosynchronously with history. “It should go 
without saying that where things and their mutual relations are conceived not as fixed but rather as 
changing, their mental images, too, i.e. concepts, are also subject to change and reformulation; that 
they are not to be encapsulated in rigid definitions, but rather developed in their process of historical 
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in order to depart from this ‘historicism’, then required to adopt an alternative 
atemporal, logical interpretation of the categories? Are not interpretations 
necessarily stuck between the shallow, logical shoals of Scylla, and the historical 
whirlpool of Charybdis? We argue not.  Moreover, the false dichotomy is actually a 
result of interpreters frequently looking in the wrong place to understand the 
relationship between Marx’s categories. This is because the crucial difference lies not 
in the abstractions’ historical ordering (or lack thereof) but instead lies in the forms 
of commodity abstraction and abstraction of workers from the means of production: 
universal and ‘natural’ versus historically specific and contingent, respectively. If seen 
in this way, we can understand why conceptualising capitalism as the result of the 
synthesis of the two real abstractions cannot be considered as an historical 
gnoseology in the orthodox Engelsian sense objected to by the Althusserian, Della 
Volpean, and ‘new dialectics’ schools of interpretation. At the same time, it is also 
the reason why Capital cannot be interpreted as an ahistorical, logical model as some 
Althuserrians and ‘new dialectics’ advocates have tended towards.171 Just because 
                                                                                                                                           
or logical formation. It will be clear then why [Marx] proceeds precisely there from the simple 
commodity and not from a conceptually and historically secondary form, the commodity as already 
modified by capital” (Fredrick Engels, “Preface” in Marx, Capital Vol. III, 103). 
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 In outlining his methodology in the introduction to the Grundrisse it will not surprise many readers 
to find that Marx rejects his predecessors’ attempts to present production “as encased in eternal 
natural laws independent of history, at which opportunity bourgeois relations are then quietly 
smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws on which society is founded in the abstract” (Grundrisse, 
87). This, however, has led some to miscomprehend Marx’s theory as historicist. For this, Finnelli 
nicely surmises, we have Engels to thank, because “for Engels, 
commodity→value→labour→money→capital is an historical progression which is mirrored in the 
logical progression, of the same order with which Marx supposedly constructed Capital by employing 
a simplistically materialist gnoseology, based on the reflection of the real in the logical-mental. Thus 
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the expository structure of Marx’s Capital, its logical method, is ‘nothing else but the historical 
method, only stripped from disturbing fortuities’” (Roberto Finelli, “Abstraction versus Contradiction: 
Observations on Chris Arthur's The New Dialectic and Marx's 'Capital'”, Historical Materialism, Vol. 15 
Issue 2 (2007), 62). Considering historicism as embroiled in the humanist Marxist trend, in Reading 
Capital Althusser takes these quotes as a starting point for a hypothesis that in his mature political 
economy Marx makes a complete break from historicism, even if he remained straddled with some of 
the prejudices of his youth. Althusser admits, “Marx often went only halfway with his real critique in 
his declared critique, by establishing the only difference between him and Classical Economists as the 
non-history of their conception” (ibid., 102). The danger, as Althusser sees it, is that if one does not 
articulate what Marx himself could not then the implication of this minimal separation of his 
economic work from his bourgeois predecessors implies that “Marx need[ed] only [to] historicize 
these categories, refusing to take them as fixed, absolute or eternal, but, on the contrary, regarding 
them as relative, provisional and transitory” (ibid, 103). The focus on the break from historicism in 
Marx’s method is not, nevertheless, exclusive to Althusserianism. As Schmidt writes, “even those who 
do not accept the thesis—which is fundamental to Althusser—that Marx’s lifework presents two 
absolutely separate ‘problematic’, an ‘ideological’ one in the early writings and a ‘scientific’ one in 
Capital, will see how little one can speak of a ‘historicism’ imprisoned by mere chronology in the 
work of the mature Marx” (History and Structure, 6). Schmidt concedes that “Marx is concerned with 
the ‘presentation’—which is model-like and removed unmediated empirical material—of his subject 
matter and knows very well that as a result of the question concerning the ‘relationship between 
scientific presentation and the real movement’ of history was not settled” (ibid., 64). As an epilogue 
to this debate, in the 1978 essay “Marx in his limits,” Althusser settled accounts with his previous 
hypothesis of an absolute break of Marx from Hegel by conceding to his Hegelian critics the 
continuity of the structure of Hegel’s Logic in Capital. He writes, “there can be no doubt that Marx 
was guided, right down to his way of interpreting them [chemistry, physics, mathematics] by an Idea 
of Truth inherited from Hegel and much earlier thinkers... the Idea of Science requires that one begin 
with abstraction, and that the thought process proceed from the abstract to the concrete” (ibid., 42). 
Althusser uses this recognition of the methodological continuity with the Logic in order to criticise 
Capital’s critical opening of deriving commodity fetishism simply from the split between use value 
and exchange value (implying for him that the fetish effect is simply in the commodity itself 
regardless of the complex social forms of which it is part), and also in passing to account for the 
critiques made by Straffa on the ‘transformation problem’. (see Louis Althusser, “Marx in his Limits” 
in Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-1987, trans. G.M.Goshgarian, eds. F. Matheron & 
O. Corpet (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 7-162). As we argue in chapter 4 of this thesis, 
Althusser’s work by the late 1970s was already on the decline and we do not attach much weight to 
this late career u-turn. His early critiques stand and are of lasting importance regardless of his later 
rejection of them. 
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the commodity form can precede capitalism does not mean that the presentation of 
the categories is historicist or that a linear, historical gnoseology is at work in the 
ordering of Capital’s categories. To claim as much would be to miss the key point 
that the difference between the categories is principally one of the form of real 
abstraction and not of their historical ordering. The commodity form is different to 
the form of the separation of workers from the means of production such that it can 
precede capitalist relations, and indeed must; yet this is not the crucial formal 
difference but rather a consequence of it. Considered in this light, we can make sense 
of Marx’s famous methodological reflections in his 1857 Introduction, where he 
states,  
 
It would therefore be unfeasible and wrong to let the economic 
categories follow one another in the same sequence as that in 
which they were historically decisive. Their sequence is determined, 
rather, by their relation to one another in modern bourgeois 
society, which is precisely the opposite of that which seems to be 
their natural order or which corresponds to historical development.  
The point is not the historic position of the economic relations in 
the succession of different forms of society.172 
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Similarly, in Marx’s mathematical writings linear historical evolution of the 
categories is also rejected. In the drafts for his essay, “On the Differential,” Marx 
stresses the fact that the methodological inversion he has inferred does not 
correspond to a historically ordered inversion: “I do not believe any mathematician 
has proved or rather even noticed this necessary reversal from the first method of 
algebraic derivation (historically the second) whether for so elementary a function 
as uz or any other.”173 Marx’s methodological reflections echo the remarks of the 
1857 Introduction by rejecting historicist gnoseology. As with the commodity form 
abstraction, the abstraction of the infinitesimal is a universal form of abstraction as 
opposed to the historically contingent real abstraction of workers from the means of 
production, or, say, the separation of the political state from the people. It follows 
that the universal form of real abstraction cannot be conceived in the same way as a 
particular form of real abstraction. Two types of real abstraction are present in 
Capital, and so one cannot see them as giving rise to historically ordered 
categories.174  
                                                 
173
 Karl Marx, “Second Draft” in The Mathematical Manuscripts of Karl Marx (London: New Park 
Publications, 1983), 54. 
 
174
 Furthermore, although the formal distinction is already there in Marx, further research since 
Marx’s time is continuing to undermining any attempt to see the two abstractions as causally 
sequential, historical and anthropological, complicating the attempt to represent a natural, 
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 Now, given that we have argued the principle difference between Capital’s 
most significant abstractions is formal and that their synthesis within the capitalist 
mode of production does not imply their sublation into the structure of 
homogenous (Hegelian) totality, what consequences result from this interpretation? 
To answer this, we have to turn our attention to the role of money. As we have 
already seen, Marx considers money a spontaneous result of the commodity form 
abstraction, serving as the universal equivalent in the exchange of goods. Marx 
further sees money developing functions such as in the credit system, and as a 
spontaneous development from experience in using the basic monetary form for 
capitalist purposes. In a lengthy passage he summarises the functions money plays 
in the circuitry of advanced capitalist reproduction: 
 
The fluxes and refluxes of money which take place on the basis of 
capitalist production, for the reconversion of the annual product, and 
which have grown up spontaneously; the advances of fixed capital at a 
single stroke, to its entire value, and the progressive withdrawl of this 
value from circulation by a process that extends over a period of many 
years, i.e. its gradual reconstitution in the money form by annual 
hoard formation, a hoard formation ... as well as the variation in the 
size and period of the reflux according to the condition or relative size 
of the production stocks in different businesses and for the different 
individual capitalists in the same line of business ... all these different 
aspects of the spontaneous movement had only to be noted and 
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brought to light by experience, in order to give rise both to a 
methodical use of the mechanical aids of the credit system and to the 
actual fishing out of available loan capital.175 
 
Marx further contends that money plays only a functional role in the process 
of expanded reproduction and accumulation within capitalism. “The money on the 
one side calls into being expanded reproduction on the other only because the 
possibility of this already exists without the money; for money in itself is not an 
element of real reproduction.”176 Yet what does it mean to say money is not an 
element of real reproduction when Marx has already established the development of 
money as one of the preconditions of capitalism? This appears to be attributable to 
his quantity theory of money, where the total quantity of money maintains an 
identity with the total value of commodities in circulation, and the value of these 
commodities in circulation is in identity with the labour-time invested in their 
production. This monetary theory explains why, at an aggregate level, total price = 
total value,177 since money is a universal abstraction of the value of the commodity 
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example of five capitals in different spheres of production. On the aggregate level, “The total price of 
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form: its universal equivalent. The fact that price and value on an industry-specific or 
commodity-specific basis fall out of sync with each other lies behind periodic crises of 
accumulation.178 Relatedly, Marx insists that explanations of supply and demand 
meeting to determine market value in fact explain nothing: the question proper is 
why does price vary and why in reality does supply actually never meet demand, or 
vice versa, their coincidental meeting rather being the exception that proves the rule 
of their divergence.179 At the same time, this disequilibrium between value and price 
– value being the long-term anchor of price variations – is what tendentially drags 
profit rates across industries towards one another. The formation of a general rate of 
profit across spheres of production results from the same process by which value 
comes to determine the rates of exchange between commodities.180 Through the 
price mechanism, supply and demand serve to regulate the amount of socially 
necessary labour expressed in a commodity’s market value; the process of 
competition perpetually driving down socially necessary labour to its minimum, 
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equilibrium level.181 The point is that the gap between value and price, or – what is 
much the same thing at a higher level of complexity – the difference between the 
rate of profit and the rate of surplus value, are tendentially reunified through market 
competition, based upon price, in turn regulating socially necessary labour time. 
 
Capital withdraws from a sphere with a low rate of profit and wends 
its way to others that yield higher profit. This constant migration, the 
distribution of capital between the different spheres according to 
where the profit rate is rising and where it is falling, is what produces 
a relationship between supply and demand such that average profit 
is the same in the various different spheres, and values are therefore 
transformed into prices of production.182 
 
This process has an organic necessity so that some spheres of production are not, in 
the long term, able to extract permanent rent from supplying commodities 
necessary for production in other spheres at a price above their value. Money, then, 
should not be seen in a crude way as just a reflective, ideal mirror of a pre-symbolic, 
real material commodity economy underlying it; money, for Marx, serves a systemic 
function to regulate price with value across capitalist industries and prevent severe 
sectoral imbalances. This function of money is thrown into stark relief if one 
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attempts to imagine, as Marx does in places, a collectively owned and managed 
economy in its absence, with labour value tokens issued in place of monetary 
remuneration for workers. 
 
With collective production, money capital is completely dispensed 
with. The society distributes labour-power and means of production 
between the various branches of industry. There is no reason why the 
producers should not receive paper tokens permitting them to 
withdraw an amount corresponding to their labour time from the 
social consumption stocks. But these tokens are not money; they do 
not circulate.183 
 
In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx makes the same suggestion, only 
further specifying that (1) these tokens operate in the absence of the exchange of 
goods and (2) that they are only drawn on the means of consumption (called 
Department II in Capital). 
 
Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from society—after 
the deductions have been made—exactly what he gives to it. What he 
has given to it is his individual quantum of labour. For example, the 
social working day consists of the sum of the individual hours of work; 
the individual labour time of the individual producer is the part of the 
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social working day contributed by him, his share in it. He receives a 
certificate from society that he has furnished such and such an 
amount of labour (after deducting his labour from the common funds), 
and with this certificate he draws from the social stock of means of 
consumption as much as costs the same amount of labour. The same 
amount of labour which he has given to society in one form he 
receives back as another.184 
 
Significantly, however, Marx qualifies that this process also takes place in the 
absence of exchange. “Within the cooperative society based on common ownership 
of the means of production, the producers do not exchange their products; just as 
little does the labour employed on the products appear here as the value of these 
products.”185 Marx has good reasons for wishing to write exchange out of this 
collectively owned and managed economy.  As he shows in Capital Vol. III, when 
imagining an economy where workers are in control of the means of production but 
continue to exchange their goods according to the labour they have expended in 
their production, the values of commodities would fall radically out of sync and so 
too would profit rates, since there would no equalization between the production 
prices and value forming constant capital component.186 Rather unconvincingly, 
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Marx nonetheless leaves the possibility open, because “Under these conditions, the 
difference in the profit-rate would be a matter of indifference, just as for a present-
day wage-labourer it is a matter of indifference in what profit rate the surplus-value 
extorted from his is expressed.”187 I say unconvincing, first because workers in a 
cooperative or particular sector could exchange their goods by distorting the 
recording of the labour-time they claim to have invested in production, second 
because there would be no regulative mechanism for correcting false reporting, and 
third because such imbalances would, after time, lead to serious systematic 
imbalances in the economy. 
Let us explore this problem in more depth, because it helps get to the nub of 
whether Marx’s analysis of capitalism sees its systemic properties reducing to just 
private property or a synthesis that includes the relatively autonomous commodity 
form. There are two possibilities resulting from implementation of Marx’s value 
token scheme. Since one of these scenarios takes place in the absence of a centrally 
controlled economy, we will discount Marx’s qualification that products are not 
exchanged. We do this for it is not clear how, in the absence of centralised 
mediation, exchange could be avoided. The Rousseauian-influenced idea that 
through the revolutionary process a new humanity will emerge around the 
subjectivity of an altruistic and consistently honest collective worker seems 
extremely utopian when considered on a national or global scale.188 Granted Marx’s 
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writings right to the end of his days repeat the idea that the revolutionary process 
gives birth to new subjectivity (a new human ‘nature’), but it is a hypothesis that is 
conceptually external to the analysis in Capital. Yes, Capital shows that capitalism 
separates workers and pits them against one another; but, it does not show how 
collective ownership of the means of production will create a new humanity – this 
has to remain a political wager (and in my opinion, an untenably utopian wager) 
external to the conceptual analysis conducted in the book.  
 Therefore, on a technical level, if we suppose such issues are not overcome 
by the honesty and altruism arising from new communist humanity, the problem 
with Marx’s suggestion relates to how socially necessary labour will be measured 
and regulated. Since socially necessary labour is regulated under capitalism by both 
real subsumption on the level of manufacturing processes and by money acting as a 
spontaneous universal equivalent exerting convergence tendencies between 
industries, directly substituting money with labour-time tokens would have two 
consequences.189 Across different cooperatives and/or industries in a decentralised 
economy, a permanent structural disequilibrium would occur in exchange due to the 
different organic compositions (and rates of change in composition) resulting in 
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inter-sectoral productivity imbalances. Since, in the absence of an overarching 
regulative authority, the labour-time invested in goods is non-transparent between 
one industry and another, the amount of labour-time tokens exchanged between 
productive units for each others’ goods would result in permanent disequilibrium.190 
On the other hand, presuming central planning, an enormous, continuing operation 
of monitoring the labour time used in the production of goods would be necessary, 
which, while technically possible, would contradict Marx’s anti-statist principles as 
proclaimed after the Paris Commune.  
In fact, Marx anticipates how labour tokens would give rise to the need for a 
command economy in the Grundrisse. While it is important to emphasize that in this 
text he is forwarding a critique of Proudhon on the basis that schemes are being 
proposed in the absence of a radical reconfiguration of the relations of production, 
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nonetheless, Marx’s critique of Proudhon’s labour money proposal – concerning the 
difficulty of establishing equivalence of socially necessary labour time, and the way it 
implies an omnipotent central bank – is no less applicable for thinking post-
revolutionary economic transition if exchange is considered necessary.  
 
A second attribute of the [central] bank [issuing labour-time chits] 
would be necessary: it would need the power to establish the 
exchange value of all commodities….But its functions could not end 
there. It would have to determine the labour time in which 
commodities could be produced….But that also would not be 
sufficient….The workers would not be selling their labour to the bank, 
but they would receive exchange value for the entire product of their 
labour, etc. Precisely seen, then, the bank would not only be the 
general buyer and seller, but also the general producer.191  
 
It is beyond the remit of this chapter to explore in greater depth the problems 
implied by Marx’s analysis of money on economic planning for post-capitalist 
transition.192 But what the above discussion should make clear is that even once the 
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abstraction of workers from the means of production is overcome in a collective 
economy (either centralized or decentralized), issues related to the formal 
properties of money persist. That is what we mean when we say that Capital’s 
analysis of the capitalist mode of production is grounded via multiple real 
abstractions that remain relatively autonomous despite their propitious (from a 
capitalist’s perspective) synthesis within the capitalist mode of production. In order 
to circumvent these issues, Marx himself places another condition on a communist 
economy – namely, that no exchange will take place – which merely displaces the 
problem of the money form onto the utopian suggestion that social production and 
development can take place on the basis of altruistic giving between the different 
branches of the association of labourers. The point is that if one follows Marx’s own 
analysis of capitalism, the two abstractions retain their own peculiar logics when 
disaggregated. Capitalism thus needs to be seen as a complex assemblage of 
different abstractions held together in a unity, which is why any attempt to 
overcome capitalism, if following Marx’s conceptual analysis in Capital, cannot be 
reduced to a single item programme corresponding to overcoming a single 
abstraction. Both the collective ownership of the means of production and the 
money form would need to be changed in sync to set in place a sustainable 
transition dynamic. Marx avoids this conclusion simply by eliminating one of the 
variables – money – but only does so by importing a utopian, political hypothesis to 
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supplement his economic analysis. But if we discount Marx’s reduction to just one 
variable as being a political hypothesis external to his analysis, then overcoming 
capitalism will involve changing a system along multiple, intersecting axes. This 
matter thus intersects his concept of revolutionary change. 
2.4 Burning the cookbook to save the recipe 
  
Let us bring the discussion back to Marx’s principle against planning the post-
capitalist future inherent to his idea of revolution. We have seen that positing real 
abstraction is compatible with the anti-planning principle for its temporal 
demarcation of abstraction only being able to build upon real abstraction. We have 
also argued that this anti-planning principle only holds when the system is diagnosed 
as suffering from a single abstraction to which all the others reduce. If the root of all 
problems can be traced to a single abstraction, then only a single item communist 
programme is needed to address that abstraction. If the oppression in the economic 
system emerges solely from the separation of workers from the means of 
production, then one only need pursue a programme aiming to reconcile the two. 
Yet if capitalism is diagnosed as a system of multiple abstractions, interacting 
dynamically with one another, then establishing a sustainable dynamic to transition 
from one mode of production (capitalism) to a new mode (socialism/communism) 
will involve sophisticated economic planning based upon value-form analysis. This is 
to say that if capitalism is a result of the commodity/monetary abstraction and 
workers’ separation from the means of production, to overcome capitalism you will 
have to address both of these in a transitional process. If not, and if you try to reduce 
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the task of addressing both abstractions by positing a singular overcoming, then you 
will, as Marx does, be forced to lean on utopian assumptions about the change in 
human subjectivity brought about by communist revolution193 – and further commit 
to these being scaleable to the macro-national or global level and sustainable in the 
long run. Yet the logic of the Marx’s economic critique in Capital (precluding 
supplementary hypotheses about the change in human nature) implicitly breaks from 
the idea of a simple inversion pivoting on collective ownership of the means of 
production. His own analysis beckons in the direction of the need for planning post-
capitalist structures, and a break from a Hegelian concept of historical change 
occurring at a single point of change. 
This point can be brought out in contrast to Marx’s earlier writings, before his 
mature political economy picks apart these different dynamics. For the early Marx, 
there is no complex of multiple abstractions called ‘capitalism’ which needs to be 
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overcome; the system of oppression all comes down to private property as a 
symptom of the single abstraction arising from the alienation of workers from their 
labour process and objects of production. In Marx’s early political economy 
everything turns on the single foundation of alienated labour. Let us consider why, if 
a single abstraction is diagnosed at the root of the ills of modern capitalist industry, 
this perfectly aligns with his principle against planning post-capitalist economic 
structure in advance of revolution.  
For early Marx, alienated labour turns the world upside down, and all the 
inversions to which this single abstraction give rise make the structure of Marx’s 
proposed overcoming adopt the form of a simple inversion taking place at a single 
nodal point. As he puts it in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts: 
 
Just as we have arrived at the concept of private property through an 
analysis of the concept of estranged, alienated labour, so with the 
help of these two factors is it possible to evolve all economic 
categories, and in each of these categories, e.g. trade, competition, 
capital, money, we shall identify only a particular and developed 
expression of these basic constituents.194 
  
In light of our reading of Capital’s multiple constitutive abstractions, Marx’s early 
emphasis on evolving all the categories solely from alienated labour should be 
conspicuous. Further, the single abstraction underlying all the laws of political 
                                                 
194
 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, 333. 
 
143 
 
economy is reflected in the linear inversions Marx claims are expressed in the ‘laws’ 
of political economy: “the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; 
the more value he creates, the more worthless he becomes.”195 This, again, is in 
sharp contradistinction to the nuanced dynamics laid out in Capital. By the time of 
his mature economic studies, Marx would never claim that there is some simple 
inverse relation between workers producing more and receiving less, there being too 
many intervening variables to make such a claim. It might be possible in some 
circumstances; it might not in others. As a consequence of the way in which in the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’ economic relations all turn on the single 
category of alienated labour, overcoming private property will, likewise in a single 
stroke, undo all existing economic laws. “Wages are a consequence of estranged 
labour, and estranged labour is the immediate cause of private property. If one falls, 
the other must fall too.”196 The crux of the matter is that there is a connection 
between attributing a single real abstraction as the cause of the ills of the working 
class and the idea that transitioning to communism can be realised by overcoming 
simply this one abstraction.  
 Marx nevertheless remained committed to this principle long after he had 
broken from his belief that capitalism turns solely on alienated labour. Indeed, the 
demarcation of lower and higher communism one finds in his later political writings 
reflects a desire to mediate between the more sober, sophisticated analysis of 
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capitalism in his later writings with the fully fledged humanist reconciliation themes 
predominating in his earlier work. Marx cautions in the Critique of the Gotha 
Programme, “What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has 
developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from 
capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and 
intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb 
it emerges.”197 This is the context in which the labour certificate scheme, discussed in 
the last section, is proposed as an immediate solution to exploitation (a scientific 
discovery of his mature writings), in the process of the transition to higher 
communism where alienation will be overcome. Marx criticises his own scheme 
insofar as it preserves the principle of the exchange of commodities according to 
equal values. Although “[c]ontent and form are changed” and “principle and practice 
are no longer at loggerheads” this is still a “bourgeois right” inasmuch as the “right of 
producers is proportional to the labour they supply; the equality consists in the fact 
that measurement is made with an equal standard, labour.”198 From admitting that 
these “defects are inevitable” in the first phase of transition, Marx then makes a 
speculative leap in his depiction of the “higher phase” in which all the economic 
categories and dualisms of capitalist society disappear. 
 
                                                 
197
 Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Programme,” 21. 
 
198
 Ibid., 22. 
 
145 
 
[A]fter the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of 
labour, and there with also the antithesis between mental and 
physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a 
means of life but life’s prime want; after the productive forces have 
also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and 
all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly—only then 
can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety 
and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, 
to each according to his needs.199 
 
Marx’s reconciliation theme is booted into the future to a point where theoretical 
analysis of the existing regime is impossible.  
 The point is that to the end of his days Marx maintains the idea that 
revolution is an epistemic cut in the historical fabric beyond which no communist 
theorist should attempt to peer far beyond. Yet, as we have seen, there are 
tendencies in his later work – complexified notions of a mode of production, multiple 
real abstractions, a break from humanist assumptions – which all point towards this 
being unsatisfactory. The idea that revolution and communist transition can be 
conceived as issuing from the closing down of a single abstraction imitates the way in 
Hegel’s linear historicism epochs are pushed forwards by the movement of the 
prevailing general contradiction of an era. In the final instance, then, Marx’s 
unwillingness to push his complexified analysis further through to thinking 
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transitional post-capitalist economics taking on board the quasi-autonomous 
dynamics of money reflects his adherence to a notion of historical change owing 
much to Hegel. Of course, one could argue that there are many other reasons Marx 
might not have wanted to expand upon transitional economics – none the least 
Engels’s and his ideological commitments to the proletariat’s self-emancipation as 
discussed in the first section – but still, the point we have tried to make is that 
underlying (or at the minimum parallel to) these commitments is a theory of 
knowledge and a set of conceptual structures relevant for analysing Marx’s idea of 
revolutionary change. In many important ways these are different from Hegelian 
historicism. But in another sense they converge back to similar postulates when the 
issue is concentrated on the question of what happens in revolution and what the 
conception of the historical mechanism is shifting the world between epochs (for 
Hegel) or modes of production (for Marx).  
In conclusion, and in terms of the overall argument of the first part of this 
thesis, Marx’s unwillingness to break from the idea of revolutionary change effected 
at solely a single point of transformation means that he remains within the Hegelian 
horizon. This is the reason why the quantity-quality leaps imported from Hegel’s 
Logic by Engels could complement Marx’s idea of revolution. Lenin perhaps came 
closest to breaking from these theoretical limits within Second International 
Marxism. But still thinking within the horizon of Hegelian philosophy and a variant of 
the historicist view on political change, as we will see his ideas still succumbed to the 
influences of his era. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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3. Lenin’s Leaps 
 
 
the evolution of revolution 
 
 
 Thus the [Paris] Commune appears to have substituted “only” fuller 
democracy for the smashed state machine… But as a matter of fact this “only” 
signifies the very important substitution of one type of institution for others 
of a fundamentally different order. This is a case of “quantity becoming 
transformed into quality”: democracy, introduced as fully and consistently as 
is generally conceivable, is transformed from bourgeois democracy into 
proletarian democracy.200 
     
 
Written during the turmoil of the Russian Revolution, in State and Revolution Lenin 
turned his back on Social Democracy to insist on the need to smash the bourgeois 
state. Nothing less than the capture of the state machine and its decimation from 
within was required. At the same time Lenin needed to demarcate his position from 
anarchism, which his antagonists in the pantheon of the Second International had 
long conflated with any form of anti-statism. He was thus compelled to show how 
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smashing the bourgeois state was not antithetical to the establishment of a 
proletarian state. In the latter, army, police force and bureaucracies were to be 
eliminated by arming the entire population and ensuring the involvement of all men 
and women in its merged operations. And this maximalist programme, diverting so 
far from the orthodoxy of the time, was defended against charges that it prescribed 
the anarchist elimination of the state as such via a conceptual representation of the 
dramatic transformation of the state’s form – from quantity to quality; from the 
bureaucratic-reactionary state to the revolutionary-democratic state.  
Along his with April Theses, Lenin’s State and Revolution is often considered 
to have sundered the theory and practice of Marxism.201 After breaking from the 
Second International over its support for imperialist war and then going on to 
complete a study of Hegel’s The Science of Logic, the resulting texts, the evidence 
suggests, are an explosive combination of philosophy and politics paying massive 
dividends for guiding practice towards radical change. Indeed, it is hard to 
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overestimate just how radical Lenin’s propositions were. In the midst of mass 
upheaval after February 1917, where for the first time the Russian people enjoyed 
unprecedented freedom of speech, assembly and representation, Marxism’s most 
famous practitioner demanded a second revolution in order to realise a platform 
only a paper-thin nuance away from fulfilling every anarchist’s dream. Where the 
German SPD202 was still backing war credits to their government, in the mould of the 
short-lived Paris Commune the Russian Bolshevik leader proposed to smash 
completely the state machine, and to do so in the largest country in the world, a 
country which had scarcely developed beyond a peasant economy. 
The boldness of Lenin’s interventions and their coincidence with his 
authorship of notebooks on Hegel’s The Science of Logic a few years earlier makes it 
easy to argue that Lenin’s rediscovery of the Hegelian dialectic and the idea of 
quantity-quality leaps thenceforth equipped Marxism with an idea of the event 
permitting it to resist all evolutionary historicist temptations. It is no wonder that 
contemporary Hegelian-Marxists like Daniel Bensaïd, Stathis Kouvelakis, Kevin 
Anderson and Slavoj Žižek continue to use Lenin’s study of Hegel as the exemplary 
case in point for why dialectical materialism remains an essential component of 
Marxist theory.203 Yet despite the seductive narrative there remain reasons to be 
cautious in endorsing their view on the matter. For if we resist being carried away by 
the epoch-making moment of history in which Lenin’s studies took place, there are a 
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number of difficulties with attributing to Lenin’s notebooks the radical break from 
the tradition typically assumed. Whilst the arch reformist of the Second 
International, Eduard Bernstein, might have turned against Hegelian dialectics at the 
same time as the arch revolutionist, Lenin, embraced them yet further, this should 
not distract from the fact that most of the concepts Lenin discovered in reading the 
Logic were already firmly entrenched within the Marxism of the time, including in 
the dialectical materialism of Plekhanov who supported the nationalist drive for war. 
If one is to argue that Lenin broke from the orthodox dialectical materialism, this 
raises the question of in what way his dialectically informed understanding of change 
is new? What novelty did Lenin bring to Marxist theory that Engels had not already 
introduced in Anti-Dühring? And how accurate is it to say that Lenin’s notion of leaps 
allowed him to break from evolutionary historicism? As we will see, answering these 
questions involves an appreciation of the peculiarities involved with applying the 
idea of quantity-quality leaps to social analysis.  
In chapter one, we already raised serious doubts about whether these 
transformations in fact break from Hegelian historicism and consequently whether 
they are adequate to conceptualise a novelty-bearing event. The challenge in this 
chapter is in some ways more difficult. For Hegel’s idea behind these transformations 
is that they apply in the domain of mechanical physics, flagging up the limits to 
quantitative determination of things and explaining how in changing along their 
linear, quantitative determinations at a certain point things suddenly leap to a new 
qualitative state. Yet Hegel stresses that this schema cannot be applied to realm of 
spirit, even though this is precisely how dialectical materialism seeks to use this idea. 
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There is therefore an extra step involved in evaluating how Marxist practitioners 
construe the idea: this pertaining to which variables they attribute to quantity and 
which to quality. Whether quantity-quality transformations allow one to think 
disjunctive historical events is a question enmeshed in the manner in which historical 
materialist variables are plugged into the schema. To understand if and potentially in 
which way Lenin’s idea of quantity-quality transformations differs from the orthodox 
evolutionism of the time therefore requires us to situate historically how such 
evolutionism was construed by his peers in both political practice and in their take on 
dialectical materialism. This is necessary as a corrective to overly simplistic 
assumptions that Lenin’s discovery of leaps, breaks in gradualness and sudden 
transformations in Hegel’s Logic sufficiently distinguishes him from the evolutionism 
of the Second International; these conclusions drawn without considering the 
interplay between his take on the idea and the historical materialist schemata to 
which it is applied. While it is obvious that Lenin’s politics sharply diverged with 
those of the Second International after the outbreak of war, and that his charges 
against the politically gradualist tendency of the European Social Democracy seems 
to mirror his discovery of the leaps between quantity and quality, the awkward truth 
is that the these leaps were already a widely accepted idea – in fact, the most 
privileged idea – of orthodox Engelsian dialectical materialism.204 If Lenin successfully 
manages a break from evolutionism upon his encounter with Hegel’s Logic, it is safe 
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to assume that this cannot solely be fully understood with respect to the ontology of 
these leaps. Instead, we need to focus our attention on his application of the concept 
through we will call the conceptual matrix brought to bear when fitting the idea of 
quantity-quality transformations to an actual historical situation. This involves 
further inquiry into whether there is a broader conceptual understanding of Hegelian 
dialectics that Lenin sourced from his own first-hand reading of the Logic allowing 
him to apply the idea of quantity-quality transformations in a way diverging from the 
approach of his peers. We argue that Lenin’s reading of totality in the Logic did allow 
him to break from his pre-war, linear historicist views on the right time and right 
place for socialist transformation first to take root. At the same time, however, we 
also argue that once in power the use of the idea of quantity-quality transformations 
to think the economic changes necessary to transition towards communism evinces 
limitations.205 In so doing, we contend against orthodox Marxism that Lenin’s 
interpretation of quantity-quality leaps still reaches an impasse circumscribed by the 
Hegelian horizon preventing it from being an adequate idea of a novelty-bearing 
event. 
This chapter begins with a review of the ways in which dialectical materialists 
have construed the notion of quantity-quality transformations. We then explicate 
the political commitments of orthodox Second International Marxism and what 
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evolutionism means in this context, helping to unpack the relationship between 
Lenin’s pre-war politics and philosophy and how these changed post-war and post-
Logic. In the final, most critical section of this chapter, we will ask how effective 
Lenin’s idea of leaps was for conceptualising novelty. While we will see how Lenin’s 
deepened conception of totality allowed him to make an admirable break with 
Plekhanov and Kautsky when it came to seizing the revolutionary moment, by the 
end of this chapter we will also see how the same idea is less effective for theorising 
how revolutionary policy can effect a break enabling transition away from capitalism.  
3.1 A genealogy of quantity and quality 
 
From Engels onwards the attempt to draw from Hegel’s The Science of Logic an idea 
of an event that would account for the sudden, disjunctive social transformations 
accompanying social revolution was marked by an inconsistency. The implications of 
this have not been considered in great enough depth by the literature considering 
what we will argue is a point requiring full acknowledgement in order to evaluate the 
novelty of Lenin’s reading of Hegel. In this section we address this problem by 
recognising the peculiarities resulting from dialectical materialists’ selective 
appropriation of the Hegelian idea, and by setting out how different Marxists 
responded to it.  
What problem are we intimating here? As already explicated in chapter one, 
Hegel’s idea of quantity-quality leaps is supposed to apply to physical mechanics. 
Hegel dismisses the notion that it can be applied to biology, or other fields where 
excessive contingency and particularity applies to the determination of its objects. 
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This disclaimer is even more pronounced in the case of the evaluation of phenomena 
belonging to the social world. As Hegel cautions, 
 
in the realm of spirit there is still less to be found a characteristic, free 
development of measure. It is quite evident, for example, that a 
republican constitution like that of Athens, or an aristocratic 
constitution tempered by democracy, is suitable only for states of a 
certain size, and that in a developed civil society the numbers of 
individuals belonging to different occupations stand in a certain ratio 
to one another; but all this yields neither laws of measure nor 
characteristic forms of it. In the spiritual sphere as such there occur 
differences of intensity of character, strength of imagination, 
sensations, general ideas, and so on; but the determination does not 
go beyond the indefiniteness of strength or weakness.206  
 
What this means is that if one nonetheless extracts the idea out of his system and 
uses it for thinking social transformation, then it raises the question of how this 
operation is to be performed. After all, in the case of water freezing into ice, thereby 
undergoing a transformation from quantity (its linear temperature change) to quality 
(its new physical state), that to which quantity and quality pertain is clear. In the case 
of social analysis, however, what we mean by quantity and quality is open to a high 
degree of interpretation. To offer what we think is an insightful interpretation of how 
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Marxists generally attribute the terms, one can place them within the Cartesian 
tradition of identifying the real as opposed to the merely subjective evaluation of 
phenomenon – a lineage running from Engels through to Meillassoux.207 This split is 
found in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy208 where the properties of 
matter are divided into those describing its primary (quantitative) characteristics, like 
extension in space, and those secondary qualities like colour, smell, taste, etc., which 
do not belong to the object itself, but only to our perception of it.209 Applied within 
Marxist discourse, this translates into an emphasis on the ‘real’ quantitative 
dimensions of phenomenon, involving a scientific analysis of economic and political 
determinations, and serving to distinguish Marxist materialism from ideologies 
founded on textual hermeneutics (theology), abstract principles (liberalism), and 
discourse contestation (poststructuralist resistance). Lenin’s Imperialism, The Highest 
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Stage of Capitalism,210 for example, is replete with statistics on the correlations 
between the concentration of monopoly capitalism and inter-state rivalry over the 
colonies. In an unfinished biography of Lenin, Trotsky proudly surmised how such a 
delicate matter as whether to align with the populist courting of the peasantry or 
instead with the industrial proletariat in Russia was decided upon by Lenin with 
reference to reams of statistics – describing economic statistics as the “science of 
sciences”.211 To similar ends, a whole series of quantifiable economic ‘objects’ are 
amenable to Marxist analysis: organic composition of capital, the rate of exploitation, 
demographics, class composition, urban-rural balance, etc. One way of interpreting 
the science in ‘scientific socialism’ is to see it as grasping the real, quantitative 
objects of the materialist base.  
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Differentiating Marxism from other quantitatively oriented social sciences in 
the 20th century, however, is its marshalling of this knowledge in order to induce 
progress to a communist society: that is, to a society which cannot be quantitatively 
analyzed for the obvious reason that it does not yet exist, and, furthermore, where 
quantification of key objects will become irrelevant since they will be eliminated in 
the process of transition, e.g. classes and capital. Developing this theme, for Nicola 
Vaccaro it implies a more general demarcation of opposed spheres of necessity and 
freedom sheltering under the quantity-quality master binary: “in the category of 
quantity we see contained the concepts of structure, necessity, economic life, while 
in that of quality those of superstructure, freedom, mind.”212 Taken to its conclusion, 
then, for Marxist science order becomes associated with quantity and change with 
quality. The real status quo can be inferred quantitatively, but the new, post-
revolutionary order can only be conceived qualitatively.213 This is how Hegel’s 
categories are mapped onto the social sphere. 
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The mapping has some limited basis in Marx’s work. Referring to the Logic, in 
Capital Marx makes occasional references to the transformation when explaining 
how the scale of production (how many workers are assembled manufacturing the 
same commodity) at a certain point effects a change in the nature of production.214 
Or elsewhere, too, when accounting for how a minimum magnitude of capital is 
necessary to generate surplus value.215 In point of fact, Marx’s analysis of capitalist 
value creation relies upon the reduction of qualitatively different labours to 
commensurate quantitative labours in order for the category of socially necessary 
abstract labour time – the lynchpin of his value theory – to make sense. Yet although 
the transformation indubitably plays some limited role in Marx’s social theories, only 
with the establishment of the philosophical ‘materialist’ supplement to Marxism in 
Engels’s Anti-Dühring is the quantity-quality transformation brought to the fore as a 
central dialectical notion for understanding transformation. In chemistry, physics and 
mathematics, for Engels, “the same dialectical laws of motion force their way 
through as those which in history govern the apparent fortuitousness of events.”216 
After Engels emphasised the quantity-quality transformation as a central 
pivot for dialectical materialist thought, subsequent generations of Marxists 
continued in the same vein. Trotsky, for one, follows Engels by repeating and 
rhetorically amplifying the quantity-quality transformation as the most fundamental 
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principle of dialectical materialism. His second notebook on Hegel asserts: “It must 
be recognized that the fundamental law of dialectics is the conversion of quantity into 
quality, for it gives [us] the general formula of all evolutionary processes—of nature 
as well as society.”217 Trotsky goes so far as to chide Hegel for not giving enough 
importance to the transformation in his own work, and presses the point by arguing 
that if Hegel had not preceded Darwinism and Marxism he would have given it more 
prominence.218 In fact, Trotsky almost completely assimilates dialectical materialism 
with Darwinian evolutionary processes, placing emphasis on catastrophic moments 
in the generally gradual developmental processes of evolution whilst affirming their 
mutual identity – dialectics being their methodological synthesis, the bridge between 
cataclysmic change and gradualism. In Philip Pomper’s estimation, which more or 
less serves to describe the whole gambit of ‘orthodox’ dialectical materialism, 
Trotsky’s view on the matter expresses an epigenetic architectonic of change where 
the best results of the processes of gradual development are preserved through 
catastrophic events; where only by throwing off structural inhibitions in acute crises 
of disequilibrium can progress be ensured.219 In the dialectical materialist 
cosmogony, revolution is like a fire engulfing the prairie, burning down all in its path, 
but seeding the ground with nutrients for a newly strengthened ecosystem. It is, in 
Stalin’s words, “an onward and upward movement ... as a development from the 
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simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher”, with the result that revolutions 
“are a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon.”220  
The ambiguities which persist even when practitioners maintain the same 
understanding of these leaps, however, are brought to the surface by reference to 
the fact that Trotsky and Stalin, two of history’s most famous nemeses, shared 
exactly the same abstract notion. Despite their deep seated political differences, not 
the least Stalin’s obvious rejection of Trotsky’ theory of ‘permanent revolution’, if we 
wish to consider how this idea of social transformation intersects ‘evolutionist’ or 
‘revolutionist’ politics – crucial for inferring if and how Lenin’s interpretation 
contributed to his political breakthrough – there is little if anything to separate the 
two. Noting their notorious political disagreements while acknowledging that they 
held almost exactly the same notion of quality-quantity transformations indicates 
that there a further set of concepts in need of consideration that are not captured on 
the abstract level. Stalin, for example, applied the idea of leaps almost entirely in 
order to demonstrate why following revolution all efforts at transitioning towards 
communism should concentrate on growing the forces of production.221 In this way 
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we can see how Stalin applies the idea by operating within a unilateral, linear notion 
of base-superstructure determination. The material forces of production have to 
reach a quantitative tipping point where the qualitative relations of production can 
no longer sustain them, therewith unleashing a social transformation.222 
Conceptualised in said manner, quantity-quality transformations assume a practically 
programmatic status in his state codification of the principles of Dialectical and 
Historical Materialism.223  
Yet even if in this text Stalin affirms the necessity of revolution against mere 
evolution, unless the former breaks substantially enough from the latter, revolution 
is still conceived as little more than a quantitatively superior evolutionary jump 
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rather than a novelty-bearing break with the evolutionary process itself. Further 
evidence that Stalin’s take on the quantity-quality transition is one of simply an 
exaggerated evolutionary jump can be seen in the dispute in his last years over 
whether Marx’s law of value holds sway in the socialist economy. Here Stalin 
opposes ideas that a ‘transformed’ law of value operates in the socialist economy by 
insisting on the trans-historical objectivity of economic laws.224 In Economic Problems 
of the USSR he writes, “It is said that some of the economic laws operating in our 
country under socialism, including the law of value, have been ‘transformed,’ or even 
‘radically transformed,’ on the basis of planned economy. That is likewise untrue. 
Laws cannot be ‘transformed,’ still less ‘radically’ transformed.”225 Only once the 
peasantry voluntarily leave the agricultural artels can the perfected planned 
economy be realised, and the step to higher communism commence; unfolding as a 
transition emergent from minor quantitative movements in the economic base so 
that “Slowly, without our noticing, we will enter communism.”226 Stalin’s position on 
the question of transition to higher communism – namely, that the process cannot 
be forced by any political means and will take a long time to unfurl according to 
objective economic laws – helps indicate some of the more subtle questions 
                                                 
224
 For a fascinating account of the nearly 20 year long development of the Soviet political economy 
textbook, subject to innumerable delays owing to Stalin’s close involvement with it, see Ethan 
Pollock, Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), Chapter 7. 
 
225
 Joseph Stalin, Economic Problems of the USSR [1951], Chapter 1. Available online at Marxists.org: 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1951/economic-problems/ch02.htm 
[Accessed 20 January 2012]. 
 
226
 Stalin, cited in Pollock, Soviet Science Wars, 205. 
 
163 
 
underlying the application of the quantity-quality transformation to historical 
situations and whether the idea connotes ‘evolutionism’ or ‘revolutionism’. It 
appears far from adequate to presume that any application of the transformation 
necessarily implies revolutionism when it can be used both to affirm revolution (as 
per Stalin) but also to defer social change endlessly into the future according to 
objective ‘laws’ that determine accumulations in the economic base as a necessary 
precondition (also as per Stalin). Political will, strategy, the relation between the 
objective and the subjective, and views on the correct ordering of the Marxist world 
historical narrative all contribute to the transformation’s conceptual matrix, which 
when conceived in purely mechanical terms, à la Stalinist dialectical materialism, are 
reduced to a linear causality almost entirely dependent upon the 
objective/quantitative material ‘base’. 
Can a line of demarcation be drawn between the Engelsian/Stalinist and Leninist 
idea of quantity-quality leaps with regard to the conceptual matrix by which the 
transformation is applied to a historical situation? Lenin actually made scant 
mention of the transformation in his writings until after studying Hegel in 1914/15. 
So to better appreciate the point he was trying to make when referencing quantity-
quality leaps in his post-Logic works some background to Lenin’s political thought 
prior to this time is necessary. As this section has shown, without an appreciation of 
actors’ historical materialist theories it will be remarkably difficult to intuit any 
differences in their interpretations and applications of the concepts of dialectical 
materialism. Directing our efforts towards this task, a few common prejudices need 
dispelling before we can be in a position to assess accurately the shift in Lenin’s 
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thought pre and post-1914 and how this might have affected the conceptual matrix 
he brought to bear when thinking quantity-quality leaps. In the next section thus 
offers an appraisal of Lenin’s pre-war political thought in order to allow a more 
nuanced account of the changes in his theorisation provoked by reading Hegel. We 
therefore leave dialectical materialism aside for the time being and return to it only 
once Lenin’s position with respect to historical materialist evolutionary schemas has 
been established. 
3.2 Lenin before war: taking responsibility for the inevitable 
Lenin’s early political thought could be characterised as a paradox at first glance: on 
the one hand, a voluntarist adherence to conspiratorial elitism for the sake of 
making revolution, and on the other hand an unquestioning acceptance of 
mechanical Marxism following an evolutionary ordering of the correct stages to be 
passed through on route to socialism. All signs of rupture with the latter position 
after 1914 (and post-Logic) can then be easily translated into celebrations of his 
rejection of evolutionism and orthodoxy. This take on things is of limited use for our 
present investigation, however, for it sets up Hegel a priori as the master key for 
unlocking the dichotomy between a mechanical, evolutionary Leninism – indebted 
to the philosophy of an equally mechanical and evolutionary Second International – 
and the later dynamic thought of a truly dialectical thinker. Now, there is of course 
some truth to this reading; but the exaggerated contrast only serves to over egg 
Lenin’s pre-war dogmatism, and conversely to overinflate the results of his 
immersion in Hegel’s codex. Any understanding of Lenin’s achievement rather 
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depends upon grasping a more subtle sense of the difference between these two 
periods and what was contributed by a renewed appreciation of Hegelian dialectics. 
Given that ‘evolutionism’ was not a recognized epithet of the era – unlike 
opportunism, revisionism and economism – without getting a precise foothold on 
what evolutionism meant in the pre-war context it is hard to trade in anything other 
than generalities as to what a break from it might mean in its post-war context. It 
follows that we should begin with an appraisal of Lenin’s political thought before the 
war, in order to set the terms and concepts in place ahead of attempting to 
elaborate upon why he turned to the Logic. 
Lenin’s principal political innovation was to introduce and maintain Social 
Democratic tenets in Bolshevik Party strategy, tailoring them to the Russian 
context.227 This involved, firstly, repudiating the belief that Social Democratic 
strategy was inappropriate in the underdeveloped and authoritarian Tsarist state; 
and secondly, a rejection of tendencies making inroads with Russian Social 
Democracy at the turn of the century, all of which were termed ‘economism’ and 
‘opportunism’ in the pages of the early R.S.D.W.P. publication, Iskra, and What is to 
be Done? In consideration of the fact that ‘economism’ represents the closest 
approximation of ‘evolutionism’ within the discourse of early 20th century Russian 
Social Democracy, it is worth lingering a while on this term. Unlike what the name 
implies, economism was not just about allowing economic forces to dictate social 
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change.228 Rather, the economism espoused by its principal Russian backers was 
concerned with proving the illegitimacy of the need for Social Democrats to bring a 
Marxist world historical narrative to worker agitation. The economists believed 
politics would and should follow economic struggles for the immediate interests of 
workers; they refused to indulge in what they saw as unnecessary and utopian 
ideological work agitating for the overthrow of the Tsar, or to set out promises of a 
gilded socialism to which future generations could look forward. In Paul Miliukov’s 
assessment of the economist position, by sticking to the pursuit of workers’ 
immediate economic interests they believed “the evolution of socialism would take 
place all by itself.”229 Consequently, the economists’ position implied an anti-
revolutionary reformism renouncing the need for the overthrow of the autocracy. 
Now, this rift between the economists and Lenin presents an obvious hermeneutic 
difficulty for the characterisation of Lenin’s reading of the Logic as a study 
permitting him to break from evolutionism. Because whilst evolutionism and 
economism might be considered the trademark signs of fatalist Marxism, setting out 
a route that runs along preordained historical tracks, for Second International Social 
Democracy it was, on the contrary, their confidence in the validity of Marxist 
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historical schemata against the evolutionists which compelled them to insist on 
political work going above and beyond the economic struggle.  
If political intervention, undergirded by an ordered Marxist historical vision, 
separated Lenin and the majority of Second International orthodoxy from the 
economist/evolutionist perspective (the latter rejected such stages), a further point 
of clarification is also needed on the answers provided by What is to be Done? 
regarding the correct organizational modality for agitation. In conventional historical 
narratives, Lenin’s solution ties an authoritarian knot between vanguard elitism and 
an alienated voluntarism, forcing workers away from their immediate interests 
according to an eschatological vision of political freedom and socialism that they 
could not be trusted to subscribe to themselves. As such, much of the focus on this 
text – taken as the distillation of Leninist formulae par excellence – has adumbrated 
Lenin’s thesis to the proposition that consciousness had to be brought to workers 
from the outside by socialist theorists, and that left to their own devices the working 
class would remain stuck at the level of trade union consciousness inevitably 
brought under the sway of bourgeois ideology.230 As a point of correction to the 
typical portrayal of Lenin’s ‘worry about workers’, however, Lars T. Lih’s exhaustive 
study of the period proves Lenin’s extreme confidence, against evident odds, in the 
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Russian workers’ movement rising to the challenge of pressing for political liberty 
above simply pursuing factional concerns restricted to small scale, artisanal-specific 
struggles over pay and working conditions.231 Lih’s archival work shows that it was 
actually Lenin’s unshakeable belief in capitalist development forcing workers to 
gravitate towards Social Democratic demands for freedom that drove his critique of 
socialist abstinence from political agitation. Certainty in the inevitability of the 
workers’ political insurrection was what motivated Lenin so doggedly to polemicise 
against the economists mechanical fatalism.232 Furthermore, such tenets were 
widely accepted within European Social Democracy; their attempted usurpation 
restricted to a short-lived, minority Bernsteinian tendency in Germany and a handful 
of advocates in Russia. 
Lenin did not therefore depart to any great extent from the contours of 
linear Marxist schemata in his early thought. The Development of Capitalism in 
Russia (1899), argued against the Narodniks’233 claim that the Russian peasant 
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commune was a unique mode of production, and marshalled this judgement 
towards stressing the ultimately progressive historical role of capitalism in causing 
the disintegration of peasantry (incidentally putting him at odds with Marx and 
Engels’s late sympathies for the idea that the peasant commune could act as a 
prototype for communist relations).234 On the corresponding political level, Lenin, 
ever a committed Social Democrat, from 1895 up until the outbreak of the First 
World War, advocated a bourgeois, democratic revolution as a necessary first stage 
to lay the groundwork for proletarian revolution.235 Notwithstanding the fact that 
Lenin’s distrust of the liberal bourgeoisie ran deeper than his Menshevik rivals, he 
still subscribed to two necessary preconditions for socialism: the development of 
industrial capitalism and a revolution to put in place institutions of liberal 
democracy.236 Whilst in part this linear scheme could be attributed to a dogmatic 
adherence to the formula laid out in The Communist Manifesto, Lenin’s confidence 
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in the ability to bring the model of German SPD style Social Democracy to Russia237 
meant that there were also practical exigencies structuring his political 
commitments beyond simply grafting abstract Marxist schemata onto empirical 
reality. In response to the challenges the importation posed, bourgeois revolution 
was not advocated for its own sake – for self-sufficient liberal, constitutional reasons 
– but instead to bring about the requisite level of political freedom that would 
permit Russian Social Democracy to create mass organizations capable of agitation 
for socialist revolution. Indeed, what differentiated Lenin from the economists and 
the Socialist Revolutionary successors to the 19th century populist movement was 
nothing less than this fixation on the need for a political movement to realise 
essential liberties.238   
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The upshot of this historical review is therefore somewhat counterintuitive. 
To surmise, it was Lenin’s belief in the inevitability and universal validity of the 
historical dynamics of capitalism as dictated by scientific socialism that led him to 
countenance not for one minute the economism/evolutionism of some of his 
contemporaries. Confidence in the inevitable Marxist stages compelled him towards 
unwavering advocacy of direct political intervention. Nonetheless, it is difficult 
pigeonholing a position that rejected evolutionism on the grounds of the necessary 
institution of bourgeois, constitutional democracy before socialist revolution could 
even be considered possible. We are stuck with an awkward position as far as most 
theoretical discussion would see it. The dichotomy generally assumes something like 
the following form: either capitalism inevitably entails its own destruction, and so 
‘base’ economic forces are more or less adequate to give rise to the consciousness 
of the proletariat and their revolutionary will to bring down the system, or, 
economic forces are inadequate to give rise to said consciousness, so it has to be 
brought to workers from the outside by single-minded professional revolutionaries. 
The former position, evolutionary and mechanical; the latter position, voluntarist 
and anti-evolutionary. Framed this way, it would seem that from the very beginning 
of Lenin’s involvement with the Marxist cause in Russia he always rejected 
evolutionary thinking. But we have already learnt that Lenin’s own stamp on the 
Russian revolutionary movement was exactly to insist on the relevance of orthodox 
historical materialist schemata even given the country’s protean capitalist relations.  
What sense can be made of these apparently contradictory positions: on the 
one hand, absolute faith in the correct sequencing of historical destiny, and, on the 
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other hand, the pressing need for Social Democracts to intervene to organize the 
proletariat to realise directly political demands? Lih provides an answer by placing 
Lenin in a third position: yes, revolutionary Social Democratic politicisation of the 
workers is inevitable; and yes, that is exactly why we need a vanguard Party to 
organize them. Actually, this did not reflect any particular theoretical innovation on 
Lenin’s part. As with Kautsky and the majority of the Second International 
subscribing to ‘Erfurt programme’239, both positions were squared by the “sooner or 
later” diagnosis of scientific socialism. 
 
Since this new natural necessity – ‘a worker party will sooner or later 
adopt the socialist programme’ – is dependent on insight, the actual 
timing is not closely tied to the course of capitalist development... The 
driving force in this respect is the quality of class leadership rather 
than the level of productive forces... Social democracy is needed and 
will be heeded. It is not needed to achieve socialism, since this will 
come about regardless. It is needed to avoid the human tragedy that 
would be caused by socialism coming ‘later’ rather than ‘sooner’.240 
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Lenin’s distinctive pre-war contribution was to apply the above thesis to the Russian 
situation with dogged persistence. He was evolutionary insofar as the task involved 
merely speeding up the inevitable sequence of events – and in Russia at least this 
would only be facilitated by a bourgeois revolution to deliver political liberty, the 
sooner the better. He was anti-evolutionary though inasmuch as there was never 
any question of just leaving workers to muddle through in a disorganized fashion, or 
relying on economic forces alone to drive political struggle. Three factors can 
therefore be said to structure the question of evolutionism in Second International 
strategy: (1) belief in the development of relations of production inevitably pushing 
the proletariat towards Social Democracy; (2) the speed at which the inevitable 
would be realised, with excessive delay leading to human tragedy, thus compelling 
political intervention; and (3) the correct sequencing of political struggle, i.e. 
whether to fight first for formal political liberty or immediately for socialist ideas. In 
regard to all three Lenin was as orthodox as one could get. But neither he nor the 
majority of the Second International were evolutionary as measured by the 
theoretical paradigms of the time, however such schemas might look in retrospect. 
Of course, the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and the collapse of 
the Second International led to a break in Lenin’s thought, which later evidences a 
greater flexibility to rethink the sequential basis of socialist revolution. Only 
thereafter does he begin to pepper his texts such Imperialism, The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism and State and Revolution with references to the dialectical materialist 
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idea of quantity-quality transformations to help bolster controversial points at which 
he breaks from orthodox historical materialism. Yet although there is intuitive sense 
to Lenin’s return to Hegel as a way to rediscover the Marxist status quo ante and 
outflank the Second International – or as Michael-Matsas would prefer: a 
refoundation for a new era passing through the origin of Marxism241 – on many 
levels it remains problematic. Does not Hegel offer a unified system of philosophy 
structured specifically to deny the use of philosophy to allow one to leap into the 
future, affirming rather than undermining historicist ‘stageism’? Why, then, turn to 
Hegel to combat the very evolutionist historicism Hegel’s thought would seem to 
prescribe? Why, moreover, to such an abstract work as the Logic? And why the 
excited rediscovery of leaps in the quantity-quality transformation that Engels had 
already spent so much theoretical effort defending in his well-read Anti-Dühring? 
What, if anything, does Lenin find here that differentiates him from his 
contemporaries? These questions are posed for the sake of pressing the point that it 
would hardly be sufficient to invoke claims of Lenin’s break from evolutionism and 
simply cite his use of the idea of quantity-quality transformations as evidence of the 
fact when considering that this idea was already firmly enshrined in Second 
International dialectical materialism.  
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Getting a handle on how Lenin sees this dialectical idea providing theoretical 
ammunition for breaking from orthodoxy – and how far this break extends – instead 
requires finding satisfactory answers to the question of why he turned to Logic in 
the first place and what possible effect a deepened dialectical understanding of the 
transformation might have had on the conceptual matrix he applies to a world beset 
by imperialist war. These are the questions the next section seeks to answer by 
explicating his motivations for studying Hegel, the key results found in the 
notebooks, and by inferring their influence upon his political theory. 
3.3 Logic for a time of madness 
 
An air of mystery hangs over Lenin’s reading of the Logic. It is no exaggeration to say 
that it must count as one of the most intriguing acts in revolutionary history. 
Although the French Jacobin leader, Maximilien Robespierre, famously carried 
around a copy of Rousseau’s The Social Contract in his jacket pocket, there is no 
equivalent in history of a revolutionary leader like Lenin embarking on an extended 
study of a book of such renowned obscurity as the Logic. This intellectual adventure 
is rendered all the more perplexing by Lenin’s reputation as an eminently practical 
politician. “Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary 
movement”242 may have been the dictum of What is to be Done?, but this did not 
often extend as far as abstract philosophy. In a letter to Gorky in 1908, he wrote in 
regard to the academic philosophers of his time, “Not only do I not ‘philosophize’ 
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with their philosophy, I do not ‘philosophize’ like them at all. Their way of 
‘philosophizing’ is to expend fortunes of intelligence and subtlety for no other 
purpose than to ruminate in philosophy. Whereas I treat philosophy differently, I 
practice it.”243 Still, Lenin had some practice in the philosophical arts when the 
occasion called for it; his scandalously ‘scientistic’ riposte to the neo-Kantian currents 
of his time in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism244 situated him within the discourse 
of scientific realism, contra philosophical idealism. But why, at the critical juncture of 
1914, with the European nations sending their young men to die in their millions in 
the trenches of the First World War, did he choose to study a book considered both 
in his time and ours the crowning apex of metaphysical idealism?  
Explanations like Stathis Kouvelakis’ emphasize a clear if indirect strategic 
purpose, relating Lenin’s reading to the acquiescence of the majority of European 
Social Democratic parties to the nationalistic war effort.245 Let us pause to consider 
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the context. One should not underestimate the shock Lenin experienced witnessing 
his former comrades support the rush to war. When the German SPD voted in favour 
of war an entire world collapsed – a world that, up until this point, Lenin had devoted 
his life to importing into the Russian revolutionary movement. What is worse, he had 
been betrayed by erstwhile comrades: foremost Kautsky and Plekhanov, whose ideas 
he hitherto considered could be more or less taken off the shelf and simply tailored 
to the peculiarities of Tsarist Russia.246 But these giants of Social Democracy had now 
betrayed the international working classes, bolstering their arguments with sophistic 
‘dialectical’ rationales. Written directly after his philosophical studies, in 1915 Lenin’s 
The Collapse of the Second International took pointed objection to Kautsky and 
Plekhanov’s justifications for supporting patriotic war: 
 
Plekhanov embellishes even this threadbare piece of vulgarity with his 
inevitable Jesuitical reference to “dialectics”: to be able to assess the 
concrete situation, he says, we must first of all find out who started it 
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and punish him; all other problems will have to wait until another 
situation arises... Plekhanov has set a new record in the noble sport of 
substituting sophistry for dialectics. The sophist grabs at one of many 
“arguments”; it was Hegel who long ago very properly observed that 
“arguments” can be found to prove anything in the world.247 
 
Note that the authors cited by Plekhanov were the sources to which Lenin devoted 
his period of intense philosophical studies. For sensing that Kautsky and Plekhanov 
were seeking to browbeat the workers’ movement with meaningless invocations of 
dialectics, Lenin must have felt, considering his isolation in the workers’ movement, 
that only with a complete mastery of the dialectical method would he be able to 
understand (hence also undermine) the institutions of Social Democracy that he had 
previously believed were exemplars of Marxist praxis. Further, the SPD’s vote for war 
could not just be attributed to an aberration on the part of giddy patriots, nor the 
result of mere bureaucratic ossification within Social Democracy; a properly Marxist 
analysis would need to unpick what had gone wrong on a more systematic level. 
Accordingly, when the SPD voted for war credits Lenin perceived it to be a result of a 
general disinclination towards revolution. An “all pervading gradualism” opposed to 
any “break in gradualness”248 had taken hold. Parliamentarism, supposed to be just a 
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strategic platform for socialist revolution, had become an end in itself: the final 
confrontation perpetually postponed. Kautsky and Plekhanov’s theoretical 
contortions were nothing but obtuse abstractions serving to legitimate the reformist 
actuality of what Social Democracy had become. Lenin’s counteroffensive would 
therefore have to understand what had led to this process of reformist evolutionism 
occurring under everyone’s noses; and quite evidently such a critical procedure could 
not be achieved by rote application of the “sooner or later” ‘Erfurtian’ understanding 
of Marxism adequate to the collapsed world. Hence the turn to Hegel’s Logic had 
both negative and positive aims: negative insofar as Lenin could no longer rely on 
Plekhanov’s now suspicious mediation of dialectical materialism and the Marxist 
workers’ movement; positive inasmuch as only a new appreciation of dialectics could 
be used to understand what had gone so terribly wrong.  
In order to get a sense of the direction of Lenin’s studies, let us begin with 
Lenin’s own précis on the question of dialectics, written just after studying the Logic. 
The 1915 short essay, On the question of dialectics, presents his most concise 
rationale for reading Hegelian dialectics against their grain in a materialist register.249 
He writes, “Philosophical idealism is only nonsense from the standpoint of crude, 
simple, metaphysical materialism,” whereas, “From the standpoint of dialectical 
materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a one-sided, exaggerated ... 
development (inflation, distension) of one of the features, aspects, facets of 
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knowledge into an absolute, divorced from matter, from nature, apotheosised.”250 As 
an inflation and exaggeration, the task is thus not an absolute repudiation of 
philosophical idealism, but rather a pruning of it down to size, whereupon it is 
revealed as capturing an element of truth. As Lenin describes the rationale for a 
materialist appropriation of idealist thought: “Human knowledge is not (or does not 
follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles, a 
spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed (transformed 
one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight line, which then (if one does 
not see the wood for the trees) leads into the quagmire, into clerical 
scholasticism.”251 Any moment of knowledge can be extended and forced into a 
unilateral determination of truth. Yet, Lenin insists, this lays the path of a road to 
nowhere. Lenin’s reading of Hegel rather aims to prise out those moments and 
arguments in Hegel’s work serving to advance knowledge of human knowledge in 
general; and in particular to seize upon those which purportedly assisted Marx in 
Capital and were so neglected by Plekhanov’s formulation of dialectical 
materialism.252 Lenin finds these in what Hegel’s Logic reveals about knowledge of 
development: the contradistinction between “The two basic (or two possible? or two 
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historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution),” namely: 
“development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of 
opposites.”253 Nonetheless if one restricted their view of Lenin’s take on dialectics to 
this essay one might come away feeling short changed. Despite interesting remarks 
on the relationship between materialism and idealism, there is little here to set him 
apart from Engels. Only the notebook on the Logic demonstrates a properly original 
break involving an enhanced appreciation of totality as it pertains to leaps between 
quantity and quality. It is to this book we now turn. 
  Lenin’s collection of quotations and notes compiled over the course of his 
reading of the Logic exhibits the criticality of his approach. In the margins Hegel is 
subjected to accusations of “nonsense,” “obscurantism” and other derogatory 
charges as Lenin attempts to prise out the work’s materialist core and free it from 
God, Absolute Spirit, or any other categories slipping into pure idealism. “One must 
first,” Lenin writes, “extract the materialist dialectics from it. Nine-tenths of it … is 
chaff, rubbish.”254 Furthermore, Lenin’s notes do not spread linearly over the course 
of the text – surprising given the fact that we know he worked systematically in his 
reading from cover to cover.255 The commentary is Spartan on the first books of the 
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Objective Logic and only really picks up a head of steam by the later books on the 
Subjective Logic. This fact considered, and given that his repeated annotations of 
“Leaps!” occur in this thinly commented upon first Book on Being, it makes more 
sense to read Lenin’s “Conspectus” against its chronological form by beginning at the 
end and working in reverse – following the culmination of the development of his 
ideas back to their incipient root.  
In his notes on the Logic’s third Book, Lenin follows Hegel’s concerns with the 
problem of the relation of ideas to material, empirical reality (the theory of 
knowledge). He has a two-sided task: on the one hand, to assess Hegel’s position and 
adduce whether a materialist reading of Hegel’s logic can be salvaged, and on the 
other hand, to follow Hegel strategically in reading with him against Kant. To take the 
latter point first, Lenin concurs with Hegel’s rebuttal of Kant’s correspondence theory 
of knowledge for the fact that it leaves each side of the equation (the subject’s 
knowledge and the empirical object) ultimately separate. In denying any more than a 
correspondence between humankind’s knowledge and the noumenal thing-in-itself, 
Kant allows no security for the truth of the determination of ideas by the objective 
world, with the result that Kant needs to draw limits upon Reason, inasmuch as he 
cannot accord a truth to the movement of one idea vis-à-vis another. Lenin isolates 
the following quote, which serves to make the point, “It will always remain a matter 
for astonishment how the Kantian philosophy knew that relation of thought to 
sensuous existence, where it halted, for a merely relative relation of bare 
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appearance, and fully acknowledged and asserted a higher unity of the two in the 
Idea in general … but yet stopped dead at this relative relation and at this assertion 
that the Notion is and remains utterly separated from reality.”256 Conversely, in 
Lenin’s estimation: 
 
Hegel is much more profound than Kant, and others, in tracing the 
reflection of the movement of the objective world in the movement of 
notion. Just as the simple form of value, the individual act of exchange 
of one given commodity for another, already includes in an 
undeveloped form all the main contradictions of capitalism,—so the 
simplest generalisation, the first and simplest formation of notions 
(judgments, syllogisms, etc.) already denotes man’s ever deeper 
cognition of the objective connection of the world. Here is where one 
should look for the true meaning, significance and role of Hegel’s 
Logic.257  
 
Yet in regard to the origin of these ideas Lenin reproaches Hegel more critically. He 
can agree fully that the caesura Kant forces between knowledge and objects is 
impermissible for a materialist-empiricist wishing to affirm the objectivity of 
scientific knowledge, yet he is initially more cautious to embrace Hegel’s positive 
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speculative conclusions. Thus, on the first page of Lenin’s commentary on the 
Subjective Logic his note evinces a desire for a standard Marxian materialist 
inversion. Rather than Being and Essence representing moments of the Becoming of 
Subjective Logic, this “Should be inverted: concepts are the highest product of the 
brain, the highest product of matter.”258 For the rest of this chapter Lenin continues 
to wrestle with the question of the extent to which Hegel’s thought about the Notion 
represents an idealistic mystification or a materialist ground for a theory of objective 
knowledge. Lenin paraphrases what is at stake in Hegel’s theory of the Notion; he 
writes that it is 
 
not only a description of the forms of thought and not only a natural-
historical description of the phenomena of thought (wherein does 
that differ from a description of the forms??) but also 
correspondence with truth, i.e.??, the quintessence or, more simply, 
the results and outcome of the history of thought?? Here Hegel is 
idealistically unclear, and fails to speak out fully. Mysticism.259 
 
Once Lenin moves on to the section on the Idea, this critical admiration transforms 
into fully fledged enthusiasm as he discovers in Hegel’s logical syllogism the 
necessary unity of theory and practice. “Cognition ... finds itself faced by that which 
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truly is as actuality present independently of subjective opinions (Setzen). (This is 
pure materialism!) Man’s will, his practice, itself blocks the attainment of its end ... in 
that it separates itself from cognition and does not recognize external actuality for 
that which truly is (for objective truth). What is necessary is the union of cognition 
and practice.”260 Even more explicitly, Lenin also writes: “The ‘syllogism of action’ ... 
For Hegel action, practice, is a logical “syllogism,” a figure of logic. And that is true! 
Not, of course, in the sense that the figure of logic has its other being in the practice 
of man (=absolute idealism), but vice versa: man’s practice, repeating itself a 
thousand million times, becomes consolidated in man’s consciousness by figures of 
logic... conclusion: The coincidence of subjective and objective, the test of subjective 
ideas, the criterion of objective truth.”261 In the Absolute Idea Lenin identifies the 
unity of opposites between theoretical ideas and practice. “Thus all opposites which 
are taken as fixed, such as, for example, finite and infinite, or individual and 
universal, are contradictory not by virtue of some external connection, but rather are 
transition in and for themselves.”262 Yet despite this stress on the principle of 
contradiction expressed through the unity of opposites – which is really no discovery, 
but merely a restatement of the most fundamental premise of the Hegelian system – 
Lenin’s true gains lie with the conception of the totality of mutual transitions. We will 
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soon see the importance of this point for understanding the difference between 
Lenin’s notion of quantity-quality leaps and that of his Engelsian forebearers. 
 Near the end of the “Conspectus,” Lenin presents the notion of dialectics he 
has derived from the Logic in the form of a sixteen-point taxonomy of features. We 
reproduce it in its entirety here, in order to underline the significance of how he ends 
the list. All emphasis and use of brackets is Lenin’s. 
 Dialectics is: 
 
1) The objectivity of consideration (not examples, not divergences, 
but the Thing-in-itself). 
2) The entire totality of the manifold relations of this thing to others. 
3) The development of this thing (phenomenon, respectively), its own 
movement, its own life. 
4) The internally contradictory tendencies (and sides) in this thing. 
5) The thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the sum and unity of opposites. 
6) The struggle, respectively unfolding of these opposites, 
contradictory strivings, etc. 
7) The union of analysis and synthesis—the break-down of the 
separate parts and the totality, the summation of these parts. 
8) The relations of each thing (phenomenon, etc.) are not only 
manifold, but general, universal. Each thing (phenomenon, 
process, etc.) is connected with every other. 
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9) Not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every 
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other 
[into its opposite?] 
10) The endless process of the discovery of new sides, relations, etc. 
11) The endless process of the deepening of man’s knowledge of the 
thing, of phenomenon, processes, etc., from appearance to 
essence and from less profound to more profound essence. 
12) From co-existence to causality and from one from of connection 
and reciprocal dependence to another, deeper, more general 
form. 
13) The repetition at a higher stage of certain features, properties, 
etc., of the lower and 
14) The apparent return to the old (negation of the negation) 
15) The struggle of content with form and conversely. The throwing off 
of the form, the transformation of the content. 
16) The transition of quantity into quality and vice versa. ((15 and 16 
are examples of 9))263 
 
Point 16 guides us back to Lenin’s commentary on the first Book of the Logic where 
he discovers the leaps between quantity and quality. In now returning to the earlier 
notes we need to bear in mind the way he describes the quantity-quality 
transformation as an example of  the conception of totality presented in point 9. 
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In the notes on ‘Quality’ it is not until the matter of the relation between 
finite beings and the infinite that Lenin begins positively to discern a principle of 
dialectics. He writes that Hegel’s derivation is “Shrewd and Clever!” and a number of 
comments onwards he quotes Hegel that “It is the nature of the finite to pass 
beyond itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite,” remarking that this 
describes “The dialectics of things themselves, of Nature itself, of the course of 
events itself.”264 After progressing further through what he describes as “Dark 
waters” in the exposition, Lenin arrives at the analysis pertaining to the quantity-
quality transformation in the second section on ‘Quantity’. Here he agrees with 
Hegel’s rejection of the representation of philosophy through mathematics. 
Nevertheless, he has his curiosity peaked by the Hegel’s reflections on the seemingly 
inexplicable transition in calculus between the ‘infinitely small’ and the actual 
infinite: i.e. the fact that mathematics cannot think what is going on when it uses an 
approximate tool to reach a precise answer (the sections explicated in Chapter One 
of this thesis). Moreover, in regard to the binary between quality and quantity 
through which Hegel seeks to understand the procedure, Lenin remarks that Hegel’s 
“abstract-theoretical exposition is so obscure that nothing can be understood. 
Return to it!!”265  
 In the next section on ‘Measure’, Lenin takes up this question by transcribing 
long quotes from Hegel on the question of the transformation of qualities into one 
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another, particularly the idea that their change can be conceived as a quantitative 
transition, and the contradictions this implies. Against gradualness, Lenin identifies 
as particularly significant a quote by Hegel arguing against the illusion that  
 
one can almost be eye-witness of disappearance; for Quantum being 
posited as limit external and variable by its very nature, change (as a 
change of Quantum only) needs no explanation. But in fact nothing is 
thereby explained; the change is also essentially the transition of one 
Quality into another, or (a more abstract transition) of one existence 
into a non-existence; and this contains a determination different 
from that of gradual, which is only a decrease or increase and a one 
sided retention of magnitude.266 
 
Only a page later Lenin makes his famous exclamations of “Leaps!” in the margin 
corresponding to the point at which Hegel begins to flesh out this transformation. He 
copies Hegel’s repudiation that there are no leaps in nature; “that that which arises is 
already, sensibly or otherwise, actually there, and is imperceptible only on account of 
its smallness; and the gradualness of vanishing is based on the idea that not-Being or 
the Other which is assuming its place equally is there, only is not yet noticeable.”267 
Nature leaps, Lenin concurs. Yet if we curtailed our analysis here all this would seem 
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to demonstrate is Lenin’s rediscovery of Engelsian quantity-quality transformations. 
Nothing more would have been gained by his conspectus of the Logic that goes 
beyond orthodox dialectical materialism. 
Let us then pose the question head on: what is new in Lenin’s reading of 
Hegel? Most significantly, although he restates most of what can already be found in 
Engels’s Anti-Dühring on the quantity-quality transformation, unlike Engels’s work 
this is embedded in a conception of totality whereby all determinations of any 
determination are in a complex state of mutual transformation. In the list describing 
dialectics cited above, Lenin draws attention to point 16 on the quantity-quality 
transformation as an example of point 9. “Not only the unity of opposites, but the 
transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other.” 
It couldn’t be put more clearly. The point of the quality-quantity transformation is 
connected to a conception of the retroaction of every determination upon every 
other determination bound within a totality. Following this approach, one would 
need to think the transformative process not as a linear interplay of quantity/quality 
and objective/subjective (assumed as given determinations), but rather as a web of 
mutual determinations, whereby the determination of any determination can 
transform into its opposite, affecting every other piece of analysis in turn. Recalling 
our discussion on the quantity-quality transformation presented by Engels and Stalin 
in section one as isomorphic with linear efficient causality operating between the 
economic ‘base’ and social ‘superstructure’, Lenin’s reading of Hegel would throw 
such laws into doubt. If every determination transforms every other, there can be no 
timeless security that at any one time the two levels can be read off each other; 
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there can be no singular objective quantity that transforms into a break in quality set 
in stone as a law of change. The conceptual matrix by which the quality-quantity 
transformation is applied to a historical situation is itself in complex, historically 
variable motion.  
Provoked by the embedding of the idea of quantity-quality transformation 
within a concept of totality, what are the results for Lenin’s political analysis? How 
did this feed into his structural analysis of the reasons for the world descending to 
war and the incapacity of the international socialist movement to respond 
appropriately? Considering that it was only with Lenin’s intransigent opposition to 
the patriotic fervour sweeping Europe that his standing as a Marxist leader would be 
forever fixed, studies of Lenin’s political thought might be expected to have already 
spent considerable time dwelling on such questions. For the most part, though, those 
focusing on Lenin’s political theory generally pass his reading of the Logic, or offer 
only broad synoptic appraisals.268 Philosophically-inclined Marxist literature often 
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suffers the same problem, giving insightful readings of the notebooks on the subject 
of the dialectic, but failing to link these back to his political thought. One noteworthy 
exception to this trend, however, is the Marxist-humanist tradition, which is 
exceptional insofar as it offers hypotheses regarding the substance of Lenin’s reading 
and how it was reflected in concrete political positions taken by Lenin from 1915. 
Raya Dunayevskaya, for one, argues that the most positive result of his studies was 
that they led Lenin to question whether Marxists should support the causes of 
oppressed nations. Bearing in mind that the notebook on Hegel’s Logic directly 
precedes the notebooks on imperialism, which would later become Imperialism, The 
Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916), Dunayevskaya suggests that the methodology 
Lenin finds in Hegel’s dialectic is inseparable from his post-1914 political analysis. 
Namely, the treatment of the economic within a consideration of the concrete 
situation in the world: taking seriously national oppression, in contradistinction to 
the abstract universalism of ‘orthodox’ Marxism. “[T]he greater truth is that Lenin 
was fighting not only the betrayers, but also Menshevik internationalists and Rosa 
Luxemburg and … the Bolsheviks abroad. And he had to do it on a subject upon 
which the Bolsheviks previously had agreed ‘in principle’—self determination of 
nations.”269 In opposition to Bukharin’s mechanical linear conception of capitalist 
growth “in a straight line, or via a quantitative ratio” Lenin posed the transformation 
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of things into their others such that “just when capitalism had reached this high stage 
of ‘organization,’ monopoly (which extended itself into imperialism), was the time to 
see new, national revolutionary forces that would act as the ‘bacilli’ for proletarian 
revolutions as well.”270  
Although Dunayevskaya’s emphasis is not on the quantity-quality 
transformation as such, we can still note that it is invoked by Lenin in Imperialism, 
The Highest Stage of Capitalism when he writes: 
 
Bank capital, etc., has developed, showing how the transformation of 
quantity into quality of developed capitalism into imperialism, has 
expressed itself. Needless to say, all the boundaries in nature and in 
society are conditional and changeable, and consequently, it would 
be absurd to discuss the exact year or the decade in which 
imperialism “definitely” became established.271 
 
Admittedly, when taken in isolation the quote is not particularly revealing, merely 
stressing a straightforward quantitative-economic to qualitative-political conversion 
and the mobile nature of categories. The full significance of its deployment is only 
revealed in contrast to Kautsky’s theory of ‘ultra-imperialism’, when exposing the 
“full depth”272 of the transformation of capitalism in the era of stagnant monopoly 
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capitalism. By evading the depth of the phenomenon, Lenin’s charge is that Kautsky’s 
“pure abstraction”, “blunting over the contradictions”, intends to present the 
situation of imperialist rivalry as one where “evolution is proceeding towards 
monopoly capitalism: therefore the trend is towards a single world monopoly, to a 
universal trust.”273 The political purposes of Kautsky’s presentation of linear 
convergence to inter-imperialist cooperation are, Lenin concludes, to downplay the 
political antagonisms arising from the decrepit state of financial monopoly 
capitalism. As a result, Kautsky’s neologisms – ultra-imperialism and inter-
imperialism – prop up both reformism and nationalist chauvinist excuses for socialist 
support for war by denying the political fault lines heightened by the era of finance 
capital, which would naturally call for firm intervention by the Social Democratic 
movement.  
Conversely, the other side to the story, about which we will have more to say 
in the final section of this chapter, is Lenin’s view on the progressive features of the 
era of financial capitalism. In the same text he also holds that production under 
monopoly capitalism has become increasingly concentrated, thereby allowing an 
easy transformation to a socialist economy: monopoly capitalism is “almost a half-
way house to transition to socialism itself.”274 Again, however, what appears to be 
just a conventional evolutionary transition has to be qualified by noting the realities 
emerging from the depth of the situation, which when fully registered forecloses the 
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possibility of any smooth evolution to socialism emerging out of these positive 
tendencies. Conclusions about the benefits of monopoly concentration in certain 
industries have to be offset by consideration of the anarchy prevailing more widely in 
the sphere of capitalist production. Further, national monopoly capital creates labour 
aristocracies in sections of the workers’ movement with incentives to acquiesce to 
war. No longer can the ‘advanced’ strata, exemplified by the German SPD, be relied 
upon to push forward the revolutionary movement from the front. The advanced 
historical development of German capitalism and their workers’ movement, under 
the conditions of national, monopoly capitalism, loses its place at the front of the 
global revolutionary process. Thenceforth economic progress and political progress 
fall out of sync. Summarising the overarching conceptual disposition of the text, 
then, in Lenin’s Imperialism contradictions become multi-vectoral, things turn into 
their opposites, and temporalities of transformation run out of joint. All these 
systematic conceptualisations indicate, much as Dunayevskaya implies, traces of a 
more vertiginous dialectical reflection than can be read from Lenin’s pre-war (and 
pre-Logic) works. According to our three theoretical axes for understanding pre-war 
Marxist orthodoxy, Lenin’s reflections abandon some of them and complicate them 
all; we see a complexified understanding of the transformation of capitalism into 
decrepit, financialised monopolies.275 To interpolate further Lenin’s philosophical 
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findings with his post-1914 political analysis, the shifting determinations of any 
determination (the mobility of the conceptual matrix) make it possible to understand 
how the most advanced workers’ movement – the German SPD, as measured by 
their relative freedom and the development of their native industries’ productive 
forces – could cede its place at the front of the global revolutionary movement to a 
less advanced movement under the new conditions of imperialist war. If we also 
remember that the pre-war determinations of the Erfurtian programme revolved 
around three axes, then we can see how the Hegelian informed insight into the 
embededness of the quantity-quality transformation in a totality of determinations 
could allow a break from Lenin’s previous commitments. In this way we can see a 
proper conceptual advance informing Lenin’s politics, affirming Dunayevskaya’s take 
on the matter.  
Still, for all the progress enabled by Lenin’s reading of the Logic, a problem 
remains that is intrinsic to the Hegelian horizon. For whilst a dissection of the totality 
of determinations permits a post facto reappraisal of existing categories, all these 
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categories being mutually determining makes it a backward-looking reanalysis of 
determinations, on that reaches an impasse when attempting to think future-
oriented change. On a systematic level this was made quite explicit in the Preface to 
the Philosophy of Right where Hegel warns against the temptation “hic Rhodes, hic 
salta [here is Rhodes, leap here]”276 and ends with his famous metaphor to convey 
the utmost philosophical humility: “The owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the 
onset of dusk.”277 Which is to say, we can admit that although the reading of the 
Logic seemed helpful in Lenin’s assessment of the conjuncture of imperialist war – 
indeed, so successful that it played a part in the Bolshevik’s successful bid to seize 
power in October 1917 – it nevertheless seems to have been much less useful in 
thinking the processes of change after revolution, at the crack of dawn when the Owl 
of Minerva cannot spread her wings. When Lenin applied the quality-quantity 
transformation to thinking through critical issues such as shifting sovereign power to 
the Soviets, or when elaborating on how the expansion of capitalist industry under 
socialist rule would transform them into institutions adequate for lower communism, 
his application of the quantity-quality transformation reverted to prescribing linear, 
more classically historicist evolutionary processes. The final section of this chapter is 
therefore the most critical. Here the limitations of Hegelian dialectics to think 
political and economic transformation will be discussed, and arguments advanced for 
why the Hegelian horizon makes this result all but inevitable. 
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3.4 State of novelty: Russia 1917 
 
Any examination of Bolshevik policies after October 1917 has the effect of opening 
up a Pandora’s Box of recriminations upon which, needless to say, this final section 
could not possibly adjudicate adequately. Let us therefore immediately refute some 
possible misunderstandings. Our intention is not to take sides with either the 
anarchists, or left or right communists on debates regarding Bolshevik economic 
policy in the years immediately following the revolution, or concerning disputes over 
workers’ self management vs. nationalisation, incentives vs. coercion, and ‘war 
communism’ vs. the New Economic Policy. There is certainly a danger, we recognize, 
in using a philosophical critique on the level of quite abstract ideas to affirm common 
prejudices regarding, say, how the programme of nationalisation, grain requisition 
and coerced labour during the ‘war communism’ years of the Civil War led to 
Stalinism. This would then inscribe Stalinism in its protean form into dominant 
Bolshevik ideas before and after the revolution, effacing the disputes regarding 
policies in the early years and also the unique historical situation to which these 
policies were forged in response.278 Leninist readers will also undoubtedly point to 
the decimation wrought by the Russian Civil War, the failure of communist revolution 
in Western Europe, imperialist encirclement of the embryonic workers’ state, and 
the unfortunate, but ultimately contingent, rise of Stalin to power, as all more 
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important considerations than the ontology underlying Lenin’s political thought. And 
they would not be wrong to argue that no comprehensive appraisal of the fortunes 
of revolutionary Russia could adequately appraise its subject matter without taking 
all these events into account. But our aim is rather more modest. We wish simply to 
demonstrate the conceptual insufficiency of Lenin’s Hegelian-informed idea of 
quantity-quality transformations when attempting to implement new political and 
socioeconomic forms. To make this point, we first examine the case where Lenin 
adopts a truly novel policy, that is, when he calls for all sovereign power to be 
transferred to the Soviets, indicating how describing the change as a quantity-quality 
transformation does not make much sense. Second, we turn to his economic 
thoughts, which remain beholden to the historical materialist evolutionism of the 
pre-war era. In particular, Lenin’s idea of taking over large scale capitalist businesses 
and further expanding and socialising them appears deficient as a conceptualisation 
of how to seed a lasting novelty into the system capable of enabling transition to 
communism.  
To reiterate the basics provided in this chapter’s introduction, in State and 
Revolution Lenin’s aim is to establish the necessity of revolution to supplant the 
bourgeois state with a proletarian state. There was to be some continuity of the 
state’s functions, Lenin claims, but crucially these are to be governed in an entirely 
novel way. Keys to the ministries of the state will not simply change hands from 
bourgeoisie to proletarians; what remained of the state form would be scarcely 
recognizable. Against Kautsky and Plekhanov, Lenin emphasizes that “the state must 
inevitably be a state that is democratic in a new way (for the proletariat and the 
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propertyless in general) and dictatorial in a new way (against the bourgeoisie).”279 
Influenced by Marx and Engels’s revision of The Communist Manifesto in light of the 
experience of the Paris Commune, this point concerns the correct interpretation (and 
exposing of distortions thereof) of the new line introduced into the 1872 edition that 
“the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and 
wield it for its own purposes.”280 Lenin aims fully to undermine “the current vulgar 
“interpretation” of Marx’s famous utterance” which places “gradual development in 
contradistinction to the seizure of power and so on.”281 Faithful to the late Marx of 
the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Lenin observes “There is no trace of an 
attempt on Marx’s part to conjure up a utopia, to make idle guesses about what 
cannot be known.” This extends to details about the transitional phase after 
revolution, “we leave the question of the length of time, or the concrete forms of the 
withering away, quite open, because no material is available to us to answer these 
questions.”282 Yet this is not entirely accurate. Lenin does make some attempt on the 
broadest conceptual level to schematize how the Bolsheviks intended to smash the 
state and institute a dictatorship of the proletariat: all power is to be transferred to 
the Soviets – and the difference between the Soviet state form and the bourgeois 
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state form283 is explained by reference to “quantity becoming transformed into 
quality.”284  
The problem here is that Lenin’s endorsement of Soviet democracy does not 
fit the model of a quantity-quality transformation. Soviet democracy is precisely new 
insofar as it is not just an expansion of democracy along normal representative lines – 
all power to the Soviets signals a change of substance and not just of form.285 
Accordingly, it cannot be considered to undergo a leap as a result of quantitative 
expansion in the sense of Hegel’s example of water freezing into ice. On the other 
hand, those instances where Lenin uses the idea of quantity-quality transformations 
more appropriately signal vice versa a change of form and not of substance, 
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continuity more than novelty. For example, Lenin’s differentiation between state 
capitalism under bourgeois rule and state capitalism for socialist ends fits this 
model.286 What is posited as new is merely an exemplification of what already exists; 
a change in the form dependent upon a continuity of substance. There is in such 
applications of the idea a process of linear, accumulative historical emergence 
underlying the transformation, rather than a spark of political ex nihilo at work. 
Equivocation over the role for the Constituent Assembly, representing the 
first institution of universal suffrage in Russia along conventional lines (the Bolsheviks 
first campaigned in its elections and then dissolved it in January 1918), provides 
indications of confusion that can be appreciated by considering them through the 
problems with quantity-quality transformations. Despite the platform of State and 
Revolution, Marcel Liebman writes that Lenin  
 
did not cease to be, in many respects, a man of Russian and 
international Social-Democracy for whom the conquests of the 
revolution formed part of the classic programme of demands of the 
labour movement – which included the securing of the constitutional 
regime ... and of universal suffrage ... Had Lenin, wholly absorbed in 
day-to-day revolutionary activity not noticed what, today, with the 
hindsight of history, seems so obvious—that the very notion of 
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entrusting power, all power, to the soviets, popular institutions which 
did not provide for the representing of all classes, ruled out all notion 
of making a Constituent Assembly elected by the population as a 
whole the sovereign organ of state power in Russia?287 
 
The incompatibility which Lenin overlooks in the heat of moment could be seen to 
reflect the problem of the quantity-quality transformation. For the enfranchisement 
of the masses to become the demos of the Constituent Assembly can be considered 
such an accumulative expansion, and possibly as triggering a quantity-quality leap. 
Whereas, according all power to the Soviets cannot, in consideration of the fact that 
the latter is a totally new form of governance, be considered an expansion of a pre-
existing model. The two institutions conflict conceptually if thought through the 
quantitative-qualitative prism.  
In economic terms the problem with applying the quantity-quality 
transformation is even more pronounced. Given Lenin’s overwhelmingly political 
focus throughout his life, looking at his economic ideas as reflective of his Hegelian 
ontology might be somewhat unfair. Although his most famous texts are all heavily 
referenced with statistics to prove his point (hence economic in some sense), there is 
evidence to suggest that Lenin generally avoided economics. Lih comments that 
despite the plan to write a series of articles on economics for Iskra, only the first of 
these ever materialised.288 Furthermore, the most striking thing about the fifth 
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chapter of State and Revolution, titled “The Economic Basis of the Withering Away of 
the State,” is the paucity of economic reflections on what is to be done, and, 
conversely, the continued predominance of discussion of politics. More tangible finds 
in terms of economic policy, however, can be located in his 1917 articles on the 
immediate tasks of revolutionary government. In these Lenin lays out the position 
that empowering the proletariat gradually to take organizational command of the 
economy and to also phasing out small scale proprietorship and commodity 
production is adequate for introducing the first stage of lower communism.289 
Building upon some of his positive reflections on the virtues of monopoly capitalism 
in Imperialism, the massification of production – its concentration and quantitative 
expansion – is held to be the key to transform production towards a socialist form. 
Liebman, a not unsympathetic reader of Lenin, makes a pointed assessment of 
Lenin’s economic thought.  
 
Lenin’s ideas about the organization of labour revealed a rigour that 
was more in line with managerial orthodoxy than with revolutionary 
enthusiasm….Here, in the last analysis, besides a specific response to 
functional exigencies, was the expression of a philosophy which, while 
not ruling out appeals to the idealistic elements in human nature, was 
                                                                                                                                           
 
289
 See Lenin, “The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat it.”  
 
205 
 
rooted in a materialist view of the world, derived from a positivist 
interpretation of Marxism.290  
 
Andrew Kliman draws the same conclusion: “there is no evidence he [Lenin] 
understood that something was wrong with workplace relations under capitalism.”291 
And this position was by no means uncommon within Second International and 
Bolshevik thought. Socialism imagined as the complete centralisation of production 
in a well-oiled, rationalised bureaucracy along Taylorist lines was common to 
Bolshevik thought in this era, finding its most eloquent expression in Bukharin and 
Preobrazhensky’s The ABC of Communism.292 As such, the economic break proposed 
by Lenin, focusing on implementing disciplined control of the economy in distinction 
to capitalist chaos, arguably does not depart from the evolutionary, historicist 
schemas of the Second International to anything like the extent that his political 
thought proposes.293 His plans propose to expand large industrial entities under 
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communist political rule in order to transform them towards a socialist mode of 
production. From the contemporary standpoint we might also be astounded to read 
statements such as the following from 1917, where the quantity-quality transition is 
used to affirm that large capitalist banks are ready-made institutions for achieving 
socialism, needing only quantitative expansion under proletarian management to 
alter their qualitative nature. 
 
The big banks are the ‘state apparatus’ which we need to bring about 
socialism, and which we take ready-made from capitalism; our task 
here is merely to lop off what capitalistically mutilates this excellent 
apparatus, to make it even bigger, even more democratic, even more 
comprehensive. Quantity will be transformed into quality. A single 
state bank, the biggest of the big, with branches in every rural district, 
in every factory, will constitute as much as nine-tenths of the socialist 
apparatus.294 
 
Such ideas still predominate in orthodox Leninism today. But as Kliman observes, “A 
state run bank is still a bank. It still has to obtain funds before it can lend them out, 
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and has to do so, it must provide a decent return to those who supply it with funds. 
(This is true of a worker-run bank too.)”295 Notwithstanding the extraordinary 
circumstances of attempting to implement socialist change in a country ravaged first 
by imperialist war and second by a devastating civil war,296 Kliman’s claim is that 
Lenin’s programme neglects the need for transformation in the underlying mode of 
production away from capitalist value creation. As Kliman writes on the limits of 
politics thought on the level of who is in control to effect a change in the economic 
laws of a dominant mode of production, “Putting different people in “control” does 
not undo the inner laws of capital ... This simply was not understood by the Marxists 
of the Second International, including Lenin.”297 In another article Kliman seeks to lay 
the blame on Lenin’s failure to conceptualise a sudden enough change in the 
underlying mode of production, contending that the failure of really existing 
socialism to enact this qualitative shift lies behind its other failures, including the 
growth of the autarchic state. This he attributes to a misreading of Marx’s Critique of 
the Gotha Programme:  
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This [mis]reading of the CGP goes back to Lenin, who conflated the 
transformation and transition in The State and Revolution, writing that 
“the transition from capitalist society … to communist society is 
impossible without a ‘political transition period’ ….” I have come to 
suspect that the very idea of “transitional society” is incoherent, and 
seems to stand in the way of thinking things through clearly. Hegel’s 
critique of the idea of gradualness in his book [the] Science of Logic 
seems relevant here.298 
 
Pace Kliman, however, who locates the problem in Lenin’s conflation of transition 
and transformation and offers a critique by insisting on the lack of gradualness in 
Hegel’s quantity-quality transformation, we argue that the problem lies with the 
deployment of this Hegelian-inspired understanding of social change taken in either 
sense. If we are correct that Kliman’s critique is fundamentally oriented around the 
charge that Lenin took too evolutionary a view of the changes needed, then it is not 
obvious that this temporal critique tells us all that much.  
 As we have tried to demonstrate in this chapter, in all the different variations 
by which Marxists utilise quantity-quality transformations the problem lies not such 
much with the temporality of the proposed transformations, but rather with the 
broader conceptual matrix in which they are embedded. The problem is not, and has 
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never been, to think mere suddenness, but instead the concepts through which the 
transformation is applied to an historical situation. In particular, we argued that 
Lenin’s appreciation of totality accompanying his rediscovery of leaps in Hegel’s Logic 
allowed him to loosen his views regarding the sequential basis of communist 
revolution. Yet in the case of using the idea to think the changes necessary to move 
towards socialism in Russia, Lenin reverted back to a linear accumulative notion of 
quantity-quality leaps whereby existing enterprises only need to be enlarged and 
production concentrated through means of state capitalism in order to induce their 
transformation. What this indicates is not a personal failing on Lenin’s part, but 
rather that the Hegelian horizon in which he was operating is necessarily limited by 
its systematic historicism. As far as dialectical materialists might want to adapt the 
notion of quantity-quality leaps they nevertheless run up against the limits of this 
horizon when it comes to conceiving a novelty-bearing event. Whatever nuance one 
might want to bring to the use of Hegelian dialectics it always ends up with a 
philosophy of historical change where the notion of a dialectical switch is responsible 
for bringing about change: a transformation relying upon the change coming about 
as the result of two variables. Hegelian dialectics is systematically bound up in a 
linear, accumulative notion of history as the result of its mechanism of change being 
reliant on dialectical switches of this kind. This is why, as we saw in Chapter One, 
Hegel’s Logic, despite its ostensible atemporality, still relies upon an historical 
gnoseology in the ordering of the categories. This is also why, as we argued in 
Chapter Two, Marx’s aversion to thinking the multi-variable processes needed to 
transition to communism indicates his latent commitments to Hegelian historicism. 
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And, finally, this is why Lenin’s deployment of quantity-quality leaps ultimately only 
allows him to break to a certain extent from linear historicism; when it comes to 
transitioning to communism a more evolutionary, linear and historicist concepts 
prevails. 
 
It is this relationship between the structures credited with responsibility for historical 
change and their inability to support a notion of a properly novelty-bearing event 
which drives the anti-Hegelian heterodox lineage beginning with Althusser. In the 
next part of this thesis we look at how Althusser’s anti-Hegelianism is tied to a notion 
of the ‘complex whole’ where change cannot be conceived as the result of a single 
contradiction, or of a dialectical switch between two variables. We see that as a 
result of breaking free from Hegelian historicism, he is able to think for the first time 
a fully fledged notion of a novelty-bearing event within the Marxist framework.  
   
211 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
 
Heterodox ontology and the problem of authority 
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4. Althusser’s Judgement 
 
on the authority of the epistemological break 
 
 
Philosophically speaking, I had to become my own father. But that was only 
possible if I conferred on myself the essential role of the father: that of 
dominating and being the master in all situations.299 
 
 
 
What problems might giving up Hegel entail? Despite Louis Althusser’s critical 
engagement with Hegel throughout his life, from his 1947 Masters thesis300 through 
to his famous texts of the mid-1960’s, For Marx and Reading Capital, Althusser 
rarely pauses to consider possible drawbacks connected with rejecting Hegelian 
historicism. For Althusser Hegel is little more than a spectre to be exorcised from the 
body of Marx. Hegel is the demiurge of fascist ideology.301 Hegel is the theoretical 
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handmaiden of a bourgeois humanism wielding a blunt social democratic edge. 
Hegel, in short, should be dispensed with without regrets; his systematic monolith 
replaced with concepts better suited for providing Marxism with its own formal 
apparatus. And this is precisely what Althusser sets out to do. To his research 
programme of the mid-1960’s we owe a wealth of concepts: over-determination, 
ruptural unity, structural causality, the complex whole, and the epistemological 
break, to name just a handful. Totality in its Hegelian sense is converted into the 
theory of the ‘complex whole’ composed of discrete practices. The Hegelian idea of 
‘general contradictions’ driving history forward is replaced by a theory of the 
‘structural causality’ where no single cause of an event can be identified. Hegel’s 
linear, diachronic concept of history is abandoned for a synchronic idea owing more 
to the spatial image of an assemblage than with the dotted line of time’s arrow. In 
sum, Althusser’s substitution of Hegelian concepts with ones of his own creation 
bequeaths to us the most remarkable body of original concepts in 20th century 
Marxist philosophy.302  
Yet the boldness of the rupture with Hegel and the impressive theoretical 
output of the Althusserian programme is of course matched by the equally famous 
story of its rapid decline. As is well known, the events of May ’68 cut short the 
project, which thereafter suffered a haemorrhaging of its inner circle of committed 
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structural Marxists and a gradual loss of confidence from its helmsman.303 Occurring 
in waves of increasing severity during the 1970’s, Althusser’s self-criticisms gradually 
undermine most of the concepts which he had forwarded in the 1960’s, culminating 
in his rejection of the entire endeavour of Marxist philosophy by the 1980’s.304 It 
would be tempting, then, to credit the May events as the decisive factor behind the 
fall of Althusser’s project; ’68 bringing forth political changes rendering his paradigm 
redundant. When students spilled onto the streets, leading the revolt with their 
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unorthodox concerns and forms of organization, Althusser’s strategy of pursuing 
patient reform within the French Communist Party, conducted from the seminar 
rooms of the elite Ecole Normale Supérieure, looked in retrospect like a relic of the 
old world. Althusserianism is henceforth seen as the philosophy of order and 
intellectual hierarchy: a ‘Theory of theory’ Althusser would disparagingly call it by 
1974,305 a Zhdanovite repression by proletarian science Jacques Rancière would 
allege,306 a Marxism of the seminar room Alain Badiou would dismiss it as in the 
1970’s.307 What problem did ’68 reveal about Althusser’s philosophy? In a word, 
authority. The outbreak of militancy in the May event showed no deference to the 
traditional institutions or hierarchies, and Althusser’s quietism during this time 
invites suspicions about the way his philosophical discourse reflects his dubious 
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attachment to the party and his defence of a division of labour between communist 
intellectuals and workers.308  
It is a parsimonious narrative, especially for those who would like to appraise 
Althusser’s contributions through a solely political filter. Take a closer look at 
Althusser’s theoretical development, however, and the chronology does not quite 
work. For if there is a single revision to the Althusserian project that initiates its 
conceptual degeneration, it is found in Lenin and Philosophy and Philosophy and the 
Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists, both written on the eve of the ’68 events, 
not in their aftermath. Hereafter Althusser’s revised position that “philosophy has 
no practice, no object”309 severs his theories from the authority of science. 
Philosophy being merely the representation of “politics in the domain of theory”310, 
it cannot create knowledge and trades only in dogmatic propositions. Where his 
ideas of the mid-60’s reflect the overall disposition that “Philosophy represents the 
science of politics and the politics of science,”311 after ’67 the idea that philosophy is 
‘class struggle in theory’ marks a major change of direction and a concomitant 
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retreat from the sophisticated conceptual understanding of historical change 
attempted by Althusser’s previous philosophical project. The point is, even before 
’68 Althusser had recognised the problem of the authoritative status of his 
philosophical discourse and had taken steps to revise it accordingly. Therein lies the 
core of this chapter’s contribution. We wish to demonstrate the way in which the 
problem with the authority of philosophical discourse motivates Althusser’s change 
of course and subsequent abandonment of most of his trademark ideas. The 
question this raises, is what is it about the conceptual apparatus of mid-60’s 
Althusserianism that makes authority such a central concern? After all, one might 
expect the opposite. Althusser’s idea of the ‘epistemological break’ as a novelty-
bearing rupture seems to delimit the ability of an all-knowing vanguard to peer into 
the future.312 His notion of structural causality, likewise, appears to impose limits on 
attributing singular causes to event, inviting a certain pluralism. His image of the 
ruptural unity of revolutions could be seen as a very model of the ’68 events, which 
in both theory and reality dispensed with any notion of the process being driven by 
a ‘general contradiction’ between labour and capital. Take away Althusser’s 
membership of the French Communist Party and personal position of authority 
within the academy and at first glance there seems to be something of a mystery in 
attributing an excessively authoritative status to his concepts. Nevertheless, can we 
still explain why his theories are beset by the problem?  
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This chapter responds in the affirmative. Although Althusser’s idea of the 
‘epistemological break’ was certainly a much more successful concept of a novelty-
bearing event than any of the orthodox attempts to fashion ideas within the 
Hegelian horizon (those examined in Part I of this thesis), it does not by the same 
stroke put the problem of the authority of philosophers to rest. Why? This chapter 
identifies the problem as lying with the judgement of historical events in Althusser’s 
conceptual apparatus of the mid-60’s. For once history is divested of the reason 
attendant to its directionality, as in Hegel, what are the criteria to which theories of 
historical change are subject? What authority has the philosopher apropos his own 
historical judgements? For Hegel the authority of the philosopher was always 
subject not only to historical conditions, but also to the labour of rationally 
reconstructing history in such a way that would vouchsafe for the categories of 
judgement. Once taking leave of a concept of history that would permit such 
judgement, Althusser has the event provide its own criteria of truth; hence the 
representation of the ‘epistemological break’ as a rupture from ideology to science. 
Rather than historical reason ascertaining the truth of events in terms of their place 
in a developmental process, Althusser turns to the philosophy of science in order to 
seize upon a concept of change that will endow historical judgement with authority. 
As we will see, the problem is that by erecting a conceptual framework to determine 
the truth of events in terms of split between ideology (error) and science (truth), his 
theoretical framework becomes entangled in a contradictory relationship with 
science. In that relationship, we will argue, lies the immanent source of his project’s 
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dissolution; one intimately bound up with the question of by which means one 
possesses the authority to determine the aforesaid categories.  
Putting to one side the sensational political discourse accompanying 
Althusser’s quietism during May ’68, then, this chapter argues that more important 
for the task of explaining the decline of high Althusserianism is the way his idea of 
the event sharply poses the question of the authority of philosophers. As we will see 
in a theme recurring across Part Two of this book, Althusser’s notion of the 
‘epistemological break’ leaves the question of the authority of philosophers 
shadowing their formal systems. They all manage to conceive a novelty-bearing 
event more successfully than those orthodox ideas of transformation fashioned 
from Hegelian dialectics, but they all also inherit the essential dilemma of the 
persistent role for philosophers in determining the truth of these events.  
The first section of the chapter aims to make sense of Althusser’s idea of the 
‘epistemological break’ for thinking science and ideology as categories of change. 
The second section demonstrates the significance of Althusser’s idea of ‘complex 
whole’ in contradistinction to the Hegelian totality – drawing attention to how the 
idea of the vanishing cause deprives his theory of any rational criteria for 
determining the truth of an epistemological break qua rupture from ideology to 
science. In the third and final section, we discuss the shift in his late writings towards 
an aleatory materialism, and the problems with this philosophy of the encounter to 
provide a recognizably Marxist theory of historical events. We will see that Althusser 
successfully subtracts himself from the problem of philosophical authority in the 
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judgement of events, but only by abandoning the very concepts that allow us to 
judge events specifically historical events. 
4.1 A Marxian epistemology of the new  
 
Althusser is most famous for his thesis of the epistemological break in Marx’s 
writings. This idea has sustained its hold on Marxist theoretical consciousness; and 
perhaps the greatest credit to its persistence is the way it has been absorbed into 
Marxist theoretical consciousness in spite of the fact that Althusser’s theory of the 
‘epistemological break’ has been mostly forgotten. Due to Althusser’s changes of 
direction and scathing self-criticisms his epistemological concepts seem like isolated 
components of a research avenue that was opened up only to reach a dead end. 
Consequently, whilst debate remains as to whether and in which way there is a 
break in Marx’s work from his early bourgeois humanism to the science of his later 
mature political economy, rare indeed are continuing discussions of Althusser’s 
epistemological concepts which seek to contest, defend or develop them.313 Since 
this part of the thesis aims to follow how heterodox ideas of the event in Marxist 
philosophy resulted from Althusser’s epistemological ideas, however, our interest 
lies precisely with the concept. Understanding Althusser’s idea of the 
‘epistemological break’ is crucial for our argument. Because it will be by formalising 
an anti-Hegelian concept of historical structure that leads him to invoke the 
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distinction between science and ideology as a line of demarcation for passing 
historical judgement on events. His idea the event, this is to say, is intimately 
connected with his epistemology of science.314 In this section we begin by briefly 
reviewing Althusser’s political context and his motivations for positing a break in 
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Marx’s work, before continuing to elaborate upon his appropriations of Gaston 
Bachelard’s theory of the ‘epistemological obstacle’ and the modifications it had to 
undergo in order to be rendered compatible with a thoroughgoing Marxist anti-
humanism. This puts the basics in place so that we can appreciate the full extent of 
the difficulties involved in creating a theory of historical change based on an 
historical epistemology of scientific discontinuity. 
To begin by providing just sketch of his intellectual biography,315 Althusser 
was a theorist operating in the philosophical fringe of the French Communist Party 
(PCF), which dominated Marxist politics in post-war France. The decisive events to 
animate Althusser’s groundbreaking philosophical work were Khrushchev’s de-
Stalinization program, announced at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, 
and its culmination in the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960’s. Taken together they 
comprise the political conjuncture Althusser saw as ripe for intervention. He 
criticised the right-wing critique of Stalinism which he associated with a rising 
idealistic humanism defended with reference to the discovery of Marx’s humanist 
‘early works’. In his view, the elevation of ‘humanity’ as the central term of Marxist 
discourse was a nefarious attempt to displace antagonistic class struggle. And in 
keeping with the Leninist operation of ‘bending the stick straight’, theoretical 
antihumanism was necessary to maintain Marxism’s oppositional focus. Thus 
deemed as the appropriate left-wing critique of Stalinism, for Althusser opposing the 
humanist trend involved defending the scientific basis of Marxism; this in order to 
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combat a deviation which he saw as possessing an anti-revolutionary, social 
democratic trajectory. The ironical result of maintaining such a ‘hard-line’ position 
would be the most remarkably heterodox synthesis of intellectual traditions. For his 
task of demarcating Marx’s early works from the scientific analysis of his mature 
work centred on emphasizing structure above the role of the subject (hence the 
temporary alliance with the structuralism of Levi-Strauss), but also, and more 
importantly, appropriating Gaston Bachelard’s notion of ‘epistemological obstacle’ 
(or in Althusser’s reconfiguration ‘epistemological break’) for thinking the rupture 
between ideology and science. With the categories of French scientific rationalism at 
hand Althusser partitioned Marx’s corpus into an early, ideological problematic, set 
against a mature, scientific inquiry of the later work. The execution of this operation 
then drew Althusser further into an arcane web of complex epistemological issues 
that would set him at odds with many of the most basic articles of faith of Hegelian-
inspired dialectical materialism. 
Before elaborating upon these conceptual innovations, however, it is 
necessary to take a step back. Given that Althusser’s ideas are the result of a 
synthesis of ideas drawing in large part on the little understood tradition of French 
scientific epistemology, a lack of familiarity with these sources can stymie our ability 
to appreciate the unique issues generated by Althusser’s development of them.  
Thus, getting to grips with his source material is necessary to allow us better to 
appreciate the problems generated by synthesising these ideas with structuralist 
theses about synchronic historical temporalities and social formation. Because it will 
be the problem of the means by which the ideology/science distinction is 
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instrumentalised as a method of historical judgement that we will argue acutely 
presses the issue of the authority of Althusser’s conceptual discourse, we therefore 
need to begin by working through his sources and how he attempts to map them 
onto a wider set of structuralist concepts of historical change. We start with a 
discussion of one of the works most influential for Althusser’s epistemological 
hypotheses, Gaston Bachelard’s The Formation of the Scientific Mind. For knowing 
its influence on both Althusser and similar theorists of discontinuity in scientific 
development like Thomas Kuhn – Kuhn was actually influenced by Alexandre Koyré, 
but they are from a kindred tradition – the difficulties of Althusser’s adaptation of 
Bachelard’s ideas will be revealed more clearly in the process. 
 In The Formation of Scientific Mind Bachelard employs psychoanalysis to 
understand the impedimenta to scientific progress. For him, distinguishing 
‘epistemological obstacles’ in scientific pedagogy and persisting in the minds of 
scientists is a matter of grasping the invariant errors of pre-scientific thought. To this 
end Bachelard draws examples from a wealth of 18th century ‘scientific’ texts in 
order to illustrate a regressive revelling in spectacle and awe at the expense of the 
sober elaboration of the abstract laws underpinning phenomena. The lesson he 
draws from this is that standing between pre-scientific thought and scientific 
thought is “experience that is ostensibly concrete and real, natural and immediate 
present[ing] us with an obstacle.”316 In search of the science of reality as “the 
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mathematical why”317 thus entails resistance against “obvious and deep-seated 
empiricism”318 because “Nothing is given. Everything is constructed.”319 
Consequently, Bachelard’s insistence on the innovative procedure of mathematical 
abstraction relies on the idea of a break between the new ‘scientific object’ and the 
object itself. The process of science, where an initial generality about an object can 
be flawed to the extreme (a necessarily erroneous starting point), implies “a very 
real break between sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge.”320 The conclusion 
Bachelard draws flies in the face a deeply ingrained empiricist image of science as 
uncovering the secrets of the object, believed to be already there in the object, 
waiting to be discovered. In his words, “the twentieth century has seen the 
beginning of scientific thought against sensations … we need to construct a theory of 
the objective against the object.”321 Bachelard proposes the objective of science as 
not coterminous with science’s objective referent; the science is not already ‘out 
there’, it has to be constructed.  
Interestingly, despite Bachelard’s assertions that his theory is 
psychoanalytically oriented, his hypotheses about scientific development can be 
read as a series of obstacles to science in absentia of psychoanalytic speculation. 
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Appraising Bachelard’s achievements, Canguilhem, for one, confirms that his 
“discovery is precisely to have recognized and then to have theoretically reflected 
the fact that science has no object outside its own activity; that it is in itself, in its 
practice, productive of its own norms and of the criterion of its existence.” To which 
he also conjoins the specificity “that it is all organized around a reflection on 
Mathematical-Physics.”322 The series of points below therefore describe Bachelard’s 
epistemology of science without making any reference to the subject of scientific 
practice, or to the specifically psychoanalytic impedimenta to making progress in 
scientific knowledge (important for considering Althusser’s appropriation outside 
the frame of psychoanalysis). 
 
1. Discontinuity in scientific practice. 
2. A strong divide between the pre-scientific (errors) and scientific approach 
(correction). 
3. Science as the realm of mathematical abstraction, against the diverse, 
sensuous concrete. 
4. Development in science as proceeding from a first, over-generalization 
and proceeding with caution in the increasing particularization of analysis. 
5. The objective of science distinguished from the object of scientific 
investigation. 
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This characterization of science exerted an overwhelming influence on Althusser’s 
epistemology in combination with other influences such as Canguilhem’s.323 
Althusser endorsed not just Bachelard’s notion of an epistemological break, but also 
the conception of science as the elaboration of abstractions from initial generalities: 
abstractions working on abstractions to induce an epistemic break in the 
problematic.  
In For Marx Althusser applies this to Marx’s innovations, thereby inferring 
the ‘double break’ from the ideological problematic to a scientific study opening up 
the continent of history in Marx’s mature works. Marxist philosophy is then cast as a 
theory of “epistemological history” (another Bachelardian phrase) implying an 
“indispensible circle in which application of Marxist theory to Marx himself appears 
to be the absolute precondition of an understanding of Marx.”324 Enabled by this 
philosophical procedure is “the theory which makes possible an understanding of its 
[Marxism’s] own genesis as of any other historical process.”325 What explains its 
genesis? This question provides a fulcrum for many of the most difficult aspects of 
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Althusser’s philosophical writings. With his anti-humanist insistence on history as a 
“process without a subject,”326 there can be no recourse to the category of genius, 
or to the world-historical individual gifted by nature with a psychological capacity to 
simply see what others could not. The problem thus posed is of “the relation 
between the events of ... thought and the one but double history which was its true 
subject.”327 Notwithstanding Althusser’s admission of Marx’s “extraordinary 
theoretical temperament, animating by insatiable critical passion,”328 repudiating 
any psychologization of Marx which would account for the break occasions 
explaining the emergence of the thoughts leading to the break. In turn, this 
betokens a synthesis with a philosophical conception of history that blocks any 
avenue allowing for ideational genesis in the teleological unfolding of the concept, à 
la Hegel. Althusserian prohibitions thus stand in the way of three possible accounts 
of the genesis of new knowledge: 
 
1. A subjective psychological explanation. 
2. An empiricist account of grasping the essence of objects, where knowledge is 
believed to be already there waiting to be discovered in the objects. 
3. A teleological disclosure of the concept, whereby the original separation of 
man from scientific knowledge of the objective world is restored in the end. 
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Let us travel down all three blind alleys to explore how these prohibitions compel 
Althusser to synthesize Bachelard’s notions with structuralist ideas in order to arrive 
at his concept of the epistemological break. 
4.1.1 Against humanist subjectivism 
 
To emphasize the difficulties facing Althusser’s anti-humanist take on discontinuous 
epistemological ruptures, one can profitably contrast it with the explanation 
forwarded by Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.329 Since Kuhn’s 
theories are well known the most basic of its contours are sufficient to bring out 
their glaring contrast with Althusser, heightening the theoretical drama of 
Althusser’s challenge in the face of having no recourse to the explanatory 
metaphors of the Anglo-American academy’s foremost philosopher of scientific 
discontinuity in the 20th century. 
Although Kuhn was hardly radical when measured against the French 
tradition predating his insights, his thesis was nonetheless a challenge to 
conventional Anglo-American philosophy of science inasmuch as it rejected a single 
trajectory of cumulative progress where success builds neatly upon success. In its 
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place proposes periods of stability interrupted by sudden, incommensurable shifts. 
These he terms ‘paradigm shifts’, which in Structure were likened to the 
psychological effect of a gestalt switch. After a scientific revolution, scientific 
practitioners live in a different world of meaning incommensurable with the 
previous world – and underwriting the progress of both normal science and the 
genesis of paradigm shifting science lie psychological categories. Because the tasks 
of normal science are “puzzles in this sense, we need no longer ask why scientists 
attack them with such passion and devotion. A man may be attracted to science for 
all sorts of reasons. Among them are the desire to be useful, the excitement of 
exploring new territory, the hope of finding order, and the drive to test established 
knowledge.”330 One can instantly recognise the psychological categories: passion, 
devotion, attraction, desire, excitement, hope and drive. The initiation of paradigm 
shifting science is also attributable to a psychological experience: one akin to 
religious revelation. As Kuhn describes, 
 
normal science ultimately leads only to the recognition of anomalies 
and to crises. And these are terminated, not by deliberation and 
interpretation, but by a relatively sudden and unstructured event like 
the gestalt switch. Scientists then often speak of the “scales falling 
from the eyes” or of the “lightning flash” … On other occasions the 
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relevant illumination comes in sleep. No ordinary sense of the term 
illumination fits these flashes of intuition.331  
 
Where Kuhn spent much of his career after Structure flirting with degrees of neo-
Kantianism attempting to specify exactly what he meant by the incommensurability 
of scientific worlds,332 the interrogation of the ‘metaphor’ of the subject’s psychic 
event (‘gestalt switch’ implying seeing what is already there, simply inverted) to 
explain genesis has generally been treated as a non-problem. It should be 
immediately obvious, however, that an explanatory recourse to the subject’s gaze – 
an inverted gestalt gaze on what is already there – would be barred by Althusser’s 
anti-humanist stipulations (also barred by Bachelard’s prohibition on conceiving 
knowledge as there in the object just waiting to be found). 
 In Reading Capital, Althusser impugns this psychological conception of the 
genesis of a ‘paradigm shift’. For Althusser, initiating a new problematic means 
opening up a terrain of thought; hence barring any explanatory metaphor of an 
extraordinary gaze falling upon already existing objects. The passage below from 
Reading Capital could not read more at odds with Kuhn’s psychological metaphor of 
subjective revelation. 
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To see the invisible ... we need an informed gaze, a new gaze, itself 
produced by a reflection of the ‘change of terrain’ on the exercise of 
vision ... Here I take this transformation for a fact, without any claim to 
analyse the mechanism that unleashed it and completed it. The fact 
that this change in terrain, which produces as its effect this 
metamorphosis in the gaze, was itself only produced in very specific, 
complex and often very dramatic conditions; that it is absolutely 
irreducible to the idealist myth of a mental decision to change ‘view-
points’; that it brings into play a whole process that the subject’s 
sighting, far from producing, merely reflects in its own place; that in 
this process of real transformation of the means of production of 
knowledge, the claims of a ‘constitutive subject’ are as vain as are the 
claims of the subject of vision in the production of the visible...333  
 
Rejecting the idea of attributing causal primacy to subjective experiences for 
explaining epistemological breaks also commands commitments at odds with 
empiricism cast in any Humean form, or what Althusser deridingly calls “subjective 
empiricism.”334 A Humean empiricism in which all knowledge derives from 
impressions formed from the empirical world, yet is tied together without certainty 
by the events of subjective ideas imposing categories such as causality, opens the 
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door to what Engels and Lenin described as ‘agnosticism’ within neo-Kantian 
philosophy (we will see the same concern re-emerge in the chapter on Meillassoux). 
This is because, as with Bachelard, Althusser sees the scientific object as a 
constructed, qualitatively new object irreducible to the real object itself. But this 
object is not a phantasm of the subject; the object is truth itself. 
4.1.2 Against empiricist real contradiction 
 
Althusser’s objections to empiricism give an anti-Hegelian inflection to Bachelard’s 
opposition to the idea of knowledge resting in the object. As Althusser sees it, the 
problem rests with empiricism’s conception of its abstraction procedure, relying on 
a Hegelian notion of contradiction within the real. In this conception, the object is 
considered the source of all knowledge, and science succeeds only insofar as it 
extracts the essence of the object. There are thus essential and inessential qualities 
to all objects: the former falling under the purview of science, extracting it from the 
barriers erected by the latter.335 To maintain empiricism’s realist credentials 
knowledge has to exist within the internal relations between the object’s essential 
and inessential traits. Scientific cognition merely takes hold of the essential by way 
of a relation already lying within the object itself. Science does not construct its 
scientific object by way of creative mathematical abstractions; it rather grasps the 
real abstraction within the empirical object itself (it is not hard to see the 
congruence of this critique with Althusser’s dissatisfaction with Marx’s theory of 
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commodity fetishism, portrayed as a pre-scientific hangover from his early works 
where the real abstraction lies within the commodity object itself, internally split 
between its use value and exchange value).336 To surmise the above using 
Althusser’s words, “For the empiricist conception of knowledge, the whole of 
knowledge is invested in the real, and knowledge never arises except as a relation 
inside its real object between the really distinct parts of that real object.”337 
Consequently, “Empiricist abstraction, which abstracts from the given real object its 
essence, is a real abstraction, leaving the subject in possession of the real 
essence.”338 
The empiricist conception of the essential and inessential provokes the 
metaphor of the invisible (essential) being covered up by the visible (inessential) 
henceforth sliding to a consecration of the humanist conception of the individual 
who can peer through the inessential fog into the essential heart of the object. Vice 
versa, “an empiricism of the subject always corresponds to an idealism of the 
essence (or an empiricism of the essence to an idealism of the subject).”339 The 
empiricist conception of knowledge is thus “the twin brother of the problematic of 
the religious vision of the essence in the transparency of existence.”340 The errors of 
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the empiricist approach are furthermore represented as those of a philosophical 
(ideological) incursion in the realm of science, embroidering the mobile scientific 
process into a philosophical tapestry of stable objects. On this point Althusser again 
repeats Bachelard. Because cutting across all of Bachelard’s numerous writings lies a 
critique of the way philosophy lags behind science, concomitant to its unfounded 
claims to provide a master discourse to assure or dissuade people from science’s 
truth claims. It is a critique of how philosophical notions external to science can 
enter into the discourse of epistemology, for which sensuous empiricism is the 
guiltiest culprit. The vessels of seemingly innocent words like ‘object’ shared by 
science and philosophy provide the site in which philosophy must reflexively criticise 
its parlous drag. Quoting Lecourt: 
 
What Bachelard is revealing here is the fact that when a scientist and a 
philosopher pronounce the word object, when they introduce it into 
their discourse, they are not discussing the same thing, or, rather: 
philosophy is discussing a thing and the scientist is discussing a result. 
We understand why Bachelard wrote in Rational Materialism: “The 
object is only instituted at the end of a long process of rational 
objectivity.''' A proposition is strictly impossible for a Philosopher. On 
this point the 'work' of philosophy can be characterized as follows: it 
takes as its theme the object-result, a scientific concept, and inserts it 
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in the philosophical couple subject/object. What it says about it is still 
valid only for the object-thing of philosophical discourse. 
 
Althusser could therefore be citing Bachelard verbatim, when in his criticism of 
empiricism’s epistemology in Reading Capital he declares “I am interested in the 
play on words itself.”341 For Althusser, the word ‘object’ is the rug under which 
empiricism’s contradictions are swept; the word ‘real’ provides the decoy. 
Attributing his counter insight to Marx and Spinoza, he rather claims that “the 
production of knowledge which is peculiar to theoretical practice constitutes a 
process that takes place in entirely in thought.”342 Far from simply extracting the real 
essences of stable real objects, science, according to Althusser, is the process of the 
transformation of ideological material in thought (like in Bachelard science is 
associated with mobilism against ideology as repetition).  
In For Marx Althusser delineated this process of conversion through the 
stages of Generality I (the ideological given), Generality II (theoretical work on the 
ideological given), and Generality III (the production of knowledge).343 Yet the idea 
that this process is supposed to take place entirely in thought obviously begs the 
question of how correspondence with the real is assured? Aware of the problem of 
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how Generality III is supposed to refine its grasp on reality, Althusser famously 
leaves the question unanswered when he asks 
  
by what mechanism does the production of the object of knowledge 
produce the cognitive appropriation of the real object which exists 
outside thought in the real world? ... The reader will understand that 
I can only claim, with the most explicit reservations, to give the 
arguments towards a sharpening of the question we have posed, and 
not an answer to it.344 
 
Or perhaps infamously unanswered would be more accurate. For this provided the 
source of many, if not most, of the discomfort commentators on his work have 
experienced with Althusser’s epistemology. Alex Callinicos puts the point most 
bluntly: “theoretical practice can cognitively appropriate its real object despite the 
fact that it takes place completely in thought it is because thought and the real are 
homologous”, to which he continues, “to employ an asserted homology between 
thought and the real as the foundation for an epistemological positions, is to fall into 
the empiricist problematic.” The damning conclusion in Callinicos’ eyes is that 
“Above all, it becomes impossible to avoid idealism.”345 
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 Now, whilst it can be conceded that the lack of a theory of correspondence 
does problematise Althusser’s epistemological endeavour that is less of a concern 
here than the mechanism of the epistemological break and the concepts permitting 
judgement on when a novel break has actually taken place. For our purposes it is an 
important distinction to clarify. The question of correspondence is important if we 
take Althusser’s epistemology as a solely scientific theory of how we gain knowledge 
about objects and laws that recur across time and space. But knowing that 
Althusser’s epistemology is part of a wider project to reconceptualise the processes 
of historical change – processes that in many cases lack such clear correspondents as 
the real ‘objects’ with which science is concerned – to submit Althusser’s theory to 
such demands and to see its degeneration as a result of a failure to elaborate a 
theory of correspondence would be to subject his theory to a criticism that seems 
rather misplaced. Furthermore, it places a demand for his epistemology to provide 
methods for guaranteeing correspondence that are alien to the whole endeavour of 
historical epistemology. For instance, when Elliott charges that “the ‘non-
problematicity of the relation between an object and the knowledge of it’ [is] 
guaranteed by ontology” he is perhaps guilty of a slippery word play on 
‘ontology’.346 Against Elliott’s claim that Althusser scaffolds ontology around 
epistemology to provide it with guarantees, it is worth remembering that the 
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“historical epistemology” of the likes propounded by Bachelard and Althusser was 
explicitly adopted to ward off the conception of philosophy as providing a guarantee 
of science. In Reading Capital Althusser places his anti-foundationalist cards on the 
table: “it is not a matter of an external reflection on the a priori conditions of 
possibility which guarantee the possibility of knowledge.”347 The very focus on the 
category of the epistemological break “is a question which is posed and 
demonstrated as open in principle, i.e. as homogenous in its structure of openness 
to all the actual questions posed in its scientific existence.”348 To contend that the 
concept of the epistemological break can ground science is self-contradictory.  In 
Paul Thomas’ summation, “the refusal to seek guarantees of scientific truth outside 
the activity of science itself” opens up the possibility of an “anti-empiricist, anti-
positivist, anti-subjectivist epistemology.”349 Truth – to use unfashionable word 
common to Bachelard, Althusser, and, later, Badiou – is immanent to the procedure 
of scientific transformation, opening up new terrains of scientific investigation, 
rendering previously invisible objects visible. Truth is not a matter of 
correspondence, but the process of change that opens up new domains of 
knowledge. “No mathematician in the world”, Althusser says, “waits until physics 
has verified a theorem to declare it proved ... the truth of his theorem is a hundred 
percent provided by criteria purely internal to the practice of mathematical proof.” 
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What goes for mathematics goes for Marx: “It has been possible to apply Marx’s 
theory with success because it is ‘true’; it is not true because it has been applied 
with success.”350 What concerns Bachelard and Althusser above all else – and it is 
this which reconfigures common sense notions of truth – is the process of change, 
quite unmistakably taking the point of view of historical epistemology. So the 
mechanism with which to ensure Generality III possesses an improved 
correspondence with the real compared to Generality I is less Althusser’s concern 
than his contention that this process opens up a new terrain of enquiry, previously 
inaccessible to GI. GIII contains new scientific objects of enquiry. So no matter what 
their validity in terms of correspondence they represent an enlargement of the 
scientific terrain. The really difficult question is not one of correspondence, but 
rather the conceptual criteria by which the novelty of a break can be universally 
confirmed as a true novelty. Accordingly, the categories that allow one to affirm the 
break between science and ideology also demand the concept of history to be 
interrogated. 
4.1.3 Against teleology  
 
For Althusser, the aporias of empiricism are exacerbated by an ideological 
conception of history through which scientific development is framed. If it is possible 
to isolate a single point at which Althusser transcends Bachelard et al., it is by 
establishing a ‘science of history’ that, as Resch writes, “Althusser forces French 
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historical epistemology beyond the limits of its own self-understanding.”351 The 
problem, Althusser argues, rests with “the traditional concept of the history of the 
sciences, which today is still profoundly steeped in the ideology of the philosophy of 
the Enlightenment, i.e. in a teleological and therefore idealist rationalism.”352 If for 
Althusser science is associated with discontinuous breaks producing novel 
“knowledge effects” Hegel’s teleological philosophy of the Idea’s realisation through 
a historical process relating origins and ends – the Enlightenment’s theorisation par 
excellence – must thenceforth be cast as an absolute ideology. Rescuing 
epistemological breaks from the overbearing weight of teleology demands their 
extrication from ideologies of history carried over in empiricism. Althusser thus 
recognises in the empiricist schema an originary mythos, whereby knowledge is 
excavated from the relation of real objects’ essential and inessential features.  It is a 
“myth of the origin; from an original unity undivided between subject and object, 
between the real and its knowledge.”353 What he calls an “idealism of the ante-
predicative” throws into suspicion the usual philosophical words for the production 
of the new. Origin, genesis and mediation – all these terms are infected by 
teleological ideology. Thus the isomorphism between empiricist epistemology and 
political ideology. He rejects empiricism’s conception of an originary separation of 
subject and object that is ultimately reconciled by science’s grasp on the real 
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essences of objects, seeing it as connected with the rejection of the Hegelian-
humanist idea of man’s necessary alienation in history which will be reconciled at 
the end with the realisation of man’s essence as man.  
 This latter point cannot be overemphasized, for in the rejection of teleology 
and linear historical development are encapsulated all the foregoing critiques of 
subjectivism, empiricism, and idealism. Causality has to be reconceived via a 
conception of the elements composing any structural formation.  The eschewal of 
Hegelian teleology also necessitates – in an attendant anti-Hegelian gesture – a 
reconceptualisation of totality, or how the parts of a whole system act on one 
another in order to bring about change. As Étienne Balibar writes in his contribution 
to Reading Capital, there is “a rigorous and necessary correlation between the 
structure of the concept of history peculiar to that theory [empiricism] (a structure 
itself dependent on the structure of the concept of the social totality peculiar to that 
theory) … and the concept of temporality in which that theory of history thinks the 
‘changes’, ‘movements’, ‘events’.”354 Delineating the exact nature of the divisions 
within the whole which permit novel breaks entails resistance against two equally 
ruinous conceptions: on the one side, the ‘simple whole’ of the Hegelian totality in 
which everything is reflected in and determined by the totality, and on the other 
side an empty concept of a wild multiplicity of elements prohibiting any stable order 
against which novelty can be discerned.  
As we will see in the next section, Althusser manages to find a middle path 
between both extremes with his concept of the ‘complex whole’ providing a notion 
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of totality allowing for rare historical breaks brought about by the vanishing cause of 
structural causality. Yet as we will also see, the idea of the vanishing cause creates a 
problem for interpreting historical breaks in terms of the rupture from science to 
ideology. It will pose most acutely how – and more importantly, on whose authority 
– historical change is to be judged. 
4.2 Structural causality of the break  
 
Examining the notion of structural causality requires entering the more famous parts 
of Althusser’s philosophical system – a world of the over-determination of different 
practices and the notorious ‘final instance’ of economic determination in the social 
‘complex whole.’ Motivating the theory of over-determination were real impasses in 
the Marxist theorisation of the base-superstructure relation and also orthodox 
confusions over to what extent Engelsian dialectical materialism provides the master 
methodology of the sciences. After the disasters of Stalin era ‘proletarian science’ – 
most spectacularly the failure of Trofim Lysenko’s Lamarkian agricultural projects of 
the 1930s – Althusser sought to affirm the autonomy of theoretical (scientific) 
practice precisely on the terrain of combating Hegelian-Marxism’s conception  of 
totality, in which all social and theoretical practices are reflected in one another on a 
single level. Perhaps no more in vogue than his epistemology – Michel Foucault 
adopted a renegade Althusserianism from the late 1960’s by casting aside thinking 
the relation of discrete practices355 – the necessity of Althusser’s notion of the 
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complex whole needed for thinking ruptures is often not well understood. To make 
clear the distinctions, then, the table below matches on the left side the Hegelian 
(and Hegelian-Marxist) conceptions with Althusser’s alternative Marxist conception 
on the right.  
 
1. General contradiction Ruptural unity 
2. Simple whole/totality Complex whole/totality 
3. Infinite One of practice  Finite relation of practices 
 
The question of the ‘general contradiction’ possesses a particularly thorny status for 
Marxist theories of change. As we saw in Part I of this thesis, the Hegelian horizon 
relies upon the notion of change coming about as the result of a dialectical switch 
occurring at a single point of transformation – a conception we argued limits the 
capacity to conceptualise the novelty of events. This critique, from which we have 
drawn much inspiration in this thesis, is important for providing Althusser with his 
alternative concepts relating the idea of the idea of the epistemological break with 
the structures of historical change. 
 Building upon Lenin’s theorisation of the revolutionary conjunction, the 
essay in For Marx, ‘Contradiction and Overdetermination’, shows Althusser at pains 
to emphasize the multiplicity of disparate circumstances permitting the 
revolutionary seizure of 1917. For him, this necessitates a theorisation of the 
relationship of contradictions that avoids recourse to any singular ‘general 
contradiction’ to which they can be attributed. Fully acknowledging this fact implies 
245 
 
that “we can no longer talk of the sole, unique power of the general ‘contradiction’”; 
rather, the unity of elements that comprise a revolutionary rupture needs to be 
thought in terms of levels and instances of effect which “might be called over-
determined in its principle.”356 This is indeed a crucial question for Marxism because 
of its default belief in a sole motor of history arising from the general exploitative 
contradiction between labour and capital. Instead, against this belief, over-
determination requires the conceptualisation of the relation of a totality that does 
not collapse into the single principle of a simple whole, an infinite relationship 
where all elements stand on a reciprocally reflected footing. And consequently this 
demands a quite different idea of totality to the predominant Hegelian-influenced 
notions of orthodox dialectical materialism. In Althusser’s view, despite the 
appearance of the development of complexity within the Hegelian dialectical 
totality, it is fraudulent for the simple reason that “it has only one centre, the centre 
of all the past worlds conserved in its memory; that is why it is simple.”357 The 
reduction of all the elements that comprise a specific situation in an historical epoch 
– “economic, social, political and legal institutions, customs, ethics art, religion, 
philosophy, and even historical events” – to a singular principle of unity “is only 
possible on the absolute condition of taking the whole concrete life of a people for 
the externalization-alienation  ... of an internal spiritual principle... moved by the 
simple play of a principle of simple contradiction.”358 A vulgar Marxist inversion of 
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this principle suffers from the same problem when it posits the economic as the 
general contradiction (base) underlying all the disparate phenomenon of the 
political, ideological and scientific (superstructure).  In this false intellection, “[t]he 
political and the ideological will therefore be the pure phenomenon of the economic 
which will be their ‘truth’.”359 Against Hegel’s infinite relation in his concept of 
totality, there is a finite number of discrete practices of production – material, 
political, ideological and theoretical, amongst others – held together in a complex 
unity360 which together provide the conditions for epistemological breaks. And this is 
for the fact that only the finite division of distinct practices possessing their own 
historical times create objects which can serve as the basis of an epistemological 
break. 
 If one can discern here what appears to be a typically post-structuralist, post-
modern, or even post-Marxist take on the plural multiplicity of reality, what then 
distinguishes it as Marxist materialism? This is typically ascribed to Althusser’s 
assertion that “the economy is determinant, but only in the last instance”361 – to wit, 
that Althusser’s analysis affirms a plurality of casual levels and then the economic 
‘final instance’ is only intercalated on the basis of a quotidian Marxist focus on the 
relations of production. Furthermore, his concession that from “the first moment to 
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the last, the lonely hour of the ‘last instance’ never comes”362 could be seen as 
providing a tacit acknowledgement of the impotence of the Marxist axiomatic in the 
face of plural reality. But whilst there might be a sense in which in laying out his 
opposition to boorish conceptions of the base-superstructure relation Althusser fails 
adequately to defend why the economic is determinant in the final instance, to see 
his theory dissolving into pluralism fires wide of the mark. Not only for the fact that 
Althusser denied these ramifications of his work – again, this could just be attributed 
to dogmatism – but much more importantly because it overlooks the basis of 
structural causality within the innovative notion of the complex whole. In his words, 
“the fact that the Hegelian type of necessity and the Hegelian essence of 
development should be rejected does not mean at all that we are in the theoretical 
void of subjectivity, of ‘pluralism’ or of contingency.”363 The appendix to 
‘Contradiction and Overdetermination’ goes some way to explaining why. 
 Althusser here discusses a letter written by Engels in which he attempts to 
impress on the recipient, Bloch, that the superstructure is the realm of infinite 
accidents underwritten by the necessities of the economic base. Althusser chastises 
Engels for failing to present any intelligible reason why economic necessity underlies 
the accidental multiplicity of events. Particularly interesting are his remarks on 
Engels’s ‘second level’ of analysis, where Engels remarks how many individual wills 
intersect to give rise to an event. Citing Engels, “there are innumerable intersecting 
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forces, an infinite series of parallelograms of forces which give rise to one resultant – 
the historical event.”364 When Engels switches to conceptualising the infinite series 
of accidents as creating the event’s necessity, it involves, however, changing the 
object of analysis to the transcendent product of a convergence of individual wills; 
and, in line with Althusser’s conception of practice, this involves drawing on an 
object which is no object at all. “The transparency of content which strikes us when 
we imagine the parallelogram of forces (of individual wills) disappears once we ask 
(as Engels does himself) about the origin (and therefore about the cause) of the 
determinations of these individual wills. For we are referred to infinity.”365 This ‘non-
Marxist’ explanation “from the point of view of knowledge is empty. It puts forward 
an infinity without content, an abstract and hardly even programmatic 
generalization.”366 In other words, it falls outside theoretical practice; it produces no 
object. It demands that “we trust to the infinite (that is, the indeterminate, 
epistemological void) for the production in the final resultant of the resultant we are 
hoping to deduce: the one that will coincide with economic determination in the last 
instance, etc., that is, we trust a void to produce a fullness.”367 This cannot produce 
an historical event, which instead requires “insertion into forms which are 
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themselves historical,” forms which are “perfectly definable and knowable,”368 and 
hence provides content to distinguish a historical event from any other type of 
event. The upshot is that no Marxist conception of historical change can surrender 
itself to “sliding into the empiricism or the irrationality of ‘that’s how it is’ and of 
‘chance’.”369  
4.3 The authority of historical judgement: whose science? 
 
Given that the previous sections have tried to reconstruct all the crucial elements of 
Althusser’s epistemology of historical change is it possible to go beyond Althusser’s 
humble claim in Reading Capital that he “take[s] this transformation [the 
epistemological break] for a fact, without any claim to analyse the mechanism that 
unleashed it and completed it”? It is worth conceding that there are no ready to 
hand answers to this question provided by Althusser; and indeed, his concept of the 
complex whole forecloses philosophical elucidation of a method which would allow 
the causal vectors of epistemological breaks to be traced. Resch succinctly captures 
the consequences: “The whole becomes what Althusser calls an “absent cause” 
because it is present only in and through the reciprocal effectivity of its elements... 
structural forces or laws are at work in social formations, but unlike the natural 
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sciences, historical science can never experimentally isolate them from one 
another.”370  
We therefore seem to reach an impasse for judging an historical event as a 
novelty-bearing break. To recapitulate, Althusser takes from the French tradition of 
scientific epistemology the idea of truth/error distinctions following epistemological 
breaks and converts it into a general theory of epistemological breaks as a rupture 
of science (truth) from ideology (falsehood). This is then embedded in a synchronic 
conception of history and social formation where discrete practices and their 
distinct temporalities are held together within a complex whole. Breaks occur 
because of the overlapping causalities of discrete practices act upon one another to 
give rise to truth-bearing events. In their process of eruption, though, structural 
causality dictates that the cause is lost amidst the manifold of effects. There are, 
ultimately, no methodological criteria by which to reconstruct rationally how any 
particular break comes about. The upshot is that whilst with one hand Althusser 
denies us insight to the exact origins of breaks as a philosophical pretension better 
cast aside, with the other we are given the philosophical framework that 
understands these breaks in terms of a stark rupture from ideology to science; from 
error to truth. The fusion of a structuralist, synchronic concept of history with the 
idea of incommensurable breaks derived from the tradition of French epistemology 
results in a theory unable to locate the causes of events yet at the same time 
aspiring to provide them with a strong attribution of truth. Unlike Hegelian-inspired 
approaches for which their historicist philosophy of history furnishes categories to 
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make judgements as to whether an event marks a new epoch, Althusser’s idea of 
the epistemological break provides no such guarantees. As a result, it brings the 
question of authority to the fore. Given the absence of any rational, methodological 
criteria for determining when ideology breaks decisively into science, the theory 
relies upon sheer deference to science to shore up its judgements. But since science 
itself proves no criteria for determining when such breaks have in fact taken place, 
this judgement returns again to Althusser’s theory of the ‘epistemological break.’ 
Provoking a vicious circularity, the procedure of nominating an event as an event 
places Althusser’s tacit theoretical authority solely in the position of being able to 
make these calls. Lacking any conceptual mechanisms for determining the purported 
truth of a particular historical break it can only assume this role through its assumed 
authority to do so. The situation facing Althusser’s theory is in some regards 
analogous to the problems identified with the implicit authoritarianism of Kuhn’s 
theory of scientific revolution.371 Whereas for Kuhn this is alleged to result from his 
approval of the use of force in order to consolidate a new scientific paradigm in the 
absence of any rational criteria, for Althusser the same absence of intra-scientific 
criteria sends the determination of an event back up the line to the final court of 
philosophical judgement. This helps explain why Althusser would later retract his 
concepts as providing an illicit ‘Theory of theory’ and label them a theoreticist 
deviation. Althusser frames his criticism of his ideas’ theoreticism in a slightly 
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different way to how we have put it here, however. So let us review his self-
criticisms order in order to place us in a position to see why authority is nevertheless 
a central problem motivating the critique. 
 In his 1974 “Elements of Self-Criticism” Althusser wishes to correct his earlier 
enmeshment in theoreticism, which he defines as a “speculative-rationalist” 
deviation.  He presents the deviation as resting with the identification of science 
with truth and ideology with error, permitting a representation of Marx’s break in 
entirely rationalist terms, wherein “the class struggle was practically absent.”372 The 
speculative rationalist tendency is defined according to three features: 
 
1. A (speculative) sketch of the theory of the difference between 
science (in the singular) and ideology (in the singular) in general. 
2. The category of “theoretical practice” (in so far as, in the existing 
context it tended to reduce philosophical practice to scientific 
practice.) 
3. The (speculative) thesis of philosophy as “Theory of theoretical 
practice”—which represented the highest point of this theoreticist 
tendency.373 
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Divesting philosophy of its pretensions as a theoretical practice on par with science, 
never mind a Science of science, entails a re-evaluation of his earlier identification of 
philosophy with epistemology. A rather lengthy footnote to the text establishes the 
focus of the criticism. The speculative-rationalist deviation 
 
was organized, as if often the case, around the manifest form of a 
word, whose credentials seemed beyond doubt: Epistemology ... the 
theory of the conditions and forms of scientific practice and of its 
history in the different concrete sciences [...which can lead to] a 
speculative way, according to which Epistemology could lead us to 
form and develop the theory of scientific practice (in the singular) in 
distinction to other practices: but how did it now differ from 
philosophy, also defined as “Theory of theoretical practice”? ... If 
epistemology is philosophy itself, their speculative unity can only 
reinforce theoreticism ... one must give up this project, and criticize 
the idealism or idealist connotations of all Epistemology.374 
 
Althusser’s self-criticism amounts to the charge that despite the way his project 
draws upon ideas from scientific epistemology, in the final instance it does little 
more than invest his own theoretical authority with the capacity to make 
judgements demarcating ideology and science, hence the speculative authority to 
determine an event as an event. In response to this realization of the theoreticist 
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deviation, from ’67 onwards Althusser demotes philosophy from any role in 
determining truth/error distinctions which would suppose to place it in a position of 
authority to adjudicate on the truth of historical events. Indeed, and as already 
discussed in the introduction to this chapter, Althusser realises the implications of 
his theory before the events of May ‘68 would cast suspicion on his theories as 
buttressing authority and hierarchy. 
In his ’67 revisions Althusser is responding to serious problems with his 
theory that could not be ignored. Yet insofar as he continues to accord philosophy 
only a subordinate role in engaging in ideological warfare in defence of science (and 
thereby, it is assumed, class struggle), there is a sense that he throws the baby out 
with the bath water. On this point, Resch astutely observes, “What is missing from 
Althusser’s elliptic self-criticism, then, is a re-evaluation of his philosophical defence 
of scientific realism in light of his rejection of theoreticism and, even more 
important, an elaboration of scientific concepts of ideological, scientific and 
philosophical practices as historical-social activities.”375 Delinking philosophy and 
epistemology from any role in thinking the idea of the event implies a theoretical 
degradation of the task of thinking the conditions and structures separating an 
historical event from any other kind of event. As Elliott also writes, “The 
denomination of a theoretical discourse as scientific (i.e. of providing objective 
knowledge of a real object) implies and necessitates evaluative principles.”376 Of 
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course, as we have argued, these evaluative principles are more or less absent from 
his mid-60’s epistemology when it comes to making historical judgements on an 
actual event. But Althusser at least seemed to be pressing in the right direction with 
these concepts, despite difficulties of circularity bolstering the authority of his 
discourse. However, once after ’67 the philosophy-epistemology couplet is 
abandoned (even though the absent cause of an epistemological break is still “not 
[an] entirely useless”377 idea, according to the Althusser of 1974), all that is left is a 
philosophical battle of ideas in defence of the autonomy of science; ideas just 
presumed to be favourable to working class struggle.378 The set of systematic 
concepts Althusser generates for thinking the historical event, thenceforth crumble 
from a combination of revision and neglect. 
 To conclude this section, we have argued that Althusser’s theories of the mid 
1960’s possess a circular logic driving them to uphold the authority of his own 
theoretical discourse. Whilst his idea of the novelty-bearing event might at first 
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glance appear to undermine the authority of philosophers, in fact the lack of criteria 
for making judgements on the ideology/science distinction ends up meaning that 
Althusser’s epistemological discourse can only tacitly offer its own purported 
scientific status as a justification for making historical judgements. This realization 
must have come as something of a blow to Althusser, since throughout his career he 
was always sensitive to the need for a consistent theory of judgement. In his 1949 
“Letter to Jean Lacroix,” for instance, it is precisely Lacroix’s lack of a “real theory of 
historical judgement”379 to which Althusser takes objection. Althusser’s realisation 
by ’67 that his own theory suffers from a similar predicament must be considered a 
crucial part of his criticism of the theoreticism of his philosophy in this period. 
Moreover, as we will see in the next chapter, Badiou’s exclusion of philosophy as a 
truth-procedure and careful attempt to prevent philosophy from playing a role in 
the nomination of events can be seen as a way to navigate this problem raised by 
Althusser’s theory of the epistemological break. In any event, Althusser’s own 
philosophical trajectory across the late 1970’s and 80’s did not make any systematic 
attempt to revise his theories of historical change. Although the philosophy of the 
encounter he developed in his later work might bear more superficial resemblances 
to the idea of the event one later finds in Badiou – owing to its categories of void, 
event, contingency, etc. – the aim of the final section below is to show that by 
abandoning the task of thinking specifically historical change, and therewith 
avoiding all the questions of the authority this entails, it nonetheless signals a 
degeneration of his philosophy. 
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4.4 A materialism for Marxism, or, the theoretical void of late Althusser 
 
It is legitimate to talk about Althusser’s late period beginning in the 1980’s. Arguably 
this period could be extended back as far as the mid 1970’s; but while by that time 
Althusser was beginning to offer criticisms of Marx and break from some of the 
more conventional Marxist theoretical positions, the overwhelming divergence of 
content and style of the fragmentary writings of the 1980’s – combined with their 
authorship after a series of devastating personal experiences – makes it legitimate 
to ring fence these as a late period proper, and the works of the mid-1970s as a 
transition stage.380 For our purposes the important observation is the shift we can 
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nd
 edition (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 343.) The idea that 
thematic/conceptual/philosophical continuity or divergence can be settled by reference to issues of 
translation seems unlikely though. 
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witness in these late writings from Althusser’s identification of philosophy as 
epistemology in the early to mid-1960’s, to a situation in the 1980’s where 
philosophy is accorded just a partisan role in affirming the ‘necessity of contingency’ 
– a phrase present in his earlier works but presented without any significant 
philosophical underpinnings. At this point in his career, Althusser gives up 
attempting to elaborate a theory of historical change and, we argue, thereby 
regresses to what he earlier identified as Engels’s ‘non-Marxist’ theorising of 
historical events. Our purpose in this final section is simply to point out why this is so 
and also to argue why, despite these writings’ superficial resemblances to the ideas 
of the event one sees in Badiou and Meillassoux’s theories, these resemblances are 
only apparent. 
In the course of an interview stretching between 1984 and 1987 with 
Fernanda Navarro, published under the title “Philosophy and Marxism,” Althusser 
puts distance between his current views and his old theories. He writes that a 
materialist philosopher is “not that horror, a dialectical materialist, but an aleatory 
materialist”381 – signifying, in turn, the shift from Marxist philosophy to a 
“philosophy for Marxism.”382 Althusser admonishes his earlier works of Marxist 
philosophising for investing Marx with “a philosophy dominated by ‘the spirit of the 
times’; it was a philosophy of Bachelardian and structuralist inspiration, which ... 
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cannot, in my opinion, be called Marxist philosophy.”383 Furthermore, contrary to his 
earlier work “materialism is not a philosophy which must be elaborated in the form 
of a system in order to deserve the name ‘philosophy’.”384 Materialist philosophy 
does not “consider itself to be a science, and still less the Science of sciences... it 
renounces the idea that it possesses truth.”385 Conversely, he writes, in a more 
mystical train of thought, “aleatory materialism [is] required to think the openness 
of the world towards the event, the as-yet-unimaginable, and also all living practice, 
politics included.”386 All very well. But his new aleatory materialism nevertheless still 
claims to be able to speak about historical processes, and pushes to an extreme his 
earlier claims of the necessity of contingency: now directed even against Marx and 
Engels, neither of whom “ever came close to proposing a theory of history, in the 
sense of the unforeseen, unique, aleatory historical event.”387 In chapter two of this 
thesis we argued a similar point, but for reasons better diagnosed by using 
Althusser’s concepts elaborated in the 1960’s which consider the specific structures 
of historical change, not on the basis of an abstract privileging of contingency. 
To account for the centrality of chance, argued on an entirely ontological level, 
Althusser introduces the void: both an ontological (non)object, permitting all 
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unstructured movement, chance and change, and a practice of philosophy, wherein 
philosophy empties itself of all grounding. This ‘underground current’ he then traces 
through Epicurus, Hobbes, Machiavelli, and, to a more qualified extent, Marx. 
Unfortunately, the move to ontology in these late texts seems to licence a wholesale 
abandonment of thinking both order and change. If this were maintained on a 
strictly ontological level then it might not pose such a problem. But troubling 
questions remain with seeing these texts as offering anything like the conceptual 
richness for thinking through historical change or the relationship between science 
and philosophy one can appreciate in his earlier works. Two questions in particular 
should raise doubts as to the contribution of these late texts. 
1. If, as Althusser once argued, philosophy is a continuation of class struggle 
within the realm of theory, does Althusser’s conception of aleatory 
materialism really contribute to thinking the changes necessary for 
revolution once all notions of order are dispensed with? (Augusto Illuminati, 
for one, affirms the familiar ideologies of our time, when he approvingly links 
Althusser’s aleatory turn to the disappearance of class, the emergence of the 
multitude and an egalitarian, subversive, democratic politics).388 
2. If aleatory materialism operates purely on the level of ontology, why then 
does he accuse Marx and Engels (neither of whom claimed to be ontologists) 
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of not thinking a “theory of history” that would allow an aleatory materialist 
event? 
It is almost as if the further Althusser pushed his philosophy towards ontology the 
more slackly he enforced his own prohibition on the transposition of ontological 
theses back to matters of concrete theoretical practice. Althusser once went out of 
his way to annul the conception of an epistemological void to account for breaks in 
practice; and he once gave no credence to ontological notions of void to explain 
change either. For instance, in 1963 Althusser criticised Foucault’s account of the 
origin of the dichotomy of reason and madness in an early preface to the History of 
Madness (later removed), writing that: “This border freely constituted is haunted by 
the temptation of being an original abyss, a verticality that is no longer a break in 
history but the originary rupture of time.”389 Althusser criticises Foucault for 
supplanting the question of origins within a specific practice with a transcendental 
conception of genesis which prevents an adequate theory of origins within historical 
time (it is much the same as his reproof to Engels on historical events discussed in 
the last section). Warren Montag observes “the deferred effect of this encounter, its 
themes and its contradictions in his post-1980 philosophical writing, particularly in 
his conception of aleatory materialism, where it sometimes appears as if Althusser 
has returned to the very notion of a transcendental abyss that he so effectively 
criticised in Foucault.”390  
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 This is also why, despite the alluring semantic parallels one can find between 
Althusser’s idea of the aleatory event in his later writings and Alain Badiou’s, the 
elaboration of Badiou’s theory is much better understood in respect to the earlier 
tendencies in Althusser’s thought. Where Badiou in some sense repeats Althusser’s 
late push of philosophy towards ontology, he remains more faithful, we argue, to 
the original project of developing a Marxist philosophy of the event insofar as his 
ontology accounts for both order and change. For Badiou, the historical event is 
intuited from ontology’s necessary inconsistencies rather than founded on simply an 
abyss of contingency. As Badiou puts it in an interview with Bruno Bosteels, 
although in his late work Althusser realised that “an ontological framework was 
needed and that materialism could not simply be an epistemological category,” he 
failed to “submit his intuitions in this regard to the final test” which would have 
involved articulated them with respect to “the ensemble of his previous 
framings.”391Moreover, we could add, this would have forced Althusser to confront 
the question of the authority of the philosophers in thinking the processes of 
change, as Badiou does by rigorously incorporated this requirement into the delicate 
fabric of his metaontological system. 
To understand how and why Althusser and Badiou parted ways does, 
however, in a sense mean affirming Althusser’s thesis of the primacy of class 
struggle in theory. It means returning to the events of 1968 after which the 
collective endeavour of Althusserianism imploded, never to return. 
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5.Badiou’s Decision 
 
 
to give up leadership, mostly 
 
 
 I am telling you as a philosopher that we have to live with an idea, and that 
what deserves to be called real politics begins with a conviction.392   
        
 
After Althusser lost one of his most “brilliant members”393 of the structural Marxist 
project to the wave of Maoist activism which engulfed France post-’68, in his 1970’s 
texts Alain Badiou refers back to Althusserian Marxism as fit only for the seminar 
room.394 Even if not cutting as deep as Rancière’s criticisms, nevertheless during 
these years Badiou’s turn away from structuralist concepts towards Hegelian 
dialectics signals a clear rejection of his teacher’s paradigm. What is more, from here 
onwards Badiou places the category of the subject, the sworn enemy of 
structuralism, at the heart of his theories of political change. On the surface it seems 
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hard to imagine how Badiou could have taken a sharper change of direction away 
from his formative influences.  
Decades later, however, Badiou concedes the lasting influence of Althusser’s 
project for his mature oeuvre of works, including Being and Event, Manifesto for 
Philosophy and Logics of Worlds, amongst others.395 As he generously maintains in 
Metapolitics, “Every truly contemporary philosophy must set out from the singular 
theses according to which Althusser identifies philosophy.”396 In part this softening 
of stance could be put down to an inevitable mellowing which comes with age and 
achievement. The Maoist militant of the 1970’s transformed into a world renowned 
philosopher, overshadowing his mentor and becoming the continental tradition’s 
most respected living thinker. But the world had also changed in the interim. Where 
in the 1970’s rejecting Althusserianism was as a symbolic vote in favour of militant 
action, the contemporary predominance of identarian and human rights discourses, 
and the widespread valorisation of ‘democracy’ as an ethical absolute, reconfigures 
the discursive terrain upon which their political positions were previously 
counterpoised. Indeed, when addressing Althusserian theoreticism in a 2007 
interview, Badiou concedes the role of changing historical conditions in its 
reappraisal. 
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Evidently the question of theoreticism does not have the same 
importance today, but I would say that the relation between 
philosophy and politics today, or the question of the role of theory has 
once again become very important because the concrete situation has 
become very difficult and mixed. In those years [’69-] we had great 
hope, truly massive, in the situation.397 
 
These ambiguous remarks about the relationship between philosophy and politics 
might appear strange for a philosopher whose best known idea – the event – 
represents a break in the order of knowledge: a break, moreover, only possible 
within the four truth procedures of art, love, science and politics, relegating 
philosophy to a reactive role of absorbing their conditions a posteriori. The idea that 
Badiou might be operating within a more complex relationship between philosophy 
and politics unsettles the impression of Badiou’s Being and Event as an elaborate 
model of praxis398; one where philosophy merely reacts to politics, or fuses with it, 
but cannot intervene into it from an authoritative position.399 Furthermore, those 
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like Bruno Bosteels, who aspires to assimilate Badiou into the Laclauian tradition of 
‘radical democracy,’400 and who represent Badiou’s philosophy as one of humble 
underlabouring to the real political work going on elsewhere, need to surmount 
difficulties brought to the surface in Badiou’s most recent texts. Through this lens, 
for example, how are we to make sense of the way Badiou positions his latest grand 
treatise, Logics of Worlds, as motivated by the need to combat the contemporary 
doxa of “democratic materialism” – a bio-materialist vitalism of living bodies and 
diverse languages wherein emancipation stands for the freedom to embrace animal 
desire? Badiou’s choice to label his alternative approach a ‘materialist dialectic’, 
openly acknowledging that his choice of words harks back to Althusser’s defence of 
dialectical materialism and that it subsumes “aristocratic idealism”401 into its fold, 
casts doubt on the impression that his philosophy does nothing more than kowtow 
to external political conditions, especially those couched in democratic platitudes. In 
fact, Bosteels registers the problem in a rare moment of disagreement with Badiou, 
                                                                                                                                           
Bosteels contains one overriding theme, namely that “political events have no need for the 
philosopher to transmit from the outside what they themselves, as events, produce in terms of 
thinking or truth, or to judge which of them qualify as properly political events.” (Badiou and Politics 
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considering the critique of ‘democratic materialism’ “badly chosen, or at least ill 
advised.”402 What Bosteels fails to consider, though, is whether Badiou’s decision to 
make ‘democratic’ his key term of opposition is more than simply an excrescent 
ideological oversight, or if it is rather a symptom of the ability of Badiou’s 
metapolitical discourse to inveigh upon politics by utilising his metaontological 
categories to uphold the truth of certain events and, conversely, to delegitimize 
others? 
 Such is the argument of this chapter, which seeks to show how attempts to 
represent Badiou’s philosophy as simply doffing its cap to movements on the street 
runs up against a number of difficulties posed by the nuances of how philosophical 
judgement is mediated within his system.403 To put the problem as plainly as 
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possible, just because in Being and Event’s metaontological system militant 
sequences occur after a contingent event through a non-philosophical truth 
procedure, does this imply no role for philosophers in the mediation of the process? 
Badiou certainly seems to have stacked his text full of safe guards to make sure this 
is the case. Only the collective subjects belonging to the four truth procedures can 
engage in the faithful processes of drawing out the consequences of an event, 
thereby securing its novelty by attaching their inferential results to its proper name. 
But as even Bosteels concedes, certain “minimal conditions must be fulfilled in order 
for us to speak of political events.”404 Is it coincidental that such conditions happen 
to validate the orthodox genealogy of political revolutions to which Badiou remains 
faithful? Is it the case that the philosopher whose system designates these 
conditions does not in some way place himself in a position of authority to 
adjudicate on which are genuinely truth-bearing procedures and which are not? Is it 
adequate, as Bosteels does, to register the existence of such conditions in little more 
than a codicil to the representation of Badiou’s system as one marked by a 
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systematic prohibition on, or irrelevance of, philosophy in making historical 
judgements?  
To answer this question our approach will interrogate Badiou’s concept of 
the evental procedure in a similar way to how our previous chapter examined why 
Althusser’s mid-60’s theoreticist discourse ends up promoting itself to a position of 
authority for making historical judgements. And as with the previous chapter, this 
will not involve reading our author’s political views between the lines of his 
philosophical work. Our approach, instead, places emphasis on working through the 
ways in which Badiou aims to account for and delimit philosophical authority 
immanently within his metaontological categories. This means that we will have to 
be attentive to the delicate fabric of Being and Event which carves up worlds into 
ontological and non-ontological situations, ontology and metaontology, politics and 
metapolitics. This task also enjoins us to understand the implications of Badiou’s 
choices of mathematical models and procedures, which interface with the above 
distinctions. In particular, we will argue that in Being and Event the philosopher’s 
metaontological grasp upon ‘non-ontological situations’, whilst being circumscribed 
by an inability to produce any truths itself, is based upon theoretical demarcations 
which his philosophical system will ultimately struggle to maintain. In this sense we 
continue in a vein of critique opened up by Ray Brassier.405 Our principal innovation 
will be to tease this problem out of Badiou’s crowning chapters on Paul Cohen’s 
forcing procedure; these representing the make or break meditations of Badiou’s 
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magnum opus.406 We will demonstrate that in the mathematical demonstration 
pursued in Cohen’s ‘ground model’ of set theory the excess between the set and the 
power-set necessary for an event to occur is repressed by the transitive nature of 
the semantic model of forcing Badiou adopts. Consequently, it will be shown that in 
Badiou’s final meditations pursued within this model, there is no event to be 
affirmed by an ‘inhabitant’ inside the model; there is no impetus for an inhabitant of 
a situation to force new truths out of a situation. Either a uniquely visionary subject 
within a situation can see the possibility of forcing a new truth, or the impetus for 
the initiation of the truth procedure needs to come from outside: from the 
philosopher who can prompt those with their non-conceptually informed vision 
within any non-ontological situation.407 Of course, our argument is not 
conspiratorial; we argue this not to claim that Badiou surreptitiously sneaks an 
obscure theoretical handle into his system in order to continue to endow 
philosophers with discursive authority over truth procedures. Rather, this point is 
made in order to highlight the way that such problems recur as a result of Badiou 
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staying with the contours of the Althusserian problematic. Following our previous 
chapter’s interpretation of theoreticism as a defence of the role for philosophical 
expertise in making historical judgements, the current chapter will thus conclude 
that it is not as clear as many of Badiou’s followers would have it that his philosophy 
has ever made an all encompassing break from this position. In the conclusion we 
will reflect upon how this problem could be seen to parallel some of the issues 
raised by Badiou’s position as a public intellectual. 
5.1 An Althusserian reversal 
 
There is no need to repeat in depth the story of Badiou’s political and theoretical 
evolution from ’68 through the Maoist ‘red years of the 1970’s. These developments 
have already been admirably charted by scholars in the field.408 For our purposes we 
need only note that in the two decades separating Badiou’s initial contributions to 
the Althusserian programme and the publication of Being and Event in 1988, 
Badiou’s relationship with Althusserianism can be seen to undergo something of a 
reversal. Beginning with his arch-Althusserian contribution to the ‘Philosophy Course 
for Scientists,’409 through to the works of the 1970’s that draw upon Hegelian 
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dialectics and crunch theory down to a homogenous epistemological-ontological 
discourse of engaged militancy, by the time we reach Being and Event Badiou 
returns to what could be seen as qualified revival of Althusserian themes.410 This 
                                                                                                                                           
(ideological) notion of scientific activity, and a concept (scientific) of mathematical logic. (ibid., 9) 
Badiou’s thesis rests on the wager that through the use of mathematical logic philosophy can 
perform the partisan role for the recovery of science that in the same lecture course Althusser 
insisted was philosophy’s duty; and it does so by turning the mathematical, logical model against the 
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demonstration logical positivism is thus exposed as an illegitimate, ideologically determined concept 
of model because it fails to recognize how the formal syntax (drawing on recursive algebra) and the 
semantic model (based in set theory) adjoin one another in an experimental dialectic wherein models 
take part in generating the syntactical systems of logic. As a consequence there is no “‘pure’, ‘formal’, 
or ‘a priori’ knowledge.” (Ray Brassier, “Badiou’s Materialist Epistemology of Mathematics”, Angelaki: 
journal of the theoretical humanities, Vol. 10, No. 2. (August 2005), 143.) Badiou’s text arguably 
represents the most sophisticated, technical application of Althusserian dialectical materialism in its 
heyday. Where Althusser had only invoked science for identifying the science/ideology rupture, 
Badiou locates within mathematical model theory the resources proving a revisable, experimental 
site of rupture between logical syntax and semantic models. For an accessible introduction to model 
theory see Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, Gödel's Proof (New York: NYU Press, 2001). 
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 On the theme of Badiou’s continuities with Althusser in Being and Event, Luke Zachary Fraser, for 
one, identifies the way non-philosophical truth procedures create splits in the regime of knowledge 
as the Badiouian successor to the Althusserian epistemological break. (“Introduction” in Badiou, The 
Concept of Model)  And also as a mark of continuity from the 1970’s period, Bosteels describes how 
“the dialectical rapport between truth and knowledge is precisely the place of inscription of most of 
Badiou’s debts to Maoism.” (Bruno Bosteels, “Post-Maoism: Badiou and Politics,” Positions, Vol. 13, 
No. 3, (Winter 2005), 581.) But to gauge a more accurate register of the continuity and discontinuity 
of this turn viz. Althusserianism, it is informative to compare Badiou’s late 1980’s change of direction 
to both the pre and post corrections of ‘theoreticism’, which split Althusser’s corpus at ’67. Badiou’s 
new conception of the subjects of different practices marks a return to the pre-’67 Althusserian 
programme of thinking finite, discrete practices conditioning one another’s development through 
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move also coincides with a break from his Maoist political commitments of the 
1970’s; the book being published after the formation of L’Organisation Politique – a 
group established with former UCF-ML comrades in 1985 to pursue politics without 
a party.411 As Peter Hallward has assessed things, the shift comes about after the 
recognition of the defeat of the revolutionary movements in the 20th century, 
responding to the exhaustion of the party form as the vehicle of emancipation.412 At 
the same time, Badiou’s continuing involvement in politics and his further 
elaboration of a theory of the subject in his philosophical works is sufficient to 
indicate that this did not result either in giving in to the counter-revolutionary spirit 
of the age or to dwelling in nostalgia for past revolutionary glories.413 Rather, within 
                                                                                                                                           
epistemological breaks. Yet in another sense, inasmuch as Badiou deliberately excludes philosophy as 
a truth procedure, he also affirms Althusser’s post-’67 correction of ‘theoreticism’ from Lenin and 
Philosophy onwards, whereby philosophy was posited as having no object of its own.  If there is no 
strict homology with any one period of Althusserianism, then, it nevertheless establishes Badiou’s 
continuing negotiation of different tendencies within the overall problematic. 
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th
 century revolutionary sequence tied 
to the party-state nexus: “the Maoist current, [is] the only true political creation of the sixties and 
seventies”, because “the Cultural Revolution is the last significant sequence that is still internal to the 
party-state.” More wistfully, in the final accounting “the strategic meaning (or the universal range) of 
these inventions was a negative one. Because what they themselves carried forth, and what they 
vitally impressed on the militant minds of the entire world, was nothing but the end of the party-state 
as the central production of revolutionary political activity.” (Alain Badiou, “The Cultural Revolution: 
The Last Revolution?”, Positions, Vol. 13, No. 3, (Winter 2005), 481-482, 488.) 
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of ‘counter revolution ‘ of the 1980’s, adopting a more affirmational philosophy, focusing upon 
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philosophy Badiou can be seen as assimilating, converting and tooling these 
conditions into a renewed theory of historical change.  
Moving away from the politically-determined theoretical discourse 
culminating in his 1982 Theory of the Subject, 414 then, Being and Event rejects his 
previous fusion of philosophy and politics into a singular discourse, and instead 
elaborates a system setting in place strict demarcations. In terms of the theoretical 
relationship between Badiou’s philosophy and his politics in this text, this can be 
seen to operate along two main axes. First, echoing the notion of discrete practices 
offered by mid-60’s Althusserianism, Badiou sets in place his famous four truth 
procedures: art, love, science and politics. And as with Althusser’s corrective thesis 
of Lenin and Philosophy and the Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the 
Scientists, Badiou also deprives philosophy of its own truth creating capacity. 
Henceforth philosophy only provides a composite site for drawing out the 
consequences for philosophy of the events and truth procedures taking place in 
domains external to it.415 Second, in Being and Event Badiou makes his notorious 
decision to equate mathematics as the discourse of ontology.416 Although 
philosophy is conditioned by the events unfolding in all four truth procedures, 
mathematics serves as the privileged discourse for philosophy’s conceptual practice 
to draw from. Philosophy’s role is described accordingly as metaontological, 
                                                                                                                                           
 
414
 Badiou, Theory of the Subject. 
415
 For more on Badiou’s considerations of the conditions effected philosophy see Manifesto for 
Philosophy, trans. 
 
416
 Badion, Being and Event, 6. 
 
275 
 
meaning that it translates the ontological insights and logics of mathematics into a 
metaontological conceptual discourse: a conceptual gloss,417 or commentary upon 
mathematical ideas.  
Further demarcations come into play too. For given that Badiou’s 
commitment to the multiple traverses even his own theoretical construction, 
ontology becomes only one situation amongst many; it is the discourse which 
“presents nothing ... besides presentation itself.”418 Opposed to this, all other 
domains of knowledge – including the political situation – are non-ontological 
situations. Yet metaontology operates from something of a privileged position 
insofar as it can draw upon the ontological situation to furnish itself with a 
conceptual apparatus for interpreting both ontological and non-ontological 
situations. It is granted a global reach for using the resources from the ontological 
situation; and it is permitted to supplement this with additional ideas such as the 
event in order to understand the processes of change occurring within truth 
procedures. Now, as Badiou has explained in commentaries on his own work in the 
years since, these truth procedures are not identical. The truth procedure of love, 
for instance, involves only two people. Art and science are aristocratic practices 
whose truths only speak to the select few who can appreciate their innovations. 
Politics alone is immediately universal and infinite owing to Badiou’s strictures 
demanding it conform to an egalitarian modality.419 Yet regardless of these 
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differences, philosophy’s metaontological role is to draw on the resources of 
mathematics in order to rigorously elaborate how truths come into being and are 
sustained within all four domains. It can pursue this demonstration indifferently to 
the precise forms of the truth procedures belonging to each domain of knowledge 
because the ideas which form the crux of understanding the procedures of change 
belong to the metaontological discourse. Since the event, particularly, cannot be 
found within the ontological situation420, there is thus an isomorphy between the 
concepts drawn from the non-ontological situation which metaontology deploys to 
understand change, and the non-ontological historical situations they are supposed 
to grasp. But still, despite the fact that metaontology deploys ideas like event which 
cannot be derived from the mathematical ontological situation, these are 
nonetheless required to be compatible with it, or else the term metaontology would 
be rendered a pointless misnomer.  
As should thus be clear, philosophy, whilst being proscribed from producing 
truths, is the key to understanding processes of change. Its core concepts, although 
configured as compatible with mathematical ontology, are specifically philosophical 
concepts geared to make sense of non-ontological historical situations. Accordingly, 
and to reference the criticisms made in the previous chapter, what prevents this set-
up getting locked into the kind of circularity experienced by Althusser’s system of 
the mid-1960’s? As with the idea of the epistemological break representing a break 
from ideology to science, yet unable to back up the idea of the break from within 
                                                                                                                                           
 
420
 Badiou, Being and Event, 184. 
 
277 
 
scientific practice itself, does not Badiou’s metaontological deference to 
mathematics make the same mistake? Does its conceptual discourse not go astray 
when it refers back to mathematics, even though its core concepts of change cannot 
be located in the mathematical-ontological situation? This seems to be the thrust of 
Ray Brassier’s criticism, when he writes that the “metaontological discourse seems 
to enjoy a condition of transcendent exception vis-a-vis the immanence of non-
ontological situations.”421 To which he adds the following crucial remarks:  
But given that philosophy itself is not a truth procedure, there can be 
no subject of philosophy strictly speaking for Badiou and thus he is at 
pains to explain how the metaontological discourse which conditions 
his entire philosophy (and from which he draws all the conceptual 
details for his theory of evental truth) is able to exempt itself from the 
immanent conditions of knowledge governed by the norm of the 
One... The a-specificity of metaontological discourse in Being and 
Event and the anomalous status of philosophical thought invite the 
impression that Badiou’s metaontological theses float between re-
representation of the mathematical presentation of being, and a 
presentation of the imaginary re-presentation of ordinary 
knowledge.422 
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Essentially, Brassier’s criticism, directed at the architectonic of Badiou’s 
metaontology, is that it sets itself up with inexplicable authoritative knowledge to 
peer through illusory re-presentations of non-ontological situations. But though 
Brassier’s critique touches on something vitally important, it is questionable 
whether one can really assess the success of Being and Event without working 
immanently through the particular mathematical content and metaontological 
reflections that comprise its theory of change. For Badiou claims that his avowed 
intention is to examine the way the ontological situation of mathematics – that set 
in motion by Cantor and continued through 20th century set theory – will speak to a 
new theory of the subject. As we will see, by the end of Being and Event the 
modality of this demonstration, channelled through Paul Cohen’s theory of forcing, 
draws directly from the ontological situation and complicates the division between 
the ontological and the non-ontological situations, and hence also ontology and 
metaontology. Two tasks therefore lie ahead. First, we need to pin down the exact 
relationship between mathematics and philosophy Badiou adheres to. Second, we 
need to work through the meditations of Being and Event to see if, by the time we 
reach those on Paul Cohen’s theory of forcing, metaontology and the truth 
procedures taking place in historical situations remain properly demarcated from 
one another.  
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5.2 On the subject of Being and Event 
 
As Badiou sees things in Being and Event, philosophy has a unique role: a 
metaontological task to think how infinite truths are sustained by the subject.423 
Amongst the book’s multifaceted elaboration of ideas from the non-existence of the 
One, to inconsistent multiplicity, and to its affirmation of the Cantorian transfinite, 
the real locus and actual terminus of the text is to establish a theory of the subject; a 
theory relying upon the set of aforementioned demarcations between mathematics 
and philosophy and philosophy and the four truth procedures. Of the three 
conditions motivating his work that Badiou lists in his introduction, the two below 
are thus the most significant for noting how the commitments of his project 
converge. 
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1. A third epoch of science. Not demonstrative mathematics, nor the 
mathematization of physics, but “a split, through which the very nature of the 
base of mathematical rationality reveals itself, as does the character of the 
decision of thought which establishes it.”424 
2. A second epoch of the subject. A subject not as a founding centre of thought 
as in the Cartesian tradition; one which can only be thought in terms of its 
role in processes with rigorous conditions. 
Or in short, conditions which combined pose the question: given “pure mathematics 
being the science of the being, how is a subject possible?” This question is asked in 
order to correct Theory of the Subject’s politically determined presupposition “that 
there ‘was some’ subjectivization.”425 Badiou emphasizes that establishing the 
philosophical decision identifying mathematics with ontology is in no way the book’s 
goal; instead “this book founds a doctrine [...that] institutes the subject, not as 
support or origin, but as a fragment of the process of a truth.”426 Given that in no 
uncertain terms Badiou positions his metaontology as one that will draw upon 
mathematics to found a new theory of the subject, before working through the 
mathematical and metaontological meditations of Being and Event, it is necessary to 
get a firm grasp on precisely how Badiou sees the relationship between philosophy 
and mathematics. This will involve relating Badiou’s metaontology to Albert 
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Lautman’s concept of the relationship between mathematics and philosophy and 
seeing how this serves (1) a new theory of the subject, and (2) the philosophical 
metaontologists’ separation from truth procedures arising from non-ontological 
situations.  
 
Badiou asserts that Being is inconsistent multiplicity. In the phenomenal world of 
particular things this multiplicity cannot be perceived or intuited: not empirically, nor 
through any mystical apprehension. Philosophical questions are best approached 
through the formal thought of mathematics, free from linguistic contamination or 
empiricist temptations. The world we inhabit is a world of specific things, and if we 
want to think being qua being we have to subtract from all these to present 
presentation as such: that is, the presentational form of presentation itself; and 
conversely, what presentation excludes as a necessity – i.e. the inconsistent multiple. 
With its very abstract rigour mathematical discourse thinks presentation, and 
nothing more. Badiou’s philosophical metaontology is thus “not a thesis about the 
world but about discourse.”427 From where could Badiou have drawn inspiration for 
this idea? Amongst the references provided by the text Albert Lautman’s (1908–
1944) name recurs. “Lautman’s writings are nothing less than admirable and what I 
owe to them,” Badiou admits, “even in the very foundational intuitions for this book, 
is immeasurable.”428  
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Lautman was a French philosopher of mathematics with a working 
relationship with the mathematician Jean Cavaillès (1903-1944), both killed in the 
war because of their involvement in the French resistance movement. Lautman can 
be considered part of the movement of the French philosophy of science; he cites 
Bachelard and emphasizes the creative development of mathematics against 
Russell’s logicism. In The Concept of Model one can already note an affinity with 
Lautman in Badiou’s model theoretic critique of logical positivism. By placing logic on 
the same level as other forms of mathematics in the order of the genesis of new 
structures within mathematics, Zamalea observes how Lautman “prefigures ... our 
conception of logic as it arises from model theory, in which a ‘logic’ is not only 
determined, but even defined ... by an adequate collection of structures.”429 With 
respect to the idea prevalent within logicism that a rich enough logical or axiomatic 
‘essence’ can account for the entire ‘existence’ of structures of mathematics, 
Lautman counters that “we always see a mode of structuration of a basic domain 
interpretable in terms of existence for certain new entities, functions, 
transformations, numbers, that the structure of a domain thus appears to 
perform.”430 Yet as Badiou recalls in an interview with Tzuchien Tho, at the time of 
writing the Concept of the Model Lautman’s works were largely unavailable, only 
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with their publication in the 1970’s did he gain contact with the texts.431 There 
should be no surprise, then, that Lautman’s speculative contribution on the nature of 
mathematics can more evidently be seen to inform Badiou’s identification of 
mathematics as ontology in the 1980’s.  
Lautman’s participatory Platonism conceives mathematics in relation to 
philosophical metaphysics within a tripartite scheme. Dialectical questions – 
whole/part, continuity/discontinuity, etc. – give rise to questions of the ‘why’, to 
which Ideas serve to form connections to attempt to answer them. Mathematics 
then fills in these ideas with more concrete, particular and precise ideas. The 
anteriority of dialectical questions to mathematical development permits the 
posterior recovery of ideas from their mathematical exploration. 
 
While the mathematical relations describe the connections that in 
fact exist between distinct mathematical entities, the Ideas of 
dialectical relations are not assertive of any connection whatsoever 
that in fact exists between notions. Insofar as ‘posed questions’, 
they only constitute a problematic relative to the possible 
situations of entities... the Ideas that constitute this problematic 
are characterized by an essential insufficiency, and it is yet once 
again in this effort to complete understanding of the Idea, that 
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more concrete notions are seen to appear relative to the entity, 
that is, true mathematical theories.432 
   
Easily discernable are the similarities to Badiou’s conception of mathematical 
Platonism where all “that we can know, and can ever know of being qua being, is set 
out, through the meditation of a theory of pure multiplicity by the historical 
discursively of mathematics.”433 Significantly, however, this does not imply that 
“mathematics here simply represents a particular instance of a ready-made 
philosophical question”; rather, mathematics is “capable of challenging or 
undermining that question.”434  The idea that all mathematics does is throw light on 
eternal metaphysical quandaries Badiou associates with the ‘little style’ of academic 
philosophy of mathematics, as opposed to the ‘grand style’ which “stipulates that 
mathematics provides a direct illumination of philosophy, rather than the 
opposite.”435 In other words, there is a reciprocal, historical dialectic between 
philosophy and mathematics, and under current circumstances mathematics should 
take the driving seat of guiding philosophy rather than vice versa. This helps clarify 
the relationship of Badiou’s metaontology to the work of pure mathematicians, who 
he positions as working ontologists. In Badiou’s view there is no spontaneous 
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philosophy of the mathematicians worth guarding in the same way that Althusser 
insisted scientists need to be protected against the incursions of idealism. As he 
would later carefully delineate the point: although “mathematicians’ spontaneous 
philosophy is Platonism”, unlike his own Platonism it is an erroneous conception 
based on Aristotelian tenets, whereby the “ideal spectacle of its results” follow from 
“fictive activiation.”436 Platonism of the Gödelian kind he believes is “a bit too 
dogmatic”, especially so when contrasted against Lautmanian Platonism: that is, “a 
Platonism of participation” of the sensible in the ideal, centred on “the dialectic of 
ideas in the history of mathematics.”437  
If mathematicians’ philosophy of their practice is not to be trusted, neither 
should their spontaneous practice be credited with immediately releasing 
philosophical insight. On the contrary, the trust working mathematicians place in 
solving specific problems “is in principle unproductive when it comes to any rigorous 
description of the generic essence of their operations”438 – that is, to extracting the 
metaontological consequences of the ideas mathematics works on with exactitude. 
In this regard, a mathematician like Paul Cohen would assume heroic stature for 
Badiou insofar as he gained his advances in the field of independence proofs by 
desuturing set theory from the inhibitions of Gödelian philosophical Platonism to see 
how, in Cohen’s words, “ideas which at first seemed merely philosophical could 
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actually be made into precise mathematics.”439 Similarly, Cohen’s scathing comments 
on those rare moments in history where philosophers seek to insert themselves 
within mathematical practice to clarify philosophical questions would probably also 
gain Badiou’s approval. In this vein, Cohen describes Russell and Whitehead’s 
Principia Mathematica as “totally unreadable, and in my opinion of very little 
interest.”440 Vice versa, ideas and techniques that seem only mathematical (without 
any attempt to imbue them with ontological significance) can also be transcribed, à 
la Lautman, to inform philosophical questions. It follows that Badiou’s focus on set 
theory as an ontological discourse is not reducible to following the cutting edge 
practice or the philosophy of the unconscious ontologists; it is rather a site for the 
extra-mathematical composition of the multiple conditions of an era. Badiou readily 
admits that by the time of writing in 1988 set theory was no longer considered the 
most fundamental or exciting field of mathematical development. His choice of set 
theoretic ontology is instead a philosophical attempt to weld the post-Cantorian era 
of science with a new idea of the subject. Although the imperative is for philosophy 
to stay broadly up to date with the mathematical resources it draws upon, there is 
certainly room to manoeuvre depending upon the philosophical questions at hand, 
which philosophers are free to determine themselves within the remit of 
philosophy’s general conditioning by its outside. Admittedly, Badiou’s own shift away 
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from metaontological theorising of the subject in later years – exemplified by the 
section on the typology of subjects in the Logics of Worlds, disjointed from the 
topological heart of the Greater Logic441 – has served to lend the impression that 
certain foundational (intra-mathematical) commitments lie behind his allegiance to 
set theory’s articulation of being qua being.442 Badiou has occasionally even seemed 
to slide explicitly towards this position when, for example, he admits that “I had to 
come to terms with Set Theory’s rival theory regarding mathematical foundations: 
category theory.”443 But at least on the terrain of Being and Event’s justification of its 
use of mathematics, it is unambiguous that following developments in set theory 
leads towards a metaontology of the subject: from the opening remarks of the 
Introduction to the way the meditations culminate in an interpretation of Paul 
Cohen’s forcing technique. Accordingly, it follows that our own judgement on 
Badiou’s success should stand or fall with whether this new idea of the subject 
maintains or undermines the role Badiou claims to allot the philosopher in only 
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drawing out metaontological concepts from mathematics. So that no prior 
knowledge of the text is assumed, this will involve an exposition of the main sections 
of the book, before arriving at the crux of the argument with the section dealing with 
Paul Cohen’s forcing technique. 
5.3 Being, event, intervention 
 
The axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory provide the tripartite specifications 
of Being, Event and Subjective Intervention for Badiou’s metaontology; the text’s 
presentation of these being chronologically synchronous with the development of 
set theory’s axioms and techniques across the 20th century. The axioms associated 
with Being are referenced to the less contentious early 20th century axioms, in 
contrast to the more controversial additions later on such as to the axiom of choice 
(forming ZFC), Gödel’s proof of the consistency of constructability, and leading up to 
Cohen’s method of forcing discovered in the early 1960’s. Given the limited space to 
present Being and Event’s dense metaontological reading of the development of set 
theory, the table below summarises the three main movements of the text and their 
relation to set theory’s axioms, the mathematical ideas they embody, and their 
philosophical interpretations – divided in this way to reflect how Badiou’s take on 
mathematics reflects Lautman’s. In the paragraphs which follow we rapidly abridge 
the main sections of the book’s mathematics and metaontology in order to take us as 
quickly as possible to the theory of the event and the subject. 
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Architectural map of Being and Event – Main movements and their ZF-C axioms, 
mathematical and philosophical Ideas 
 
  Axiom Mathematical Idea Philosophical Idea 
 
 
 
 
Being 
 Separation Sets’ existence is 
given. The language 
separates sets’ 
relations. 
No direct access to Being. 
Determines sets’ ontic 
existence. 
Power-set The power-set p(a) of 
any set (a) has more 
‘parts’; its cardinality 
is greater. 
Theorem of excess: there is at 
least one element included in 
the ‘state’ that does not belong 
to any situation. 
 
Event 
 Foundation Sets cannot belong to 
themselves: ~(a ∈ a). 
The event is non-ontolologial: 
its self-belonging is prohibited 
by set theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intervention 
(Subject) 
 Constructability All of set theory can 
be rendered in a 
constructible 
universe. 
Axiom of foundation 
redundant; axiom of choice 
more a theorem of well 
ordering. All excess banished. 
Constructability is the form of 
knowledge. 
Infinity There exist infinite 
sets. 
The actual infinite is decided. 
Infinite sets necessary for 
axiom of choice, for 
unnameable multiples. 
Choice A function of an 
element of any set 
can be decided to 
represent it. 
Form of intervention. Arbitrary 
choice of an unnameable 
element. 
(N/A) Forcing to construct 
the generic set: G. 
Creating a generic 
extension of the 
‘ground model’, 
where theorems 
about the 
indiscernable can be 
made verifiable or 
not. 
Form of the generic ♀. Theory 
of the Subject to truth.  
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a. Being 
The absence of a definition of a set within the ZF axioms is an important starting 
point for understanding Badiou’s metaontology since it immediately rules out any 
primordial definition of Being.444 Axiomatic set theory is rather structured 
presentation which prohibits the presentation of being so to not fall to pieces under 
the weight of its own inconsistencies (‘large’ paradoxical sets, such as those exposed 
by Russell’s paradox). There is therefore a double move involved in Badiou’s 
interpretation of being within axiomatic set theory. On the one hand, the axiom of 
separation, whereby all sets are constructed out of other sets, prescribes a 
mathematical language foreclosing any direct access to being, because every existent 
is already assumed. Sets are given; the language of presentation (set theory) only 
separates out existents and structures their relations. On the other hand, in any 
situation other than ontology – in non-ontological situations this is to say – the 
inconsistent multiple (the paradoxes the axiomatic is designed to suppress) is being, 
because it is ruled out from presentation within any structure because of the law of 
the ‘count as one’. However, the operation by which structure renders inconsistent 
being imperceptible is retrospectively graspable by ontology; its outlawed 
inconsistency may nothing within any situation, but for ontology it is not a non-
being.445  
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The imperceptible, inconsistent nothing within any situation Badiou terms the 
void, and following set theorists’ inscription of the empty set he represents it with 
the symbol Ø to reinforce that this nothing is strictly unpresentable except as a lack. 
Ontology is only a theory of the void, because if ontology presented the other terms 
in its ‘presentation of presentation’ it would put the void on the same level of 
structured presentation alongside every other inscription; ontology would collapse to 
mere presentation of structure rather than delving deeper into the unstructured 
Being of structure.446 The axiom of the powerset opens up a distinction allowing 
ontology to grasp the non-presentable existence of the void. The axiom prescribes 
the absolute excess of inclusion ⊂ over belonging ∈. Belonging is the count forming 
the structure of the presentation of a situation, whereas inclusion operates as the 
meta-structure, or the ‘state’ of the situation – the count of the multiples of the 
multiples (or, sets of sets) forming a re-presentation greater than the ‘initial’ 
multiples. In a play on words designed to establish affinity with the Marxist 
revolutionary tradition, the state is described as a ‘representational state’: “Marxist 
thought relates the State directly to sub-multiples rather than to terms of the 
situation… By consequence, as a political programme, the Marxist proposes the 
revolutionary suppression of the State; thus the end of representation and the 
universality of simple presentation.”447  
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The excess of representational inclusion over presentational belonging – a 
“dialectic which is knotted together”448 – lays the road to Badiou’s new theory of the 
subject. Albeit true that Badiou maintains two ‘levels’ in his inconsistent-
being/consistent-presentation ontology, with only the latter perceptible for 
‘inhabitants’ of a situation, because the void is universally included449 within meta-
structure/re-presentation (the power-set) its presence as an empty set (as a nothing 
{Ø}) is implicated in the gap between sets belonging and included in a situation. 
What could have been a potentially static juxtaposition of ontological inconsistent 
multiplicity with structured, consistent presentation possesses a dialectical inflection 
from the initial axioms of ZF onwards. 
Badiou’s distinction between nature and historical events clarifies the above 
point in the assertion – and this seems to be nothing more than an assumption based 
on a very classical philosophical Idea of Nature450 – that ‘natural’ multiples are 
ordinals.451 These sets’ transitivity from one to the other implies a maximal 
coincidence of belonging and inclusion: there is no ordinal included which also does 
not also belong to another ordinal. With the atomism implicated by the transitivity of 
ordinals – a halting point for the properties of ordinals beneath which there is no 
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more fundamental substratum – the void is universally included but has no dynamic 
to leave a mark in the gap between the meta-structure of inclusion (the power-set) 
and the structure of belonging (presentational set). Nature is in static equilibrium 
because of its ordinal numerary structure, hence leaves no room for events and 
subjects. Badiou concludes that it is “thus true that ‘nature’ and ‘number’ are 
substitutable.”452 Solely by historical events can the natural order be unsettled. 
These happen at evental sites in non-ontological situations where a multiple asserts 
itself: a multiple in which none of the elements are presented in a situation. When 
the evental site is counted within a situation it has the void as its minimal point of 
singularity, which is why Badiou speaks of it as on the edge of the void. How this 
conception does not end up reduplicating the inert atomism of natural ordinals will 
lead us all the way to Badiou’s crowning theory of the subject. But for a subject, first 
an event. 
b. Event 
Critical for proper comprehension of Badiou’s theory of the event is the 
coimplication of evental-sites (singularities produced by the structure) and events 
themselves. The evental site produces the conditions for an event, yet does not 
necessitate an event.453 In what appears to be a rather redundant prohibition given 
that the theory of natural multiples as transitive ordinals blocks the excess of 
inclusion necessary for an evental site, Badiou confirms “once and for all that there 
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are  no natural events, nor are there neutral events. In natural or neutral situations, 
there are solely facts.”454 Badiou does not waver in insisting that the existence of the 
event through subjective force is predicated on the thinking being making it so. 
Significant for enabling the subjective procedures which will maintain the event, the 
event is the first non-ontological concept introduced in the text. It is prohibited by 
the ZF axiom of foundation, one of the main consequences of which is that no set can 
belong to itself. Thus, the event’s self-belonging, non-ontological matheme means 
that the event both belongs as a nomination of itself (ex) and of its site within a 
situation (X):  
 
ex = {x  ∈  X, ex] 
 
“[T]he event is a one-multiple made up of, on the one hand, all the multiples which 
belong to its site, and on the other hand, the event itself.”455 If this appears to 
establish the event as a transcendent eruption, supernumerary to the situation, the 
meditations of Being and Event devoted to the event (16-18) do little to establish any 
contrary impression. The event, an unpredictable eruption from the standpoint of an 
inhabitant of a non-ontological historical situation, demands subjective intervention 
because of undecideability regarding whether it belongs to the situation. It is not 
enough to say ‘there has been an event’, rather the wager of the event is to affirm 
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that it belongs to a situation, when nothing of the event is presented in the 
situation.456  
If one removes the event from its situation indexed to a sequence of 
preceding events (‘evental recurrence’) then the “speculative leftist” deviation 
degenerates into proposing “a primal event”, “a radical beginning”, or an “absolute 
commencement”.457 The Two of the event – the event and its site – are both equally 
important to affirm or else begins the inevitable slide into static Manicheism. 
Affirming both is a procedure of fidelity to the consequences of the event by securing 
its lasting impact through a disciplined labour of fidelity. Although the event is rooted 
in an ontological disjunction in structure, the emphasis nevertheless clearly lays ex-
post on the side of the subject through the naming of the event and its declaration as 
part of the situation. Again, it might appear that with the procedure of faithful 
evental nomination the schema has settled into a comfortable binary: a taut 
mathematics of structure, versus a romantically inexplicable, subjectively induced 
belief system entirely disjoint from ontology. Yet this is far from the case, as the 
return to the ZF axiomatics’ most controversial supplement – the axiom of choice – 
will show. 
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c. Intervention 
The Idea of subjective intervention is inscribed into metaontology by the axiom of 
choice. A source of controversy for mathematicians in the early twentieth century, 
the axiom pertains to the application of functions within infinite sets. Given that from 
here on in the rest of Badiou’s theory will be equally dependent upon the transfinite, 
a few preliminary words on the axiom of infinity are first required. For Badiou the 
decision to affirm the transfinite – which the axiom of infinity combined with the 
power-set necessitates – is crucial for the mathematics (axiom of choice, forcing) he 
will draw upon to prove the possibility of subjective intervention. It is a pivotal 
axiomatic for the inscription of subjective decision within set theoretic ontology. But 
why accept infinity? The actual infinite’s existence remains an open question, 
dividing mathematicians, physicists and philosophers alike. Philosophical speculation, 
scientific process, or mathematical foundationalism cannot adequately legislate upon 
the question. The lack of criteria for making a decision on the actual infinite is thus 
central for placing a decisionistic theory of the subject at the heart of Badiou’s 
metaphysics.458 Additionally, in a supplementary argument against finitary or 
denumerable, transfinite mathematical paradigms – beyond simply the circularity of 
making an affirmative decision on infinity that will allow an ontology of decision to 
be developed – Badiou rejects intuitionism and contrasts the richness of the 
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mathematical domain permitted by properly transfinite set theory against their 
barren, denumerable twin towns.459 In any case, the wager on the infinite is cast by 
ZF’s axioms and Badiou keenly follows.  
 This is important because in the case of finite sets the choice procedure of 
finding a representative element of all a set’s multiples poses few problems, because 
there is a minimal (non void) element to perform the role. The function of choice 
needs no axiomatic legislation owing to the fact that the element can be procedurally 
derived. In an infinite set, on the other hand, defining a function faces the problem 
that a single element has to represent an infinite number of elements: an operation 
with no definable rules given the excess of the immeasurable infinite over the finite, 
with no halting point of minimality other than the universal inclusion of the void.460 It 
follows that the axiom of choice is required to permit the arbitrary assignment of a 
representative element within an infinite set. For mathematicians, the axiom 
maintains the existence of a selection set on the force of assertion.  
None of this should be taken to imply that the axiom of choice should just be 
considered like any other ZF axiom. The fact that after being included within the ZF 
axioms set theory is abbreviated as ZFC is sufficient to demonstrate the 
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supplementary character of choice. The difference of this axiom is that if supposing 
the existence of a set, the function (the set of choice) has no explicit link to it: the 
function’s existence is not prescribed by the set, its uniqueness to perform the 
function is not assured, and it is impossible to know which element the 
representative set is supposed to be representing. Mapping this within Badiou’s 
philosophical interpretation, insofar as the choice permitted by the axiom “is 
subtracted from the count” (that is, the operation of choosing cannot be presented 
in the language of set theory) it is “an Idea which is fundamentally different from all 
those in which we have recognized the laws of presentation”, and thus “within 
ontology, the axiom of choice formalizes the predicates of intervention. It is a 
question of thinking intervention in its being; that is, without the event”.461 Or put 
differently, its unpresentable operation (only the result is presented) affirms the 
ontological existence of the subjective form of intervention also carried across in the 
non-ontological idea of an event. By splitting early twentieth mathematicians apart in 
a similar way to Cantor’s transfinite, Zermelo’s axiomatic intervention was in essence 
“a political conflict, because its stakes were those of admitting a being of 
intervention; something that no known procedure or intuition justified.”462 It was an 
event within the situation of ontology – but note, only for the situation of ontology, 
for in all other situations events are non-ontological. The philosophical denouement 
is that since the axiom of choice is only of relevance with regard to infinite sets, and 
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only in an infinite situation is the form of intervention possible, Badiou is obliged to 
make a “fundamental ontological decision” that “in the last resort, every situation is 
infinite.”463 Henceforth, all truths are infinite. 
 At this point (Meditations 31 onwards) a disjunction in the book’s approach 
occurs which is crucial to flag up for our argument regarding the relationship of 
philosophical metaontology to non-ontological historical situations, ergo to the 
question of the authority of the philosopher viz. political truth procedures. It is 
therefore worth recalling some of key points elaborated heretofore.  
• That ontology is a situation means it presents presentation; it is the study of 
the void based underbelly of presentation only possible from the vantage 
point of mathematics. Both ontological and non-ontological situations are 
founded by the ZF set theory axioms: a universe of transfinite 
immeasurability. In ontological situations ontology can view its situation from 
the outside; in non-ontological situations this is impossible. 
• Hence, although the ontologist is aware of the incompleteness of 
presentation, for an inhabitant of a non-ontological situation (and we can also 
include the metaphor of ‘real world’ politics under this designation) a 
supernumerary event taking place at an evental site is needed in order for it 
to be named as part of a situation by a subject. 
• The event is thus necessary to initiate change for an inhabitant of a non-
ontological, historical situation inside the ZFC universe because of the 
ontological/non-ontological distinction prohibiting an inhabitant from 
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intuiting what could be changed in lieu of an evental site opening up the 
possibly to affirm the new.  
We stress these points again, for they demonstrate how subtly interwoven the idea 
of the event is with the ontological/non-ontological distinction (hence, also, the 
relation between metaontology and non-ontological situations). The event is the 
cornerstone idea preventing the collapse of the situations into one another, 
therewith preserving the creative, truth bearing role for non-philosophical subjects. 
The event is what makes philosophy ultimately subservient to non-philosophical 
truths, but it is also what allows philosophy to think the procedures of an event and 
subjective affirmation without creating truths itself. Events circumscribe the 
philosopher to the level of abstract thought about processes of change. These 
remarks are necessary in order to appreciate the discrepancy between Badiou’s 
theory of the event in the middle meditations of the book in contrast with how 
Badiou completes the arc of the text with his theory of subjective intervention within 
a situation that creates (by forcing) a generic extension of it. Because when proving 
via Cohen the possibility of subjective decision to remake the situation within a 
transitive model of set theory in the later meditations Badiou undermines the 
structural basis of the evental site (excess of inclusion over belonging) for an 
inhabitant of the situation. This leaves, we will argue, only the ontologist Subject to 
suppose an event for the inhabitant from the outside – that is, to provide the impetus 
for the inhabitant subject to force change. Cognizance of this point requires us to 
continue to follow Badiou’s text by passing through both the constructible universe 
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of set theory and how, from within a similarly delimited model, Paul Cohen’s method 
of forcing generic extensions completes Badiou’s theory of the subject. 
5.4 Constructible universes and the vanishing event 
 
Gödel’s proof of the consistency of a constructible inner model of set theory within 
ZF established the legitimacy of a model in which Cantor’s continuum hypothesis 
could be proven. The constructible model is created through an iterative process 
wherein only the parts of a set which can be assigned properties through formulas 
are permitted: no indeterminate or unnameable parts are allowed entry. The process 
of hierarchically ascending up levels of construction along a denumerable ordinal 
index retains only those parts which formulas can assign properties to. Consequently, 
there is a provable equivalence between the ‘class’ of constructible sets (L) and the 
universal ‘class’ (V), or V=L.464 Within this model of ZF its quasi-completeness – quasi, 
because Gödel’s incompleteness theorem establishes the impossibility of the 
completion of a denumerable model – means that it is impossible to demonstrate 
that any sets are not constructible. The immeasurability of cardinality in a non-
constructed universe is reduced to an ordered succession of constructible cardinals 
leaping over the non-constructible, immeasurable sets effaced by the delimitations 
of the constructible universe. Therefore, in the constructible model the axiom of 
choice is provable, but also curtailed to the level of a theorem constructible from the 
other axioms, since the excessive cardinality demanding axiomatic prescription of a 
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choice function for infinite sets is rendered unnecessary by the ordered hierarchy of 
cardinal construction. In Badiou’s estimation this is a “flattened and correct universe 
in which excess is reduced to the strictest of measures, and in which situations 
persevere indefinitely in their regulated being.”465 It is also a universe prohibiting 
both the structural possibility of an evental site and the interventional form of a 
subject’s nomination of an event (since the operation of the axiom of choice is 
unnecessary).  
 But something odd then happens in Badiou’s metaontological schema. For, in 
spite of all that has been said about constructible models preventing the emergence 
of evental sites, it is precisely from within Cohen’s similarly transitive, denumerable 
universe (the ‘ground model’) that Badiou will seek to prove the possibility of forcing 
truths through subjective intervention. The generally neglectful attitude to Badiou’s 
theory of the subject is again evidenced in the fact that nowhere in the literature has 
anyone questioned exactly why Badiou chooses to follow Cohen’s demonstration of 
forcing in this semantic model when more intuitive variations have subsequently 
been developed.466 Another motivation for questioning why Badiou makes use of 
Cohen’s approach, when he would almost certainly have been familiar with the more 
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intuitive approaches developed subsequently, is provided by a problem confronting 
readers seeking secondary literature on forcing: the use of the Boolean valued model 
variant by the few existing ‘beginner’s guides’.467 This procedure differs from Cohen’s 
in that it creates a Boolean algebraic model  within the standard model M of ZF, 
and then uses an ultra-filter mapping to verify or disprove independence results.468 
Our suspicion is that Badiou sticks with Cohen’s original model-theoretical, semantic 
approach because it maintains a more clearly demarked sense of the 
internal/external, and hence something more like the ontological/non-ontological 
philosophical distinction upheld throughout Being and Event. But to understand this 
decision’s implication in the suppression of the evental site and what it means for the 
philosopher’s authority in nominating event requires us to wade into the 
technicalities of forcing. 
 From the perspective of Badiou’s philosophical metaontology, the final 
section of Being and Event concerned with forcing is restricted to the ontological 
situation. Problematically, although these Meditations are restricted in this way, 
something very much like the ontological/historical situation distinction is revived 
through an implicit demarcation between the ontologist ‘outside’ the model and the 
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inhabitant ‘internal’ to the model.469 Now, even though this flatly contradicts the 
distinction between nature as transitive and historical situations as non-transitive in 
the earlier mediations of Being and Event, it would seem safe to assume that the 
non-ontological, historical situation is transposed internally to Cohen’s model in the 
later Meditations. Therefore the event, since it is prohibited by ontology by the 
axiom of foundation (which Badiou mentions) and also impossible within a transitive 
model (which he does not), receives a surrogate in the meditations on Cohen in the 
form of the symbol ♀ to denote the generic, indiscernible set which will be forcibly 
constructed (in the mathematical literature: G). The indiscernable in any situation 
transcribes the idea of the event from non-ontological situations to ontology; it is “an 
event-without-event”.470 But notwithstanding the way this generic set will be 
constructed retroactively, thereby matching the affirmational procedure of an event, 
the insinuated symmetry between the two notions lacks its most crucial component 
the evental site. Only the affirmational part of an event is reflected in the 
indiscernible, because in the transitive ‘ground model’ the excess of inclusion over 
belonging necessary for an evental site is prohibited. Badiou himself draws attention 
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to the fact that the power-set axiom is not absolute within the model.471 Or to put it 
another way, the inhabitant of the model – insofar as we assume by analogy this 
situation would be a non-ontological, historical situation for a subject – could never 
witness a rupture of evental excess; only the ontologist (or philosopher 
metaontologist) can see its potential from a position of exteriority. Here lies the 
elision between the ontological and non-ontological levels prepared by the 
suppression of cardinal immeasurability in Cohen’s ‘ground model’ prior to a forcing 
procedure. It is an apparent anomaly in the reasoning of Being and Event all the 
more perplexing considering the rapid development of alternative techniques 
permitting forcing from the starting point of a non-denumerable universe by Cohen, 
Robert Soloway and others in the years following Cohen’s first results. In Cohen’s 
semantic ‘ground model’, however, where V≠L only after a forcing procedure, from 
the ontological ‘outside’ the event is impossible because of its relation of self-
belonging, but from the non-ontological ‘inside’ the event is equally impossible 
because of the transitivity preventing an evental site from forming. This will have 
consequences for how we think the extra-philosophical autonomy of the subject in 
the four truth procedures, and particularly in politics.472 We return to this point 
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shortly. But first some technical exegesis is required to give a brief explanation of 
forcing.473 For simplification, we work primarily from Cohen’s presentation and his 
use of terminology.  
As a point of entry, in his book Cohen insightfully contrasts forcing with the 
standard mathematical notion of implication. Whereas implication demands that any 
single statement implies another to be true (e.g., a ⇒ P, or, if a then P), forcing 
differs from this classical logic in that when constructing a generic set consistent with 
the infinity of sets within a model, one needs to construct statements (A) which can 
be decided true or false for this generic set. Because statements about the generic 
set cannot contradict the semantics of the ‘ground model’, this means that by 
compiling consistent statements about the supposed set it is possible to create a 
finite set of such statements (P), or what Cohen calls a ‘forcing condition’. Thus, a 
finite procedure of compiling compatible statements regarding the as-yet-unknown 
generic set permits this set’s compatibility with the model. Forcing therefore differs 
from implication owing to the fact that not just any set a satisfying the set of 
statements P will also satisfy the requirement of P to impute truth or falsity to a 
statement A about a. Only a generic set a will fulfil this demand. The difference 
between implication and forcing rests entirely on the procedure’s necessity to 
operate only on generic sets. 
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 Generic sets are thus the lynchpin of the whole procedure. The aim of 
constructing them is to show how by only using sets already present within the 
model, one can still construct an extension of the model which forces certain 
statements to be true or false (this was Cohen’s aim when creating forcing, to show 
how an extension of the model can be created which refutes the continuum 
hypothesis – henceforth CH). In Cohen’s words, the “chief point is that we do not 
wish a to contain “special” information about M, which can only be seen from the 
outside, such as the countability of , and will imply that the model containing a 
must contain more ordinals than those in M.”474 The point is instead to derive 
information out of M from the inside, by creating an extension of the model (N) 
containing the generic set, yet preserving the consistency of all the existing axioms 
and theorems of the initial model.  The stipulation against measuring the highest 
ordinal  is required because simply adding ordinals to the model from the ‘outside’ 
(as measuring the highest ordinal necessitates) would result in a collapse of the 
model. No gain would therefore be made viz. Gödel’s proof of the consistency of the 
CH in a transitive, denumerable model where V=L, because Cohen’s new model 
arising from forcing, aiming to prove V≠L (hence refuting CH), would not be a model 
at all if ordinals were simply added at will without passing through the generic 
procedure of ensuring their consistency with the constructive, ground model. Near 
the end of his Appendix entry on forcing, Peter Hallward insightfully describes the 
approach as drawing out the tacitly included non-constructible sets in M to force 
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their belonging in N.475 The point is to ‘seed’ the ‘ground model’ with a non-
constuctible generic set containing the requisite information to create a one-to-one 
correspondence between the ordinals and the desired cardinality of the continuum. 
It follows that what is required is a process, which by using no more than the internal 
possibilities of the ‘ground model’, one can prove the falsity of the CH by adding 
generic integers, ergo demonstrating that CH cannot be proved one way or the other 
within ZF set theory – i.e. the hypothesis is independent. In Kanamori’s judgement, 
Cohen’s constructions obtained their crucial operational clarity with this requirement 
in mind: “to start with a (transitive) standard model of ZF and extend it without 
altering the ordinals.”476 Or in Cohen’s own reflections on the subject: “Just as Gödel 
did not remove any ordinals from the constructible universe, a kind of converse 
decision is made not to add any ordinals.”477 The generic set is so important for this 
task because it is constructed out of the fixation of sequences of compatible 
conditions permitting veridical statements consistent with everything else in the 
model. If an infinite number of generic integers can be paired with the natural 
numbers by these forcing conditions then CH is refuted. Because choice between 
these conditions lies at the heart of the forcing procedure, in applying the method 
one is only ever ‘reading off’ a limited, finite part of the generic set; thus the set itself 
cannot be represented as a theorem, which is necessarily finite in length. However, 
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given that the ordinal index is denumerable we can nonetheless still be sure that a 
complete set exists.478  Cohen recalls his concerns prior to fully fleshing out the 
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 To cover much of the same ground again but including more of the method’s technical nuances, 
forcing involves a retroactive approach beginning with a supposed extended model N to ascertain all 
possible statements about N and deciding whether they are to be true or false. To this end ‘labels’ are 
assigned to all the elements of N with the aim to complete an enumeration of all possible formulas by 
creating a function  which can put the label space  into one-to-one correspondence with the set 
of all such formulas. The procedure of transfinite induction permits the label space   to be defined 
as the set of all formulas in which every quantifier (e.g.  or ) has a rank in the ordinal index. The 
ranking process is necessary for establishing the ordering of statements so that the construction of a 
finite set of such statements (a forcing condition: P) can proceed in a way so to discern the 
enrichment and sequential compatibility of statements. In Badiou’s express emphasis: the “concept of 
order is central here, because it permits us to distinguish multiples which are ‘richer’ in sense than 
others; even if, in terms of belonging, they are all elements of the supposed indiscernible, ♀ [the 
generic set: G].” (Badiou, Being and Event, 362.) For the purposes of refuting CH, order is established 
by assigning a rank to each statement A composed of (α,i,r): α being the least ordinal, r the number of 
symbols in A, and i is either 1 or 0 depending upon whether α is a successor ordinal. Thus, the rank of 
any statement can be written in suchlike form: (α+1,1,3). As a point of clarification between forcing in 
general, and the form of forcing used by Cohen in his independence proofs, it is worth noting that 
many such ranking systems could be used depending on the purposes to which forcing is undertaken. 
Ordering is critical for forcing, but the form of the ordering is dependent on the purposes of the 
generic set being constructed. Here Cohen’s ordering process is engineered towards forcing a truth or 
falsity result for a one-to-one correspondence between  and a cardinality of any size – e.g. . To 
do this Cohen creates sets of ordered pairs that match the elements of the natural numbers  (often 
written ) with elements of the cardinality of the continuum desired in N. If they can be made to 
match by establishing a complete forcing condition – the generic set in question, forging the extension 
of the model: N – then CH is refuted by proving its independence from the axioms of ZF set theory. In 
terms of how ranking conditions serve the forcing procedure, Badiou provides an easily graspable 
example of the concept by way of a simplified scenario in which conditions are composed of only 
finite sequences of 0’s and 1’s. As the conditions are enriched their compatibility is assured by their 
accumulation. So condition 1 (0,1,0) is enriched by a further condition 2 (0,1,0,0) without 
contradiction, since C2 contains C1. The centrality of order also pertains directly to the definition of 
forcing given that a forcing condition is the set of compatible statements. A statement becomes a 
condition as it is enriched by other compatible statements, with the effect that they force the lower-
ranked statement. The crux of the matter requires a suspension of the implication P ⇒ A because of 
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technique that “It seemed too much to ask to hope that a finite number of conditions 
might be enough to decide everything.”479 And in Badiou’s metaontological 
interpretation, the significance of forcing runs along similar lines when he adduces 
from Cohen’s discovery that the infinity of truths is mediated by the finite 
procedures of a subject. In this procedure, where ‘militant investigations’ construct 
the generic set, Badiou ascertains his new conception of the subject, bringing Being 
and Event to the theory of the subject. This subject is no longer presumed as 
ubiquitous; now it rather supports “a hypothesis of the rarity of the subject, which 
suspends its occurrence from the event, from the intervention, and from the generic 
paths of fidelity.”480 Giving birth to truths through forcing compatible connections 
redefines a notion of truth as an “indiscernible multiple whose finite approximation 
                                                                                                                                           
the possibility that a stronger condition Q might force the opposite, i.e. the negation of a statement 
rather than its verification. P   A therefore means P forces A unless a stronger condition Q forces the 
negation of A (Q  ~A). Yet the permanent suspension of forcing implication is prevented once, by 
transfinite induction, a complete sequence of forcing conditions Pn has been established, which is 
possible in a denumerable model. In this case, where Pn ! Pn+1 for all n and A, Pn either forces A or 
forces its negation. Pn is the resulting set on which the extension of M is based and a model for ZF set 
theory fully consistent with the initial model. So although the set of all P is a set in the original model 
M, the complete sequence Pn accounts for the novelty of the new, extended model. N is formed out of 
an ordered, compatible sequence of forcing conditions, of which all its elements are already contained 
in M. Once a complete sequence of forcing conditions Pn has been established, N is established – an 
extension of M and a model for ZF set theory fully consistent with the model it was derived from. So 
although the set of all P is a set in the original model M, the complete sequence Pn forms the new, 
extended model. N is formed out of an ordered, compatible sequence of forcing conditions, of which 
all its elements are already contained in M.  
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is supported by the subject, such that its ideality-to-come, nameless correlate of the 
naming of the event”.481 And thus, Badiou particularly stresses, the cause of the 
subject is ‘in the final instance’ the event – the subject is “under the condition of an 
indiscernible, thus of a generic procedure, a fidelity, an intervention, and, ultimately, 
of an event.”482 In any historical situation, “The ‘there is’ of a subject is the coming-
to-be of the event, via the ideal occurrence of truth, in its finite modalities.”483  
5.5 Paradoxes of formalism 
 
As already remarked upon, however, by pursuing the demonstration of the forcing 
procedure from within the semantic ‘ground model’ of set theory utilised by Cohen, 
Badiou’s idea of the event, as a disjunction in the schema between presentation and 
re-presentation, is foreclosed the possibility of actualisation. The forcing procedure 
only takes place within an ontological situation, which is why Badiou has to 
substitute the non-ontological event with the ontological indiscernible. Hence, the 
dividing line between non-ontological and ontological situations, around which the 
distinction between metaontology and its conditioning truth procedures is also 
organised, falls away too in these meditations. If one presumes – and Badiou is quite 
cryptic on this point – that an ‘inhabitant’ of the Cohen’s model can be said to be 
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inside a historical situation, and if we also remember that within the ontological 
situation events are impossible, then one is left only to conclude that truth 
procedures are either sparked by an illuminated subject for change (cause 
unknown), or else the model’s ambiguous interior/exterior distinction reserves a 
role for the metaontologist to propose an event for a subject. The point is, at the 
climax of Being and Event, where the new doctrine of truth and the subject will be 
sealed, the careful demarcations between ontological and non-ontological 
situations, ontology and metaontology, all become rather blurred and uncertain. If 
Badiou has up until these meditations gone to extra special lengths to ensure a strict 
division of labour so that non-philosophical procedures unilaterally condition 
metaontology, in these final chapters all that is solid melts into air. There seems 
little to stop Badiou’s metaontological conceptual discourse endowing the 
philosopher a capacity – and certain authority – to make judgements on real political 
procedures.484 Partly this is for the reasons already diagnosed by Brassier’s criticisms 
of Being and Event’s’s metaontological architectonic, where philosophy enjoys a de 
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 One example: during the 2010/11 ‘Arab Spring’ Badiou’s former student, Mehdi Belhaj Kacem, was 
outraged at Badiou’s description of the Tunisian protests as ‘riots’ because their militancy had not yet 
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Marxist-Leninist forms of judgement on the necessary conditions for political change, charging him 
with Stalinism and indifference to cruelty. (I have discussed Badiou and Kacem’s dispute over how to 
term events in the Middle East and North Africa in the following essay: Nathan Coombs, “Political 
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facto transcendent status. But the fact that Badiou struggles to rigorously maintain 
his own intricate demarcations between ontological and non-ontological situations 
in the final meditations adds to the impression that his system is riven with internal 
tensions. Of course, the existence of such tensions does not by itself mean that 
Badiou’s system sets itself up as an authoritative discourse for making historical 
judgements. It is only an indicator that the intricate demarcations set in place in 
order to put philosophy at a distance from its conditioning truth procedures runs 
into troubles, suggesting that the lines he draws are not as steady as some readings 
of Badiou’s philosophy might presume. So while this admittedly does not provide a 
smoking gun argument for showing how Badiou’s metaontological discourse can 
have a role in sculpting the practices to which it is meant to be external, perhaps 
better to simply say that like Althusser’s project, from which Badiou draws so much, 
adopting a highly formalistic conceptual discourse of historical change by drawing on 
a complex theoretical interpretation of the sciences will necessarily pose acutely the 
question of the authority of that discourse. As much as Badiou might struggle to 
build in the safe guard demarcations that would prevent his understanding of 
change creating knowledge allowing intervention into a historical situation, in the 
final accounting his effort may just be an elaborate attempt to avoid an irreducible 
paradox.  
Along these lines, and adding to the ambiguity regarding the relationship 
between Badiou’s philosophy and real political processes, Adrian Johnston has 
questioned the credibility of Badiou’s demarcation of his own philosophical and 
metapolitical writings from having any influence on the political reality on the 
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ground. He argues that if “Badiou succeeds in gaining an audience among 
practitioners of politics, then, contrary to his insistence that political practices 
condition philosophical theories and not vice versa, it’s reasonable to anticipate that 
there will be extra-philosophical repercussions generated by a reciprocal counter-
conditioning of politics by (Badiouian) metapolitics.”485 Much the same ambiguity is 
exemplified by Badiou’s description of himself, alongside Slavoj Žižek, as forming a 
philosophic ‘politburo’, to which many on the left look up to for their analysis of 
events. Certainly, the sell-out conferences in London and New York on the ‘Idea of 
Communism’ (spearheaded by the Badiou and Žižek) seem to throw into doubt the 
supposed ring fencing between the intellectual projects of these philosophers and 
the activist communities who comprise their audience. After all, Badiou has always 
insisted that ideas can move mountains, or encircle cities. Is it incredible, as 
Johnston speculates, that Badiouian metapolitics, drawing on a metaontology of 
historical change, could become a framework around which politics is conducted, 
and around which the historical events of the 20th century are evaluated? Do not 
Badiou’s own persistent political interventions as a public intellectual and evident 
willingness to cultivate a community of global community of activists devoted to the 
idea of communism indicate a certain contradiction here between the ostensible 
aims of the metaontological demarcation and his own political practice? 
To conclude this chapter, it would not be untoward to mention the second 
part of the treatise, Logics of Worlds. Other than the change in style between this 
text and Being and Event, it is interesting to note its increasingly prescriptive 
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political interventions. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, motivating 
the entire work is opposition to an ideology of “democratic materialism”. That is, for 
Badiou, the “humanist protection of all living bodies”486 comprises the ideological 
norm of contemporary materialism he seeks to quash. Through a ‘materialist 
dialectic’ Badiou wishes to counter this ideology through a mathematical 
conceptualisation of bodies bearing no resemblance to the anthropological, 
humanist body revered by practitioners of human rights and relativists of all 
varieties. Therewith he positions his work against the sum-total ideology of most of 
the activist left today, who are drawn in “by the doxa of the body, desire, affect, 
networks, the multitude, nomadism and enjoyment into which a whole 
contemporary ‘politics’ sinks, as if into a poor man’s Spinozism.”487 Now, even 
though Being and Event was a riposte to certain ideological tendencies of the 
1980’s, what is notable about Badiou’s targets here is how much distance they put 
between possible democratic interpretations of his philosophy (i.e. by Bosteels) and 
his desired modality of political engagement. While Being and Event retains a certain 
openness to the forms of politics it could be said to model, Badiou’s emphasis on the 
political body as the carrier of truth signals an increasing stress on organization. 
Alongside his already much noted revival of the notion of destruction which he 
abandoned after Theory of the Subject, there are also strident remarks made about 
contemporary libertarian/anarchist tendencies which recall his disagreements with 
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the adventurist wing of French Maoism in the 1970’s. Badiou here refuses to 
concede anything to the ‘left wing’ tradition. 
 
We thereby eliminate the whole ‘left-wing’ tradition which believes 
that a progressive politics ‘fights against oppression’. But we also 
eliminate, for example, a certain modernist tradition which believes 
that the criterion for art is the ‘subversion’ of established forms, to 
say nothing of those who wish to articulate amorous truth onto the 
fantasy of a sexual emancipation (against ‘taboos’, patriarchy, etc.)488 
 
Combined with Badiou’s stress on political truths being carried by organized political 
bodies489 like the Bolshevik party these observations give the impression of a return 
                                                 
488
 Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 62. 
 
489
 I have already put into print a rather descriptive reading of Badiou’s theory of the object. (Nathan 
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(2010), 135-144. Available online: http://www.publicpraxis.com/speculations/wp-
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consequences of the existence of an inexistent’” to which he adds “I leave them for another time, or 
for others to solve.” (Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 39) Solving the ontological discrepancies between the 
books is a beguiling prospect, but one that will, for the time being, have to wait. 
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to a more hard-line persuasion somewhat at odds with the ostensible modesty of 
the demarcation of metaontological reflection from actual political sequences 
maintained throughout Being and Event. 
 To bring this chapter to a close, we have seen that Badiou’s idea of the 
novelty-bearing events that disrupts the state of affairs, the truth of which sustained 
by collective procedures lying outside of philosophy, whilst seemingly geared to 
resolve the problem of intellectual authority in politics leaves a number of 
unresolved questions. To avoid undue repetition, these can be distilled down to the 
following: how can the conceptual discourses of philosophy avoid positioning 
themselves in an authoritative role for making historical judgements about events? 
Particularly, as is the case with Althusser and Badiou, when they draw upon the 
sciences to create elaborate conceptual models of historical processes that require a 
high degree of intellectual mastery to understand, deploy, and contest? What we 
are hinting at here is a possible transcendental political condition: Unless one is 
willing to surrender to humanist optimism about the capacity of the masses’ 
spontaneous general intellect to make the right judgements, and at the same time 
abstain from subjecting these decision procedures to verifiable standards of 
examination, then the theoretical work of creating formal models of historical 
change – ontological or otherwise – seems to necessarily endow philosophers with a 
degree of authority over the judgement of political processes. This indicates, in our 
eyes, that perhaps rather than engaging in ever more vexed attempts to eliminate 
scientific and philosophical authority from politics the task is rather to think their 
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effective mediation. That is, our task today seems to involve accepting the necessity 
of rational conceptual work in political leadership and to theorise how this can be 
incorporated with a praxis open to contingent events and the frequent irrationality 
of political processes. We return to this challenge in the conclusion to this thesis. 
 
The next chapter looks at the idea of the event offered by Badiou’s student, Quentin 
Meillassoux. In Meillassoux’s theories one can locate the most extreme formulation 
of the event ever devised within philosophy. Unlike in Badiou’s theories, 
Meillassoux’s event possesses an unsettling cosmic power to unravel every law of 
the universe. Although here, finally, we might imagine that we have discovered a 
philosophy that puts all questions about the authority of philosophers to rest, 
perversely we discover the opposite. As we shall see, Meillassoux positions his 
theory as the successor to the ‘historical symbol’ of classical Marxism, but by so 
doing he makes philosophy a sovereign ethical discourse opposed to mass politics 
and revolutionary enthusiasm.   
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6. Meillassoux’s Gamble 
 
on messianic anti-politics 
 
 
For no one dares even now to defend philosophy in the full scope of its 
ambition: the absolute intelligibility of being qua being and the conceptual 
apprehension of our immortality.490   
 
 
The only thing we can know with absolute certainty is the contingency of nature’s 
laws – such is Quentin Meillassoux’s startling thesis. More surprisingly still, this 
apparently destructive claim does not traverse towards melancholic conclusions 
about the limitations contingency imposes upon knowledge. Quite the opposite, 
Meillassoux’s premise stands for absolute knowledge in a revamped Hegelian 
sense491 – it allows us to test a raft of positive claims against what at first seems a 
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nebulous hypothesis only capable of undermining scientific, metaphysical, moral 
and political certainty. Meillassouxian contingency does not therefore sound a 
familiar note of scepticism; its recognition opens up the ‘great outdoors’ of nature, 
now freed from philosophy’s conviction that only fixating on the givenness of nature 
for human cognition (a genealogy of thought he describes as ‘correlationism’), is 
capable of granting the world philosophical meaning. Only by breaking free from this 
transparent cell of anthropic self-reflection can we gain access to the wealth of 
speculative possibilities our universe cannot logically prohibit. The contention that 
at any moment gravity could cease to function, a new form of life emerge, or a God 
rise into being; the fact that Meillassoux’s philosophy rules out none of these 
possibilities, and does so off the back of a rigorous line of argumentation, 
establishes him as the most extreme thinker of the event in the contemporary 
tradition, perhaps in the history of Western philosophy.  
Yet our principal concern here is not the strange world of Meillassoux’s 
speculative imagination per se492, but rather the political consequences of 
                                                                                                                                           
investigation to what he sees as the properly Hegelian question of how a subject could have emerged 
from pre-subjective reality (Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 633-647.) However, Žižek brushes over 
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of his intellectual maturity. Further, Meillassoux describes the kind of materialism advocated by Žižek 
as a “sickened correlationism”, desperately seeking to “to detect the trace of an impossible 
coincidence of the subject with itself, and thus of an extra-correlational residue.” (Quentin 
Meillassoux, “Interview with Quentin Meillassoux” in Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: 
Philosophy in the Making (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 166-168.) 
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establishing absolute contingency as a founding principle for materialist thought – 
what are the implications of positing the potential for, and encouraging belief in, 
events that can undo any law of the universe? For if we are to understand this idea 
within the tradition of Marxist philosophy493 – an inclusion that some readers might 
receive incredulously despite Meillassoux’s claim that his approach radicalises the 
critique of ideology494 – we are required to pin down the positive political content of 
his idea of the event. To this end, we need to begin by addressing the inevitable 
doubts such a reading will engender. Understandably, the idea that Meillassoux 
does not have a politics, or at least not one that makes its way into his philosophical 
works in any serious sense, will be persuasive to those whose encounter with his 
                                                                                                                                           
Gabriel Catren, “A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish the Copernican Revolution”, Collapse, Vol. V 
(Falmouth: Urbanomic Press, 2009), 453-499. 
 
493
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work remains transfixed by the speculative orientation of After Finitude towards 
securing mathematical science’s grasp on the real.495 Through this scientistic lens, 
Meillassoux emerges as a ‘pure’ metaphysician – and if one follows his imperative to 
think the world without the human (pre-life and post-extinction) then the political 
stances nested in the interstices to his books soon begin to appear nihil ad rem.496 
‘Weak’ and ‘strong’ arguments can used to defend the legitimacy of a 
political reading of his work, however. The weak response is to point out at that 
while Meillassoux admittedly devotes himself to the naturalistic register in his most 
first and most famous book, After Finitude, there are enough politically suggestive 
ideas to reconstruct the symmetry between his speculative and political voices. On 
this theme, Alberto Toscano has already drawn attention to the classical 
Enlightenment motifs buttressing Meillassoux’s assault on fideistic agnosticism and 
religious ‘fanaticism.’497 Yet this approach has its limitations. By addressing 
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Meillassoux’s stated motivations for the arguments made in After Finitude, 
Toscano’s piece inevitably does not consider the recently published fragments of 
The Divine Inexistence (Meillassoux’s long-awaited tome based on his PhD thesis), 
which are much more explicit in laying out positive moral, political, and messianic 
positions which follow from making contingency an absolute principle. With these 
fragments now in hand though, it is possible to make an argument which does not 
pivot around the animating impulses of the work, which may (or may not) 
circumscribe the results of his speculative enterprise. In other words, now fragments 
of The Divine Inexistence are available, the possibility emerges of providing a strong 
political reading of Meillassoux’s philosophy. What does this reading consist of? It 
goes further to maintain that Meillassoux’s conceptual configuration of the 
speculative itself prescribes, at least at a high level of abstraction, a particular 
political disposition. Which is to say, if one follows Meillassoux through to his 
conclusions then one falls under the influence of a prescriptive political discourse 
encouraging us towards some sorts of politics and dissuading us against others. 
Now, note the difference between the two readings. While the first weak political 
reading makes it possible to discount Meillassoux’s political voice, owing to fact that 
an author’s motivations do not necessarily determine their speculative results (a bit 
like how some claim the Marxian appropriation of the ‘rational kernel’ of Hegel’s 
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‘revolutionary dialectic’ disintricates it from Hegel’s conservative politics), the 
second strong reading extracts political consequences from the results of 
Meillassoux’s ontology of the event, drawing out the ramifications of what if people 
were to accept his ontology – what effect would it have upon their politics?  
Pursuing the above approach, we orient our political reading around the 
themes heretofore developed across Part II of this thesis: namely, what role does 
the idea of the event play in determining the scope for conceptual thought on the 
part of philosophers in bringing about change – what effect for the authority of 
philosophers do Meillassoux’s theories have?498 The twist here will be that the 
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perspective first, Hallward writes, “to the degree that Meillassoux insists on the absolute disjunction 
of an event from existing situations he deprives himself of any concretely mediated means of 
thinking, with and after Marx, the possible ways of changing such situations.” To which Hallward also 
adds, the “current fascination with his work, in some quarters, may be a symptom of impatience with 
a more modest but also more robust conception of social and political change”. (Hallward, “Anything 
is Possible: A Reading of Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude” in The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman (Melbourne: Re.Press, 
2011), 141.) Taking the opposite point of view, Brown, in turn, objects to the insinuation that 
Meillassoux’s readers are unable to distinguish the specifically speculative dimension of his work and 
that they cannot compartmentalize his theory of the contingency of laws from the concrete 
processes of working through change in a stable situation. In Brown’s words, “A speculative 
demonstration that whatever-situation is contingent rather than necessary (despite its manifest 
stability) does not undermine the political urgency of working toward the contingent stability of 
another situation—toward just and equitable ways of structuring or distributing relations among the 
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passivity advocated by Meillassoux, while we are advised to wait expectantly for the 
advent of the ‘fourth world of justice’, results in an elevation of the role for 
philosophers far beyond what we have seen Althusser or Badiou’s theories admit. 
Paradoxically, we infer, Meillassoux’s extreme theory of the absoluteness of 
contingency endows the philosopher with a role to direct ethical fervour. We then 
aim to explicate the connection between this elevation of the authority of the 
philosopher with how Meillassoux’s politics of the event bears more resemblances 
with Derridean messianism than with the Promethean antagonistics of his Maoist 
mentor.499 Specifically, we will see that Meillassoux’s central political manoeuvre 
                                                                                                                                           
given.” Quite contrary to undermining this urgency he claims, admitting a certain motivational 
transitivity between speculative discourse and political subjectivity, “An insistence upon—or a 
rational demonstration of—the contingency of any stable situation that we might imagine or 
construct, and which we might care to preserve, would seem to encourage rather than disable the 
active task of such preservation, however fragile that task may be.” (Brown, “The Speculative and the 
Specific: On Hallward and Meillassoux”, 146.) 
 
499
 With respect to considering Meillassoux’s idea of the event as equivalent to Badiou’s (Harman, 
Meillassoux, 64) only freed from his teacher’s anthropocentricism, it is by pursuing the ‘strong’ 
reading of Meillassoux’s politics described above that we can also prise apart the impression of the 
two thinker’s appropinquity. For one possible misinterpretation is to view Meillassoux’s event as a 
repetition of Badiou’s (they both base their ideas on Cantor’s transfinite, after all) but extended to 
the domain of nature – thus seeing Meillassoux viz. Badiou as an equivalent of Engels’s dialectics of 
nature compared to Marx’s historical materialism (Meillassoux encourages such an interpretation by 
pitching his work as an investigation into the ‘archi-facticty’ of Badiou’s categories: why there are 
events and thinking beings. See Meillassoux, “Interview with Quentin Meillassoux”, 169.). Such a 
perspective would then see the politics of Meillassoux’s theory of the event as transitive with 
Badiou’s, with its political ramifications already accounted for in his mentor’s work. The flattery cuts 
both ways too, for at the start of the Greater Logic of Logics of Worlds Badiou cites Meillassoux’s 
“irrefutable” proof that appearance does not rest on conscious constitution – that is, “what Quentin 
Meillassoux calls ‘the fossil’s argument’: the irrefutable materialist argument that interrupts the 
idealist (and empiricist) apparatus of ‘consciousness’ and the ‘object’.” (Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 
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involves combating political messianism by transporting these impulses to the level 
of individual longing for justice under the aegis of the philosopher’s speculative 
                                                                                                                                           
119). Badiou’s warm Introduction to the English edition of Meillassoux’s first monograph, After 
Finitude, further establishes a sense of continuity. In Badiou’s estimation the way Meillassoux breaks 
down the post-Kantian distinction between empirical receptivity and the transcendental subject 
undermines a binary “which is fundamental for Carnap and the analytic tradition, between formal 
and empirical sciences.” (Badiou, “Introduction” in Meillassoux, After Finitude, vii.) As we noted in a 
footnote in the previous chapter, this is the very dualism Badiou devoted his own first book, The 
Concept of Model, to disproving by way of an Althusserian model theoretic critique of logical 
positivism. There are also other symmetries between the two thinkers. The way Meillassoux annexes 
religious themes in the service of an ostensibly secular philosophy also could be seen as repeating 
some of Badiou’s boldest gestures, more conspicuously, the adoption of St.Paul’s establishment of 
Christianity as the archetypal case study of a truth procedure in St. Paul: The Foundation of 
Universalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). Nonetheless, Badiou and Meillassoux’s 
divergences in style and approach have already been adequately discussed amongst the community 
of scholars receptive to their work. To name but a few examples, Ray Brassier has drawn attention to 
their different treatment of mathematics, contrasting Badiou’s more cautious Platonism with 
Meilassoux’s tendencies towards fully blown Pythagoreanism – a tendency only partially obviated by 
his invocation of the primacy of ‘intellectual intuition’. (Ray Brassier, “The Enigma of Realism: On 
Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude”, Collapse, Vol. II (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2007), 45). Hallward 
pursues a similar line of thought when he questions Meillassoux’s direct application of transfinite 
number theory to thinking probabilities in the real world (Peter Hallward, “Anything is Possible: A 
Reading of Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude” in The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism 
and Realism (Melbourne: Re.Press, 2011), 140). Brown has also noted the more interrogative, 
classically dialectical approach of Meillassoux’s work compared to Badiouian axiomatics. (Nathan 
Brown, “The Speculative and the Specific: On Hallward and Meillassoux” in The Speculative Turn: 
Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: Re.Press, 2011), 140.) Yet the principal difference 
between the two, which will assume such importance for the argument of this chapter, is the role 
they accord to philosophy. For Badiou, whether we are dealing with politics or science, philosophy 
can only ever respond to truth events within these self-sufficient fields and draw out their 
consequences (see Chap 5 of this thesis). Meillassoux, on the contrary, sees philosophy as able to 
interrogate and positively ascertain the a priori foundations of science. Politically too, we will see, he 
also sees philosophy taking a driving seat rather than solely the reactive role Badiou attributes to it. 
As such, the way their ideas of the event mediate intellectual authority over political change sharply 
diverge. 
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discourse. And how, in the process, he quite decisively reverses the impetus of 
Badiou’s theory of the event, which (whether successful or not) at least aims to 
circumscribe philosophical discourse to labouring under conditions originating 
elsewhere.  
 We begin with a concise reading of the argument for absolute contingency 
made in After Finitude, noting that this dimension takes a back seat compared to 
establishing the need for philosophy to devote itself to discovering absolute 
knowledge. In the second section, attending to some of Meillassoux’s political 
stances revealed in interviews and through themes brought to the surface in 
fragments of The Divine Inexistence, we establish a weak political reading of 
Meillassoux’s theory of the event. This is used to show that Meillassoux’s targets 
extend beyond the figure of the religious fanatic and also encompass opposition to 
the ‘totalitarian’ figure of collective political action driven by historicist eschatology. 
In the final section, by extrapolating on hints provided by his book on the poet 
Mallarmé, The Number and the Siren, we indicate how Meillassoux’s speculative 
prescriptions intersect real political dispositions. 
6.1 In the spirit of the fossil? 
 
One of the mysteries behind the enthusiastic reception of Meillassoux’s After 
Finitude is that its most exciting claim – to speculatively secure objects’ primary, 
mathematical attributes so that we can think a world indifferent to human cognition 
– is the one argument never actually resolved in the text. It is more surprising still, 
because this is the claim which has led some to identify Meillassoux’s treatise as the 
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21st century successor to Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.500 The question 
raised by drawing attention to this curious situation, whereby a thinker’s reputation 
is based on an unresolved argument, is if the interpretation of After Finitude as a 
defence of scientific realism is in fact a misconstrual of its real intellectual locus? By 
exploring this question we can evaluate if the treatise is instead driven by the 
demands of a different project.  
Despite also intimating that what is at stake is “thought’s relation to the 
absolute,”501 Meillassoux opens After Finitude by presenting its purpose as primarily 
concerned with how we can make sense of ancestral statements: how can 
philosophy interpret the meaning of mathematical scientific claims such as ‘the 
accretion of the earth occurred 4.56 billion years ago’? Although seemingly an 
obscure topic of only specialist interest, Meillassoux manages to imbue it with an 
unexpected urgency for drawing a line of demarcation between scientific reason and 
the unreason promoted by post-Kantian philosophies. For while the ancestral 
                                                 
500
 Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 625; Brown, “Rationalist Empiricism/Dialectical Materialism: from 
Althusser to Meillassoux”; Johnson, “A dieu Meillassoux”. Meillassoux in fact makes no mention of 
Lenin’s work in After Finitude, but probably as a result of how his readers have joined the dots 
between his conception of materialism and that of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, in recent talks 
he credits some Marxist materialisms as being aligned with his own project, yet still concludes 
“ultimately this came to nothing, except for Lenin’s belated and undistinguished philosophical effort.” 
(Quentin Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative Analysis of the Meaningless 
Sign”, trans. Robin Mackay, talk given at Freie Universität, Berlin (20 April 2012), 3. Available online 
at: http://oursecretblog.com/txt/QMpaperApr12.pdf [Accessed 16 September 2012].) 
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 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 1. In a recent talk in Berlin Meillassoux clarifies that: “My thesis ... 
comes down to saying that thought is capable of the ‘absolute’, capable even of producing something 
like ‘eternal truths’.” (Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition”, 1.) 
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statement poses no mysteries for the spontaneously realist modern scientist, or for 
the majority of the (non-creationist) general public, for many post-Kantians it 
presents a deeper paradox. Meillassoux’s aim is to show why the commonplace 
realism of ancestral statements – regarding a world before a thinking conscience 
existed to cognize it, or moreover before any life at all – would be for the line of 
post-Kantian thought he terms ‘correlationism’, only a statement for us (the thinking 
subject), or else strictly senseless. At the same time, owing to the respect for science 
expected of modern philosophy and the predictable coyness of correlationists in 
admitting to their anti-scientific bias, Meillassoux’s challenge is to show why the 
problem with interpreting ancestral statements holds with cast-iron necessity for 
philosophies accepting the correlational imperative of Kant’s critical revolution. 
Crucially, this demonstration is not made for the purpose of advising a retreat to 
dogmatic, pre-critical philosophy; rather, Meillassoux seeks to show why only the 
passage through ‘correlationism’ can deliver a speculative materialism certain, and 
able to discourse about, an objective world existing before our species and long 
after we have passed away.502  
To prove why this is the case, and why no dogmatic or naive realism is 
adequate for shoring up scientific realism, Meillassoux has to hold firm to the 
rupture of Kant’s critical revolution. He sees both the positive and negative 
dimensions of Kant’s break within the history of philosophy, persuading us that, 
                                                 
502
 Meillassoux writes on the necessary passage through correlationism: “I try to give to 
correlationism its most rigorous form – to isolate the fundamental argument in it... My concern in 
After Finitude is to give a rigorous refutation of this standpoint (and certainly not to accept it) and 
thus a refutation of the argument.” (Meillassoux, “Interview with Quentin Meillassoux”, 164-165). 
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whatever its faults, there is no turning back to pre-critical ignorant bliss. When 
seeking to abjure metaphysics by establishing science as the primary source of 
knowledge, Kant, he concedes, made the right choice; but Kant’s peculiar 
configuration of this response, involving a recentering of knowledge on the side of 
the subject, quite contrary to the advances made by Galilean mathematical science, 
was nothing less than a “catastrophe”, inaugurating a “Ptolemaic counter-
revolution” within philosophy.503  Meillassoux’s speculative materialism therefore 
has to show the possibility of an alternative speculative path in order to 
demonstrate why we can neither go back to dogmatic metaphysics, nor rest content 
with Kantianism whilst avoiding slippage to the ‘strong correlationism’ of his 
progeny. In particular, he has to show why, in leaving an inaccessible noumenal 
realm, the Kantian ‘weak correlationist’ limitations on knowing the real through the 
categories of understanding necessarily has to give way to the closed circle of 
‘strong correlationism’ (Hegel, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, etc.) where world and 
subject are always co-constitutive; or, where a world is always a world for-us, sealing 
off the possibility of a straightforward interpretation of mathematical ancestral 
statements.  
The lynchpin for resolving both of the above criteria is Meillassoux’s isolation 
of the root of the problem in Kant’s unexamined acceptance of facticity (Heidegger’s 
term for describing the way the world reveals itself to us through categories of the 
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 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 118-120. 
 
331 
 
understanding, seemingly without any rational explanation).504 Facticity opens the 
door for absolutizing what Meillassoux calls his anhypothetically derived principle of 
unreason. The reason why it is possible to derive the principle in this way 
(‘anthypothetical’ meaning a principle that cannot be deduced from any other, but is 
provable due to inconsistencies in all attempts to refute it) is because in the face of 
facticity, and if wishing to hold on to the existence of the in-itself, the Kantian faces 
two choices: either to absolutize facticity (against idealism), or absolutize correlation 
(against realism). Since the decision to absolutize at least one of the terms is 
logically impressed upon Kant’s weak correlationism, post-Kantianism, if choosing 
the latter option – as was historically the case with German idealism – has to adopt 
the pernicious strong variety of correlationism, which, whatever its protestations to 
the contrary, inevitably transits in the direction of Bishop Berkeley’s subjective 
idealism where to even talk of a thing-in-itself beyond thought becomes a 
contradiction. The idealist dictum that every X is always a posited X, where thought 
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 Astute readers of Meillassoux will recognize this point as the crux of his entire argument, the point 
on which the positive theories of his whole text stand or fall. His anhypothetical derivation, 
converting epistemological limit into ontological absolute, is Meillassoux speculative coup de théâtre. 
Catren, in an extremely incisive critique of Meillassoux’s solution of absolutizing facticity, takes issue 
with Meillassoux a priori assumption that we cannot discover any rational necessity of physical laws 
(this precisely being the task of speculative physics), accusing him of fomenting  confusion between 
epistemological criticism and ontological idealism, with the result that “Far from defending science 
from the Ptolemaic counter-revolution that Meillassoux describes so admirably, this narcissitic 
absolutisation of an inexistent limitation bolsters a certain form of contempt for scientific 
rationality.” (Catren, “A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish the Copernican Revolution”, 466) I 
agree with Catren’s critique, and believe it complements the argument of this chapter that 
Meillassoux’s principal concern does not really rest with upholding scientific realism but with 
endowing philosophy with the capacity for absolute knowledge, ultimately at the expense of science.  
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always returns to itself even whilst trying to escape itself, becomes the logical 
trajectory of Kant’s critical revolution unless one finds another way through the 
impasse.505 As Meillassoux sees it, then, the imperative is to overturn strong 
correlationism from within by choosing in favour of the alternative path from Kant 
of absolutizing facticity; not on the grounds that there is an absolute reason why 
things are how they are, but, oppositely, because there is absolutely no reason why 
things are as they are. Once the only option is thus seen to be absolutizing the 
principle of unreason, then the hyper-chaos of the ever-possible instability of the 
laws of the universe is revealed to intellectual intuition. All laws of the universe are 
shown to rest on nothing but reasonless contingency. 
Once reaching this point in his text, Meillassoux admits that the menacing 
force of hyper-chaos he has unleashed seems to have taken the demonstration far 
from its initial aim of securing mathematical access to primary qualities. Indeed, it 
appears that his principle of unreason has undermined the capacity for positive 
knowledge of the real; now unsettled by the radical contingency lurking beneath the 
seeming stability of nature. But Meillassoux seeks to offset this impression by 
showing how certain conditions of positive knowledge can be derived from the 
principle of unreason. As he maintains, “the whole interest of the thesis lies therein 
– that to be contingent, an entity (be it a thing, event, law or structure) cannot be 
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 As Harman notes, it is crucial for Meillassoux’s argument that he is able to distinguish ‘strong 
correlationism’ (which he will seek to overturn from within) from Berkley’s absolute subjective 
idealism, since the latter would preclude any escape from the correlationist circle. This is the case 
even through.Meillassoux points out that in respect to the arche-fossil the two become blurred. 
(Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 20.) 
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just ‘anything whatsoever’, with no constraints.”506 Foremost amongst these is the 
principle of non-contradiction; a principle that Kant assumed and never attempted 
to derive. By endeavouring to show that a contradictory entity would be a necessary 
entity – with Hegelian philosophy representing the culmination of this hypothesis 
par excellence – Meillassoux seeks to disqualify contradiction in the real by 
reference to the principle of unreason – no entity can be necessary, thus no entity 
can be contradictory – so that they become two sides of the same anhypothetically 
derived principle. Meillassoux’s absolutization procedure therewith rationally 
secures both of Kant’s principles – the existence of the in-itself and the law of non-
contradiction – by passing them through a speculative conversion rendering all 
things, and all laws, contingent. Yet if the treatise is to live up to the express aim of 
the critique of correlationism viz. the ancestral statement, then deriving the law of 
non-contradiction is not enough to pass from the Kantian in-itself to the Cartesian 
in-itself. This requires, instead, a proof of the absolute capacity for mathematics to 
gain a firm grasp upon nature’s objective properties. 
Meillassoux’s response to Hume’s problem in chapter four of the book is as 
close as he gets to furnishing us with an ontological argument for securing the 
mathematical in-itself. His reasoning is as follows: Hume’s problem is the illusive 
necessary connection between events; the problem of proving laws of causality. 
Although Hume was to abandon the search and switch the focus of the question to 
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human habitual patterns,507 others have sought to address the problem based on 
probabilistic reasoning. These attempts, he argues, all revolve around variations of 
the same assumption: given the totality of all possible conceivable events and the 
sum total of events that take place in accordance with physical laws, is it not 
improbable that laws would not change regularly if there were no underlying reason 
for their apparent constancy? Drawing upon the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory 
axioms, Meillassoux seeks to show how these probabilistic arguments all rely on an 
idea, problematised since Cantor, of forming such a totality of possibilities.508 And if 
we concede that the transfinite forecloses the formation of a countable totality due 
to the gaping, uncountable chasms between the cardinals (and their endless 
repetition up the transfinite scale), then the whole notion of a probabilistic 
resolution to Hume’s problem loses its sense. Still, he admits this only takes us as far 
as an ontological hypothesis, leaving us without a proof of how the transfinite 
secures the stability of natural laws. Thus, the interesting thing is that even as close 
as Meillassoux gets to pulling together the threads, he falls short in his final attempt 
to tie together the anhypothetical derivation of the principle of unreason with the 
Cantorian transfinite. The transfer from an ontological proof of the law of non-
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 In a separate essay Meillassoux also cites Nelson Goodman as one example of a philosopher who 
simply accepts Hume’s abandonment of the ontological problem of necessary connection in favour of 
shifting the focus to human practices. (Quentin Meillassoux, “Potentiality and Virtuality”, Collapse, 
Vol. II (Oxford: Urbanomic, 2007), 55-56.) 
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 As we saw in the previous chapter of this thesis, in ZF set theory this is because the power-set is 
always ‘larger’ than the original. Even if we accept that the set could be infinite – if expanded to the 
scale of the universe – then the axiom of infinity tells us that the power -set’s infinity would be 
‘larger’, and the power-set of that set, and so on, travelling up the transfinite scale. 
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contradiction to an ontological proof of the speculative purview of this particular 
mathematical theorem is left incomplete: the Kantian in-itself is not traversed to the 
Cartesian in-itself. Similarly, in more recent work on this subject, investigating the 
connection between the meaningless signs utilised by mathematics and their ability 
to discourse about a world without thought Meillassoux also concedes that “we 
have not at all shown that the empty sign allows ... the description of a world 
independent of thought.”509 Meillassoux’s After Finitude therefore leaves two 
unresolved absolutisations necessary for securing the realist truth of the ancestral 
statement. The first being mathematics, which unlike the logical principle of non-
contradiction Meillassoux admits to having yet provided no demonstration of its 
absoluteness; the second being the Cantorian transfinite as the ontological 
“structure of the possible as such.”510 
Now, given the text’s unresolved aim to speculatively secure the 
mathematical in-itself – and the evident difficulties of somehow deriving a 
controversial axiom of set theory from the conceptually minimal anhypothetical 
principal of unreason511 –  let us recall that this proof was necessary to give sense to 
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 Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition”, 37. 
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 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 127. 
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 Meillassoux writes that he has not yet published a proof of this point (Meillassoux, “Interview with 
Quentin Meillassoux”), leaving it ambiguous as to whether he has a proof that he is still working on, 
or whether he has not yet come up with an idea of how to link the principle of unreason with 
Cantor’s transfinite. An indication of the direction he may be heading can be found in the excerpts 
from The Divine Inexistence where Meillassoux claims that quality is a trace of novelty, and also that 
advents should “be perceptible not only qualitatively but also quantitatively”, indicating that like his 
derivation of the law of non-contradiction, his derivation of the Cantorian transfinite as the 
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the ‘ancestral statement’. Only by reference to the ancestral statement and his 
critique of correlationism’s inability to grant its full realist sense, has Meillassoux 
made a splash as a scientific realist in a continental tradition frequently harbouring 
suspicions of an objective ‘outside’ beyond thought. It is his critique of 
‘correlationism’, this is to say, which lies behind the impression of his own 
philosophy being an (admittedly bizarre) form of materialist metaphysics. 
Consequently, a scientistic reading of his work that would disparage any attempt to 
read politics from his speculation runs aground on Meillassoux’s conspicuous lack of 
proof for the point which would secure his reputation as a stalwart of scientific 
realism, never mind some sort of neo-positivist. What is worse for our scientistic 
reader, by the close of the book we discover that “our goal here was not to tackle 
this resolution as such.”512 In fact, by the final pages we find Meillasoux’s aim stated 
in different terms: “Our aim has been to try and convince the reader not only that it 
is possible to rediscover thought’s absolutizing scope, but that it is urgent that we do 
so.” The focus of the task lies not so much in a lexical order of priorities determined 
by securing scientific realism, but instead by the imperative to “reconcile thought 
                                                                                                                                           
ontological ‘structure of the possible as such’ may be also related to a Hegelian theme: this time to 
the quantity-quality transformations in The Science of Logic, and the relation between their 
circumscription to the first power of infinity and their inability to think novelty ex-nihilo (this point 
was discussed in the last sections of Chapter 3 of this thesis). Meillassoux writes: “only the 
mathematical discontinuity of Cantorian infinity is adequate to the rupture generated by the advent 
of qualities.” (“Excerpts from L’inexistence divine”, 182.) 
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and [the] absolute”513 with the correlationist scourge presented as a justification for 
the task, not its goal. But if Meillassoux readily concedes to having not yet provided 
the arguments securing the mathematical in-itself, hence leaving his demonstration 
of scientific realism incomplete, and further, if this was not the main priority of the 
text anyway, then clearly the concern to re-establish philosophical absolutes is the 
text’s real locus. But for what purpose? What compels the revival of absolutes 
within philosophy? To answer this requires us to engage a weak political reading of 
his work. 
6.2 A weak reading: against historicist enthusiasm 
 
In chapter two of After Finitude on ‘Metaphysics, Fideism, Speculation’ Meillassoux 
addresses the importance of his challenge for undermining the sceptical-fideist 
alliance. By this he means to implicate, in some part, trends within philosophy with 
the revival of religion in the late 20th century. As he sees it, the critique of 
metaphysics, presumed for so long to be complementary with the critique of 
religion, has resulted in a pyrrhic victory for atheists. By conflating the critique of 
metaphysics with a solemn censorship on thinking absolutes all philosophy has 
succeeded in doing is enjoining a suspicion of rational absolutes. In other words, 
philosophy has acted as a handmaiden for religious obscurantism by opening the 
door for belief in all absolutes no matter how contradictory, affirming that there is 
no sense in attempting to ground the absolute in reason. Interestingly, however, 
                                                 
513
 Ibid. 
 
338 
 
Meillassoux does not use this move to conduct a classical rationalist critique of 
belief tout court, but to criticise the specifically de-Christianising tendencies this 
gives rise to, positioning his intellectual battle against the obscurantist fanatic doling 
out the “worst forms of violence.”514 Concomitant with the revival of the Hegelian 
idea of ‘absolutes’ is a defence of the rational kernel of Christian theology, a 
doctrine he presents as being assailed by scepticism to the point where the 
contemporary philosopher is rendered a sad “liberal servant of any theology 
whatsoever.”515 Abjuring the right for reason to adjudicate on the validity of 
absolutes “establishes how any piety whatsoever enjoys an equal and exclusive right 
to grasp the ultimate truth.”516 For Meillassoux this is the consequence of the 
particular conjunction of modern, secular thought with philosophical correlationism: 
“the modern man is he who has been re-ligionized precisely to the extent that he 
has been de-Christianized.”517 Thus, the critique of the de-absolutization of thought 
“goes beyond that of the legitimation of ancestral statements. What is urgently 
required, in effect, is that we re-think what could be called ‘the prejudices of critical 
sense’; viz., critical potency is not necessarily on the side of those who would 
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undermine the validity of absolute truths, but rather on the side of those who would 
succeed in criticizing both ideological dogmatism and sceptical fanaticism.”518  
If we read these remarks as providing both the motivation and real 
intellectual locus of After Finitude everything falls into place: the text can then be 
seen as an elaboration of a particular subset of the theological and ethical themes 
found in The Divine Inexistence. Since most of Meillassoux’s readership is surely 
aware of the strange (a)theological work accompanying his arguments against 
correlationism in After Finitude, before we introduce a reading of the text let us 
stress why we have approached the arguments of this more obviously political text 
in such a seemingly roundabout way. The ordering of our argument in this way has 
been to pre-empt critics who might hope to firewall a good Meillassoux, who 
upholds mathematical science in After Finitude, against a bad Meillassoux in The 
Divine Inexistence espousing perhaps connected, but still, from the point of view of 
his speculative philosophy non-essential, political and religious stances. Accordingly, 
if we did not show why his defence of scientific realism is secondary to the need to 
grant philosophy a speculative hold on the absolute, the strong political reading we 
are aiming towards by the end of this chapter would be easy to dismiss as an 
overbearing attempt to transpose Meillassoux’s politics onto his ontology. Yet our 
reading of After Finitude has already demonstrated that the lexical order of his 
concerns lie with establishing the need for philosophical absolutes above and 
beyond the question of scientific realism. Further, if we follow the process of his 
intellectual development we can see that this concern with scientific realism is 
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something that comes later on in the development of his project to establish the 
necessity of contingency. To demonstrate the point, let us first recall some of the 
historical conditions driving the project before, second, approaching the arguments 
of The Divine Inexistence. By so doing, we will see that beyond his opposition to the 
sceptical-fideist alliance, there are ample indications that his project is also a 
response to perceived impasses within Marxism. 
Without wishing to conduct vulgar biographical reductionism, a few 
pertinent facts show how Meillassoux’s intellectual upbringing was immersed in 
Marxist philosophy and the influence this had upon the development of his theories. 
Meillassoux remarks on his father, Claude Meillassoux (a famous intellectual in his 
own right, influential amongst Althusserian anthropologists)519, that he was “quite a 
remarkable Marxist, inventive and individualistic (distant from every party, very anti-
Stalinist, very anti-Maoist).”520 From his father, Quentin Meillassoux would have 
picked up the anti-historicist current of thought; an important influence to bear in 
mind when we consider his profession that “Hegel, along with Marx, was my only 
                                                 
519
 In the 1960s and 70s a number of scholars  – Emmanuel Terray, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and 
Pierre Pilippe Rey – attempted to synthesize the work of Althusser with the insights of Claude 
Meillssoux’s ethnography by focusing on the idea of a ‘mode of production’ – specifically, how 
‘traditional economies’ are synthesized with the capitalist economy to form a complex articulation of 
modes of production. The ‘Meillassoux seminar’ that ran for a decade from 1969 was known as a 
lively cross-disciplinary forum for exchange of scientific and political views. (Mahir Saul¸ “Claude 
Meillassoux (1925-2005)”, American Anthropologist, Vol. 107,  No. 4 (2005), 753-757; Bernard 
Schlemmer, “A Tribute to Claude Meillassoux”, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 103 
(2005), 197-201). 
 
520
 Quentin Meillassoux interview in Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 160. 
 
341 
 
true master: the one on whom I had to depend in order to achieve my own 
thinking.”521 But how can we square Meillassoux’s immersion within the ideas of the 
Parisan leftist milieu with the need to re-establish absolutes, a move that would 
seem to mark a retreat from materialist to more idealist themes? Some 
historicisation might help. Meillassoux’s doctoral thesis was completed in 1997, 
forming the basis of the endlessly reworked and still unpublished tome The Divine 
Inexistence; but he started to elaborate his distinctive philosophical ideas from the 
early 1990’s, a period marked by a sense of fin de siècle after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, and placing the maturation of his ideas roughly synchronous with the 
publication of Jacques Derrida’s Spectres of Marx.522 Although by his own testimony 
we know Meillassoux’s formative influences were Hegel, Marx and Badiou – not the 
deconstructive and poststructuralist canon – the comparison with Derrida is actually 
more insightful than might be expected because of the way the spirit of the age is 
captured by both philosophers in a commensurate fashion.523 For the manner in 
which Derrida’s Spectres of Marx offers to hold on to the skeletal messianic promise 
of Marxism in the aftermath of the collapse of communism, attempting to salvage 
the Marxian messianic impulse by disparaging any articulation with real political and 
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economic forces, is in a number of senses repeated by Meillassoux. Like Derrida, 
channelling the messianic event against historicist ‘metaphysics’ goes in hand in 
hand with ontological speculations about the event, and, conversely, away from the 
analysis of social, political and economic forces. Going further down this line of 
thought than Derrida’s iconoclastic (and somewhat hollow) fidelity to Marxism 
permits, Meillassoux couples the rejection of historicist metaphysics with a rejection 
of Marxism, treating the former as the essential ontology of the latter. And when he 
couples this with a speculative insistence on the contingency of nature’s laws, his 
theories are then purposively used to reject Marxism, not to provide it with a new 
epistemology as Althusser tried in the mid 60’s, or to furnish it with an ontology of 
militancy as did Badiou in the 1970’s and 80’s. 
Consequently, maintaining the radical contingency of nature’s laws is a 
doctrine not only directed at undermining religious fanaticism, as it would be later 
presented in After Finitude (perhaps in a way more acceptable for a 21st century 
continental philosophy readership raised on a diet of Žižek and Badiou), but equally, 
if not more so, against secular political fanaticism underwritten by historicist 
ontology, under which Marxism is unproblematically categorised. Indeed, the 
central theme of The Divine Inexistence is precisely the ethical implications of how 
philosophy can relate values to the real, and the argument is structured around 
positioning his philosophy to take over this task from Marxism’s failed ‘historical 
symbol’. For Meillassoux philosophy is positioned as the perennial attempt to 
reconcile our values with the real after science creates a rupture between the 
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two.524 In his words, philosophy “is meaningful only once we have a scientific 
rupture of the religious link between reality and norms.”525 Meillassoux’s position is 
not to accept the nihilistic consequences of scientific knowledge, as in Ray Brassier’s 
Nihil Unbound; he rather sees philosophy’s task being to seal the wound opened up 
by science between value and being, navigating between the two poles of the priest 
who would drag us back towards a transcendent anchor for human values, and the 
sophist who, like Tharasyamchus, Socrates’ antagonist in Plato’s The Republic, 
declares justice is only a profitable social convention to serve the powerful.526 What 
he calls symbolization is the conjoining of these two spheres: the human value of 
justice with the non-human real. If The Divine Inexistence has a programme it is to 
take up the mantle of providing a new philosophical symbolization of the 
relationship between values and a real through knowledge of absolute contingency.  
In Meillassoux’s view, the history of symbolization has passed through three 
stages: the cosmological, the romantic, and the historical. First was the regime of 
the cosmological symbol where, after the dissolution of myth by early natural 
philosophy, Plato tried to reconcile value and being by inscribing justice into the 
eternal Ideas. Second was the birth of the romantic symbol in response to the blow 
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dealt by Newton to the cosmological symbol with his description of planetary orbits 
following a linear, clockwork motion. Here, with the simultaneous birth of 
Enlightenment scepticism, Meillassoux sees the replacement of the figure of the 
sophist with his potentially more destructive modern equivalent, so that “this 
splendid liberation of fanaticism is accompanied once more by a cynicism that 
renews the habitual categories of despair.”527 With the romantic symbol – 
responding to the break between nature and the social of which Rousseau would 
become the most famous advocate – the earth bound natural order is associated 
with the good, and the social with the corrupt. But this symbolization rapidly breaks 
down under its own biased privileging of natural good (Meillassoux draws upon his 
Hobbesian subtext, about which we will say more below, by arguing that the pity of 
Rousseau’s noble savage “is no more common in the living than are war, violence 
and cruelty.”528) As such, the romantic symbol is no more than a transitional symbol 
quickly giving way to the “authentic symbol of modernity”; that is, “the historic 
Symbol through whose culmination we are still living today.”529 
It is plausible to consider the historical symbol as the most important for 
Meillassoux’s argument. First, because it is the last of our inherited symbols: the one 
Meillassoux sees his own philosophy as replacing in order to recommence the fusion 
of values and the real. Second, because it is here that the political compulsions 
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motivating his project are most evident. Let us therefore pay special attention to 
this symbol and to the representation of Marxism implied by its inclusion in the 
category. In his depiction of the historical symbol Meillassoux gives a 
straightforward representation of historicist Marxism, one interchangeable with 
Hegelian historicist ontology. On this reading, the “ruse of history” finds its way 
through the disorganized jumble of individual actions to secure “economism”: an 
“ultra-objective principle of a teleology of the Good, whether in its liberal or Marxist 
version.”530 For Meillassoux, perhaps with the likes of Francis Fukuyama in mind, 
Marxism and liberalism share the same historicist teleology where “every economic 
reverse amounts to a transient retreat amidst a larger movement towards a 
necessarily positive outcome.”531  
The reduction of Marxism to these particular historicist variants serves to 
move towards generalised cynicism about all political and economic theories and 
practices which involve mass mobilisation. “The romantic gives way to the 
Robespierrist cult of the supreme Being. The historical is degraded into the dogma 
of infallibility, whether of the Party or of the Invisible Hand.”532 Despite the 
reference to the Smithian metaphysics of the free market, the real critical force of 
Meillassoux’s argument is directed at the damage to the idea of truth caused by 
Stalin’s dialectical materialism, a philosophy “promoting generalized falsehood in 
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the name of the proletarian Good to come.”533 In a discussion on ‘Promethean 
humanism’ this turns into a more general argument against the disastrous 
consequences of political power where he seeks to overturn young Marx’s humanist 
critique of religion. “What humans transpose into the religious God is not their own 
essence, as Feuerbach and the young Marx claimed, but rather their degradation of 
their own essence. For what humans see in God is the possibility of their own 
omnipotence: the accomplishment of their inhumanity rather than their 
humanity.”534 In any event, humanity having lost its belief in the real movement of 
history being on the side of emancipation: 
 
Justice deserts being once more, even once we have arrived in the 
innermost recess of History. We now live the death of the Symbol of 
modernity, just as the eighteenth century lived the death of the 
Greek Symbol. The Symbol is lacking once more, and now as ever we 
confront the alternative nightmares reborn from the ashes: 
traditionalism and sophistical immoralism.535 
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At the end of this symbol of modernity we are thus faced by the spectre of the 
religious fanatic and the atheist nihilist, taking us to the contemporary political 
situation as depicted by After Finitude. 
 Meillassoux’s ethical orientation, centred on avoiding the worst excesses of 
human violence, directly informs the symbolization he proposes to replace the 
Marxist historical symbol: the ‘factical’ symbol – a fusion of values and the real 
based upon knowledge of absolute contingency. Now, this new symbolization will 
not by itself accomplish anything unless it is wedded to anticipation of a new 
advent, by which Meillassoux means the epochal ex-nihilo event inaugurating a new 
cosmic World of justice. Thus, to understand the purpose of Meillassoux’s new 
symbol one also has to appreciate its alignment with a periodisation of the previous 
World-changing advents of matter, life and thought: all reasonless eruptions of 
change following from the absence of sufficient reason in the Universe and the 
excess of effects over their causes. Since no principle, cause, or any agent governs 
these epochal ruptures, their origin is solely the unreasonable hyper-chaos 
underlying the seeming stability of natural laws. This has to be put in contrast to 
intra-Worldly modifications, on the other hand, which are changes possible within 
the probabilistic distribution of what already exists in World. Meillassoux insists that 
the distinction is necessary in order to show why rebirth would constitute a new 
World entirely and could not be “an advent internal to the creative activities of 
humans.”536 This Fourth World – a world of justice – is thus out of the hands of 
humans to realise themselves even though the immortality it bestows would 
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provide “the sole life worthy of their [humans’] condition.”537 In order to isolate a 
universal principle of justice Meillassoux fixes on a Hobbesian axiomatic where 
relating all species of injustice is the ethical genus of human mortality: its 
vulnerability to abuse. “And of all these injustices the most extreme is still death: 
absurd death, early death, death inflicted by those unconcerned with equality.”538 
The axiomatic of death as the ‘factical’ limit to any intra-Worldly attempt to realise 
justice permits him to assume a human-centric horizon to justice on a condition 
which humans, he believes, (perhaps erroneously) could never realise themselves 
through any rational volition. Let us pause for a moment though, because despite 
the appeal of ‘absurd death’ as the horizon of injustice, especially for a generation 
sensitive to the moral imperative of human rights, it is really the case that death is 
the genus of all injustice? What about poverty, inequality, exploitation? All these 
would be more conventional candidates to occupy the category of injustice in the 
Marxist tradition. Isolating death as the horizon of injustice places its resolution out 
of reach of any political movement to correct. Lesser intra-Worldy injustices are 
thereby placed under the horizon of the ontological injustice of our present cosmic-
scale World of injustice. The upshot of placing ethical primacy on death, a condition 
we can only hope will be overcome by the absolute contingency of advent, has the 
double-effect of allowing humankind to hope for the new World of Justice whilst 
recognising its impotence to realise it. Yet Meillassoux’s argument relies on the 
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contention that just because we cannot create this change does not mean its 
anticipation is irrelevant. On the contrary, by anticipating the new world of justice 
he claims that “Humanity can be unified by intensively lived values, because they are 
founded on the active expectation of an ontologically remarkable event that is 
accessible to every thinking being.”539 Meillassoux seeks to correct the impression of 
his theory’s prescription of passivity, but as we will see only by redirecting political 
impulses to a subjective, individual disposition.  
  How does Meillassoux ward off “lazy fatalism under the pretext that the 
advent of the world of justice does not depend on the power of humans”?540 This is 
the most awkward of the arguments in The Divine Inexistence, since it purports a 
link, within thought, of intra-Worldy actions and World changes, without any causal 
link from one to the other. It also indicates where Meillassoux’s speculative ethics 
provides the clearest signs of a politics of how we should act within our existing 
World. 
6.3 A strong reading: infinitization a.k.a. idealist esotericism 
   
To understand how Meillassoux’s fourth world of justice can come into being one 
needs to distinguish between its contingent advent and the subjective dispositions 
that would make it into a new world. He thereby aims to link the advent of justice 
with its intra-Worldly anticipation. The new World’s novelty ultimately resides in our 
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appreciation of it precisely as a novelty, and this can only be accomplished by pre-
advental expectation. If such a World change is to take place we need to be able to 
be surprised by the beauty of the contingent alignment of our factical symbolic 
desire for a concord between value and the real. Why intra-Worldly action is 
necessary to form a new World, which without such action would otherwise be 
merely an “improved third World,”541 can be explained by reference to the 
accumulative nature of Meillassoux’s advents, where every novelty is only a novelty 
apropos the World it has exceeded. For Meillassoux depicts our present ‘third 
World’, after the discoveries of his philosophy, as one where “the ultimate has in 
fact taken place,” inasmuch as the ultimate is “the contingent being that knows the 
absoluteness of contingency.”542 Thus, since we have already reached the ultimate 
as a rational being, we need to maintain the capacity to surprise ourselves with the 
novelty of the new World for it to truly to be in excess of our current situation. How 
can this accomplished? In The Divine Inexistence Meillassoux gives no detail of the 
‘actions’ that would instantiate these practices of expectation. Yet if the realization 
of the fourth World depends upon our ability to long for the resolution of our values 
and the real, and if our values are ultimately underwritten by knowledge of absolute 
contingency, it would make sense that these practices are ones whereby we can, in 
the greatest sense possible within an intra-Worldly situation, bring our subjectivity 
into line with an ontology of contingency. Hints of what this might involve can be 
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found in Meillassoux’s book on Stéphane Mallarmé’s poem, Un Coup de Dés Jamais 
N'Abolira Le Hasard (A Throw of the Dice will Never Abolish Chance). For as 
Meillassoux hints in The Divine Inexistence, awaiting the fourth world one can 
compare to “the free act to the throw of the dice”543 – a throw, perhaps, like the 
Master of the ship in Mallarmé’s poem? 
Meillassoux’ book, The Number and the Siren, aims to show that Mallarmé’s 
poem is coded and that it is possible to decipher this code in order to reveal the way 
its cryptic repetition of ‘The Number’ in its verse stands for a wager that a precise 
number (encrypted in the form of the poem) is Chance – for Mallarmé, Chance 
itself.544 Part Two of Meillassoux’s book is particularly interesting since he here 
indulges a speculative reading of the poem in order to draw out the consequences 
of what he calls the infinitization of Mallarmé’s encryption. What Meillassoux means 
by Mallarmé’s infinitization of the poem is the way it is ambiguously coded so that it 
perpetuates chance. The paradox grappled with is compelling: how can a single 
number, a most finite determination, represent the undecidability of chance? Let us 
give an example to demonstrate the difficulty. If one throws the dice, as the Master 
of the ship in Mallarmé’s poem prevaricates about, chance will dictate which 
number is rolled. But as soon as the resulting number of the throw is revealed – in 
other words, is fixed – then it is no longer chance, but the result of chance: chance 
finitized. Is infinitization then better represented as a withdrawal from deciding to 
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throwing the dice, suspending the actualisation of the virtual possibilities and 
preserving all possible results? If so, then a unique number cannot be chance itself 
since infinitization would demand that all possible outcomes be preserved. Deadlock 
it seems.  
 “The solution,” Meillassoux claims, “consists in displacing the demand that 
the gesture (of throwing or not throwing) be infinite, onto the Number itself. In other 
words, to throw the dice, to produce a Number – but a ‘unique Number’ supporting 
in itself the virtually contradictory structure of Chance.”545 In this way Meillassoux 
seeks to show how indeterminacy is built into the deployment of a specific number, 
and how, self-reflexively, this indeterminacy traverses Mallarmé’s very act of 
encrypting the poem so that we cannot even be certain that Mallarmé has in fact 
coded his poem. Because Mallarmé comes close to making his poem precisely 707 
words, the number Meillassoux decodes as the poem’s unique Number, but at the 
same time builds in enough ambiguity so that we can never be sure even if the 
poem has been encoded, this he interprets as a deliberate act of infinitization on 
Mallarmé’s part: a fixing of the infinite. Meillassoux explains his point in anti-
Hegelian terms: 
 
‘Fixing the infinite’ is indeed the fundamental programme of 
Mallarméan poetics, a programme that renders it a stranger to those 
notions, so valorized by modernity, of ‘becoming’ and ‘dynamism’ ... 
What is required is to capture a sudden modification, a 
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transfiguration, a fulguration ... a passed movement annulled as soon 
it is initiated. And thus a movement of which one could doubt whether 
it ever took place ... A dialectical infinite, then, that includes its other, 
but without invoking any dynamism – and in this sense a non-Hegelian 
dialectic, one without progress, without any surpassing of one step by 
the next.546 
 
As Meillassoux sees it, Mallarmé created enough ambiguity so that it would never be 
certain if the poem would be deciphered: the poem being a wager cast to sea like a 
message in a bottle. Thus, both author and reader are locked into the same 
uncertainty: an uncertainty ‘quavering’ around a determinate number: “For the 
code was discovered, and, if we succeed at demonstrating that it is affected by a 
slight uncertainty, we will have established that Mallarmé’s Number and his gesture 
have indeed been infinitized in the eyes of his readers.”547 Infinitization can thus be 
read as Meillassoux’s first intervention into theorising intra-Worldly chance as acted 
upon by subjects; that is, what a subjectivity based on change, reflecting at a lower 
level an ontology of contingency, would mean. In a remarkably compressed 
conclusion to the book, Meillassoux frames his discussion of Mallarmé in terms of an 
alternative to modernist views of historical progress. Mallarmé’s act allows us to 
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once more vectorize the subject with meaning, with a direction freed 
from ancient eschatology; all that our masters have instructed us to 
regard  as outmoded par excellence – those dead Grand Narratives, 
at best obsolete when fermented by solitary researchers, at worst 
criminal when clothed in the statist finery of Progress or Revolution; 
all this would nevertheless have succeeded in making one 
breakthrough up to our time, one only, and at a precise point – a 
unique Poem that would traverse the 20th century like a hidden gem, 
finally to reveal itself, in the following century, as the strangely 
successful defense of an epoch we had buried under our 
disenchantments.548 
 
There is a lot going on in these words, but nonetheless one can discern the basic 
point. As opposed to modernist narratives of historical progress, inevitably giving 
rise to criminal revolutions, Mallarmé alone stands out as a shining example of the 
type of subject fit for an ontology of contingency. In his refusal to give away the 
secrets of his poem easily, and by forever imprinting it with a mark of undecidability, 
he became a prophetic subject: one whose ideas speak across the ages from poet to 
philosopher. If we are right in our interpretation, and if for Meillassoux Mallarmé 
thus exemplifies a subjective praxis fit for an ontology of absolute contingency, then 
there is a name for Meillasoux’s alternative to the political subjects of the 20th 
century: esotericism. Or using Badiou’s terminology from the Logics of Worlds: 
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aristocratic idealism. Contra mass mobilisation, revolution, or any modality of 
historical vision oriented around progress that would be freely knowable and 
rationally disseminated, the subject of change, the subject who knows the ultimate 
– that the universe is ultimately governed by reasonless hyper-chaos – this subject is 
one who keeps their cards (or dice) close to their chest and who talks in a prose only 
capable of being deciphered by the finest minds of an age. One can begin to see 
what a strong Meillassouxian politics might look like.  
In an interview with Graham Harman Meillassoux reflects upon the human 
losses of the 20th century and their role in motivating his theories. With the 
contingency of nature’s laws being “outside the grasp of our action,” the positive 
result of this political impotence is that the 
 
‘eternal possible’ frees me from suffering over the appalling 
misfortune of those who have experienced atrocious deaths, allows 
me to escape being paralyzed by an impossible mourning for the 
atrocities of the twentieth century, and also permits me to invest 
energy in an egalitarian politics that has become conscious of its 
limits. Indeed, politics is delivered from all charges of messianism, 
since eschatological awaiting is entirely recuperated by individual 
subjectivity. This partition of tasks (individual messianism, political 
finitude) allows us to avoid the totalitarian temptation of collective 
action. We can efficiently expel the eschatological desire from 
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politics only be allowing this desire to be unfolded openly in another 
sphere of existence (such as private life or philosophy).549 
 
What is most remarkable here for an author of a text named After Finitude and 
whose intellectual background includes the tutelage of Badiou’s Being and Event, 
where political truths are sustained through an collective, infinite truth procedure, is 
the emphasis on imposing limits upon political thought, effectively cutting politics 
down to size and transferring those desires into the realm of individual subjectivity 
informed by speculative philosophy. If Marx’s early innovation can be identified as 
funnelling the misattributed desire for reconciliation of man with his essence on a 
spiritual level into the political movement capable of realising the real conditions for 
emancipation, Meillassoux’s move can be read as something of a coup within 
Marxist philosophy for the restoration of the ethical orientation of pre-Marxist 
critical idealism. Meillassoux’s absolutisation of the event as a cosmic force does 
indeed take us a long way from Marxist philosophy. By pushing novelty to its utmost 
extreme – and it is difficult to see how an event could be conceptualised that bears 
more novelty – Meillassoux’s theories are oriented towards establishing a master 
ethical discourse under the aegis of philosophy’s speculative discourse. Novelty does 
not curtail authority; novelty elevates it.  
In Graham Harman’s hyperbolic reading he asks us to imagine “the absolute 
triumph of the philosophy of Quentin Meillassoux by the year 2050”, a world where, 
“A survey done of Le Monde in a feature on Meillassoux reveals that 80 percent of 
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European academics now literally hope for the rebirth of humans who have died 
atrocious deaths.”550 Is this a world really worth anticipating? 
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Conclusion 
 
rethinking events 
 
 
The criticisms offered by the foregoing chapters on Hegel, Marx, Lenin, Althusser, 
Badiou and Meillassoux should have indicated political problems with their ideas of 
the event. While all can be seen as admirable conceptual constructions for 
understanding change within a ruptural paradigm, and while all go some way 
towards delimiting the authority of theoreticians to predict, govern and judge 
historical events, at the same time all these theories reach limits. Yet this thesis’ 
approach should also indicate that our central categories of analysis – novelty and 
authority – do have legitimate purchase on understanding the motivation, 
formulation, and difficulties of considering change through events. Whilst perhaps 
not going as far to claim they are transcendental political categories, there is 
definitely a close connection between the two of continuing pertinence for political 
theory. Any use of the concept of the event to think process of political 
transformation will necessarily stress the novelty unleashed. And novelty, although 
not necessarily negating authority, plays a role in regulating expert, theoretical 
knowledge as power from governing the future. In the opinion of your author, the 
event thus has an important part to play in theorising political practice. Existing 
theories should thus serve to beg the question of how we can better theorise and 
incorporate events into our political approaches. In this sense, political theory could 
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take a more proactive role in the future in constructing new theories that navigate 
the problems of novelty and authority. There are ample resources available in the 
existing traditions of Hegelian-Marxist and Althusserian-inspired theory to draw 
from. Moreover, there are further untapped theoretical resources that could be 
utilised to think through these problems.  These will be touched up below. Before 
this, the conclusion will briefly recapitulate the problems identified throughout the 
thesis. 
In Part I criticism was directed at ideas of the event within Hegelian-inspired 
dialectical materialism. We located the core problem in the incapacity of the 
accumulative notion of quantity-quality transformations to conceptualise novelty-
bearing ruptures. Working immanently through Hegel’s ontology, chapter one 
identified the problem with these ‘leaps’ in the fact that Hegel’s notion relies on the 
dialecticization of the mathematical infinite; this in turn reflecting the historicism of 
the Logic’s categorical aufhebung. Consequently, Hegel’s Logic and the ‘leaps’ 
dialectical materialism sourced from it do not break from the historicism evident 
throughout the rest of Hegel’s system. Despite the association of Hegelian ‘leaps’ 
with suddenness and novelty, in fact they merely restate historicism in metaphysical 
terms. Further reasons for the inadequacy of the Hegelian-inspired idea of the event 
were then provided in chapter two by seeing how, in the final instance, Marx’s idea 
of revolution sticks to this imprint. For although Capital’s analysis is conducted using 
an epistemology of real abstraction – as opposed to a Hegelian ontology of 
contradiction – the presence of multiple, non-historically ordered forms of 
abstraction in the work’s critique of capitalism are not incorporated into Marx’s idea 
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of transformation to communism. In order to initiate a sustainable transition 
process, Marx’s economic analysis in Capital indicates the need for undoing two 
abstractions: the value-form abstraction and the separation of the workers from the 
means of production. But in keeping with his aversion to post-capitalist economic 
planning ahead of the revolutionary event, and his latent affinities with Hegelian 
conceptions of historical development, Marx still sees transition to communism 
being inaugurated solely by uniting workers with the means of production. In 
abstract terms, we thus interpreted Marx’s idea of revolution as reflective of the 
way he adheres to the notion that historical change comes about at a single site of 
transformation, through a dialectical switch. Since this reduplicates the dialectical 
motor within the Hegelian model of historical change, we therefore concluded that 
Marx’s idea is compatible with the idea of quantity-quality transformations, and, 
likewise, struggles to conceive a properly novelty-bearing event. In the third and 
final chapter of Part I, we put these ideas to the test by seeing to what extent 
Lenin’s first-hand reading of the Logic allows him to synthesise Hegel’s idea of 
‘leaps’ with Marxist political practice. The conclusion drawn was that whilst in an 
impressionistic sense Lenin’s linking of quantity-quality ‘leaps’ with Hegel’s idea of 
totality allows him to reappraise linear Marxist historicism, when it comes to using 
this concept for thinking the processes that can set in motion the transition from 
capitalism to communism, the quantity-quality transformation proves inadequate to 
the task. That Lenin proposes the policy of quantitatively expanding industry in 
order to induce a qualitative transformation from the capitalist to the socialist mode 
of production starkly exhibits the vicissitudes of Hegelian historicism. In all three 
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cases, then, the problem with adequately conceiving novelty-bearing events within 
the Hegelian horizon spills over to encompass a wider set of concerns. While 
orthodox Marxists continue to pose the issue in terms of a dichotomy between 
gradual evolutionary processes and sudden revolutionary transformation, we hope 
to have shown that this temporal distinction is insufficient inasmuch as it does not 
consider the broader set of conceptual structures for understanding processes of 
change.  
Part II of the thesis switched its focus to the question of the authority of 
philosophers in making judgements about events. Whereas in Part I theories of the 
event were principally concerned with forward-looking revolutionary 
transformations, the heterodox Althusserian-inspired lineage focused on 
retrospective judgement of events. Chapter four began by looking at how Althusser 
sought to replace Hegelian-inspired dialectical materialism by developing 
Bachleard’s epistemology of scientific discontinuity and fusing it with structuralist 
notions of social formation. In so doing, and by casting the idea of the 
epistemological break as the result of the vanishing cause of structural causality, 
Althusser, we argued, better conceives an idea of the novelty-bearing event than 
those fashioned from Hegelian dialectics. However, in pitching these breaks as a 
rupture from ideology to science, his theory of historical change acutely presses the 
issue of the authority of philosophers to make these historical judgements; a 
problem he recognises in the corrections of ’67 and to which others drew attention 
in the wake of the events of May ’68. Lacking any clear criteria for the nomination of 
an event, Althusser draws on the authority of science in order to legitimize the 
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notion of a break from ideology to science. Yet unable to locate within scientific 
practice the resources to validate this break, his discourse assumes a tacitly 
authoritative status in making decisions about actual historical events. As we then 
saw in chapter five, in Being and Event Badiou seeks to resolve many of the issues 
related to the authority of historical judgement by placing his theory of the event 
within an intricate web of demarcations wherein philosophy is supposed only to play 
the reactive role. We demonstrated that by making philosophy a metaontological 
discourse solely interpreting the insights of mathematical set theory for philosophy 
Badiou’s system goes to great lengths to limit the authoritative role of philosophers 
over political processes. However, both the architectonic of his text and problems 
with the demarcation between ontological and non-ontological situations 
problematised his ambitions to remove philosophical judgement from political 
processes. In the final chapter of this thesis, we engaged a thinker furthest removed 
from conventional philosophies of the event, yet whose continuities with Althusser 
and Badiou’s project make his theories worthy of inclusion. Meillassoux’s notion of 
the absolute contingency of nature’s laws provided further evidence for the fact that 
valorising novelty-bearing events does not de jure resolve all questions related to 
the authority of philosophers. This was particularly brought out with respect to the 
fact that Meillassoux positions his theories as a successor to the Hegelian ‘historical 
symbol’ dominating orthodox Marxism. In converting contingency into absolute 
speculative knowledge Meillassoux places philosophers in charge of the ethical, 
messianic discourse of preparing for the advent of the ‘fourth world of justice’. But 
in the process, mass revolutionary fervour is recuperated into a cautious, 
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individualised ethical disposition. The chapter on Meillassoux thus aimed to 
demonstrate that there is no easy solution to the knot of novelty and authority 
within theories of the event – exaggerating the former does not necessarily put to 
rest the problems associated with the latter.  
 What lessons can we draw from all these results? The scope of our readings 
and the multiple themes engaged make it impossible to distil our conclusions into a 
single, satisfying take home point. Nevertheless, we will at least attempt a concise 
enumeration.  
First, philosophies of the event cannot be taken as isolated concepts; rather, 
they need to be appreciated in terms of their situation in wider conceptual 
networks. Which is to say, as soon as one begins to talk about theories of the event 
solely in terms of the temporality of political change then one is almost certainly 
missing crucial elements of the theory. What Althusser recognised, and which 
represents a lasting contribution of his research programme, is that our concept of 
social structure is intimately connected with our concepts of historical change. If one 
wishes to understand ideas of the events then one also has to scrutinise the 
concepts of social structure which they are embedded within.   
Second, intellectual authority appears an unavoidable consequence of 
creating conceptual models of social change. To pick up on remarks made at the end 
of chapter five, as soon as sophisticated models of social change are created – and 
we have no reason to believe that social change is any less a complex process than 
other processes subjected to scientific analysis – then this will inevitably endow the 
philosophers and/or scientists who create these concepts with a degree of authority 
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for interpreting and guiding processes of change. Rather than going to ever more 
baroque lengths to circumscribe authority, then, perhaps it is better to acknowledge 
this inevitability and construct theories that help mediate the authority of concepts 
with the mass procedures they are supposed to model. Classical Marxism attempts 
this through the idea of revolution, where the authority of communist theoreticians 
is delimited by the revolutionary event circumscribing their knowledge. As we have 
seen, though, this relies on a concept of historical change that seems caught in a 
contradiction where revolutionary novelty ostensibly delimits the knowledge of 
communist theorists, but the concept of historical change underlying this notion 
seems inadequate to deliver this novelty. Whether in its Hegelian or Althusserian 
guise, concepts of novelty do not eliminate authority; at best they help to prevent 
theories from assuming the worst excesses of knowledge as power.  
Third, there is a reciprocal conditioning between ideas of the event and real 
social and political changes, even though the two can slip out of sync. As with any 
conceptual frameworks, ideas of the event can take on a dynamic autonomous to 
the political and social realities they are supposed to help explain. Indeed, those 
instances where theory and political reality coincide seem more the exceptions that 
confirm the rule of their frequent divergence. On this point, Marx’s idea of real 
abstraction might be useful for further theorising of events. For while the idea of the 
event in orthodox Hegelian-Marxist thought, relying on a dialectical switch pushing 
history from one era to another, makes some sense given that it reflects the 
separation of workers from the means of production and the sharp class polarisation 
of the early 20th century, is this still the case today? In the advanced capitalist states 
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at least, class has become a more complex phenomenon; the financialisation of 
capitalism alongside the advance of non-factory based labour, means that these 
concepts of social change appear somewhat out of date with respect to the 
abstractions underlying models of change. Any appropriate notion of the event 
today instead needs to emerge from recognition of changed social circumstances. 
And this will inevitably involve new articulations of the relationship between novelty 
and authority, and their relationship to contemporary sites of political practice.  
 What might a 21st century idea of the event look like? It is a question already 
being grappled with by experimental, politically-engaged theorists. One example 
from communization theory particularly stands out. Endnotes, for instance, justify 
their take on communization theory551 as “an answer to the question of what the 
revolution is” in an epoch in which the post-revolutionary transitionary period has 
rendered redundant by the historical obsolescence of programmatism.552 In 
                                                 
551
 Communization takes its name and influence from currents within the French ultra-left of the 
1960’s and 70’s. Noys describes it as “often a weird mixing-up of insurrectionist anarchism, the 
communist ultra-left, postautonomists, anti-political currents, groups like the Invisible Committee, as 
well as more explicitly ‘communizing’ currents, such as Théorie Communiste and Endnotes. Obviously 
at the heart of the word is communism and, as the shift to communization suggests, communism as a 
particular activity and process.” (Benjamin Noys, “Introduction” in Communization and its 
Discontents: Contestation, Critique, and Contemporary Struggles, ed. Benjamin Noys (Wivenhoe/New 
York /Port Watson: Minor Compositions, 2011), 8.) We have previously discussed the anonymous 
communization text, “Communiqué from an Absent Future”, issued during the California student 
occupations in light of the decline of communist Party politics. (Nathan Coombs, “Faint Signal: The 
student occupations in California and the Communiqué from an Absent Future”, Radical Philosophy 
159 (Jan/Feb 2010), 66-68.) 
 
552
 Endnotes, “What are we to do?” in Communization and its Discontents: Contestation, Critique, and 
Contemporary Struggles, ed. Benjamin Noys (Wivenhoe/New York /Port Watson: Minor 
Compositions, 2011), 29, 25. 
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maintaining that their theory is still directed towards revolution – albeit negatively, 
in the sense of attempting to chart an unknown course through a historical impasse 
– they recognise the need for concepts of revolutionary change and criticise the still 
canonical Hegelian-Marxist notion of quantity-quality transformations. They write, 
 
[it is] wrong to think of the revolution in terms of the sum of already-
communizing acts, as if all that was needed was a certain 
accumulation of such acts to a critical point. A conception of the 
revolution as such an accumulation is premised on a quantitative 
extension which is supposed to provoke a qualitative transformation. 
In this it is not unlike the problematic of the growing-over of 
everyday struggles into revolution which was one of the salient 
characteristics of the programmatic epoch.553 
 
What they mean is that one should not presume that a horizontal spread of 
communes, occupations, co-operatives, or whatever prefiguratively post-capitalist 
spaces are involved in a communizing procedure will be adequate at a certain scale 
to tip over into revolution. This example thus demonstrates the close connection 
between ideas of the event and the concepts used to make sense of current social 
formations and political practices.  
                                                                                                                                           
 
553
 Ibid., 28. 
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We cannot, of course, hope to offer a fully elaborated new idea of the event 
here taking these concerns on board. So let it suffice to say that in our view any 
appropriate idea of the event will we have to be based on a theory of social 
formation matching the complexities of contemporary abstract social and economic 
logics with the contingency of politics. In this vein, we can only intimate the promise 
provided by complexity theory to think the emergence of social logics at the macro 
scale. Tony Lawson’s remarks on causation and emergence provide some promising 
conceptual signposts that could help facilitate this theorising. Looking to found the 
methodological basis for a science of social processes that nonetheless recognises its 
relational and contingent properties, whilst avoiding grounding the notion of 
emergence through methodological individualism, he writes that 
 
social reality is found to be comprised of a multitude of interrelating 
multiple-component collective practices, processes and events that 
simultaneously both ground and presuppose a complex system of 
positions, positioned rights and obligations, that is, social relations, 
which are always in process, and serve, amongst other things, to 
organise individuals as social systems of community participants, 
with the latter sometimes evolving into collective or corporate 
agents.554 
 
                                                 
554
 Tony Lawson, “Emergence and Social Causation” in John Greco and Ruth Groff (eds.), Powers and 
Capacities in Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 295. 
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If all social actors occupy mutually constituting positions within the social totality, 
then a new conception of the event, perhaps informed by complexity theory, should 
try to theorise how elements of novelty introduced into the system could have 
recursive effects on other parts of the system. What in effect is being proposed is 
that we try to further Althusser’s synchronic notions of social formation and change, 
but in a way that would allow for anticipatory practice in the pre-evental world. If 
we chose not to share the somewhat overwrought concern with authority indicative 
of existing notions of the event examined in this thesis, then we can adjust our 
theorising the event so that it would be able to take of advantage of knowledge of 
tendencies and patterns with the most productive political potential. To some 
extent, and as paradoxical as it might sound, events should be planned for. 
An image which also comes to mind, and which may prove to be useful, is 
Badiou’s notion of seeding the situation in order to produce new truths. In Cohen’s 
forcing procedure, seeding is the implantation of elements within a model in order 
to test their compatibility with it and to construct a generic set which conserves the 
features of an original model, but is deliberately adapted to new purposes. 
Construed as a metaphor for economic and social change, perhaps there is 
something to work with here. If the grand social revolutions of the modernist era 
appear to be over, and if macro-level change may now only be possible through the 
hegemonic capture of the radical wing of social democracy in a time of crisis, then 
maybe there is leverage in the idea of the event as a process of experimentally 
seeding changes at multiple sites within the system: that is, seeding an assemblage 
of dual-economic and dual-power positions throughout the system, elements that 
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can then interface with one another and be developed in an ongoing, contingent 
process of constructing a post-capitalist system. Imagine a game of Chinese Go555: 
involving logically but organically placing compatible elements within the system to 
gain territory piece by piece. This would not mean a reversion to the idea that one 
can carve out a space free from capitalism or exist within the interstices of the 
economic totality. For this notion rests on the metaphor of in/out, itself implying 
certain commitments about social structure and the reproduction of complex 
systems which may need to be jettisoned. If instead we need to conceive of the 
social, political and economic totality as a complex system composed of 
heterogeneous components and feedback loops, then old metaphors of in/out, 
quantity/quality, all relying on dialectical pairs, will lose their efficacy to think 
change. Our concept of the event will have to be one that can be interface with our 
conceptualisation of the real tendencies traversing the system – as in classical 
Hegelian-Marxism – but it cannot be based on Hegelian dialectical structures of 
thought. Rather, a new philosophy of the event will be one that can provide 
strategic direction on the basis of contemporary epistemological paradigms able to 
think complexity and emergence. Such ideas should still remain sensitive to 
contingency and novelty, yet they should also enable political organizations to 
prepare for events and, when they arrive, follow through on a plan to fundamentally 
reorganise the system to achieve lasting change. We await these theories’ creation.  
 
  
                                                 
555
 Credit to Tzuchien Tho for suggesting this metaphor. 
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